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~ . .. 
·;;The·thesis.e,xamines the.application -0£ Western :urban-industrial gtowth"pOle theo.ry . 
tt>·the frontier iones of the.developing countries .and. in particular~ to the Malaysian· 
· regians..c>f F.ahang Te.nggara and Kesedar. The study begins by· tracing the ·origins of the · 
grow.th-pole theory after the Second World War when the ·west urgently needed.to initiate : 
gro~th in the· developing world as a means .of countering Soviet expansion. In response 
tc>'this political imperative, economists· and geographers fonnulated concepts to guide 
growth across space - the :basic ingredients of growth pole theory; ·When the theory· was 
~pp.lied to the frontier regions of developing countries, various forms of resource frontier 
. straregies·emerged Jmder.the .sponsorship of the respective national governments. The 
. initial applications were in South America during the early 1960s. ·but the resource . 
frontier strategy has been .. a'lso incorporated as part of Malaysia's New Economic· Policy. 
since 1970·to bolster Malay .. ·urbanisation.and reduce regional disparity. Unlike South 
America, howevert the !propulsiv.e-force'·hinged .. upon oil palm and rubber. As these·: 
commodities· are stron~y rled·to the wo~ld market and relatively little·value-added is 
created within the producing regions, they serv.e the .interests of ·national metropolitan .. 
centres rather.than . .Jocal settlements. Consequently, littie:urbanisation has been-achieved .. ·! ,:.\'. 
. .:· .. ~ :: .. 
in ·the regions .. such as. Pahang ·Tenggara and Kes~dar. Assessed .·ag:afosr ·the twin .... ·: ..... :. ~ .. \\!'. :;.:· 
objecti~es of the New Economic Policy,.the two'froncier regions have.not bo.osted..Mai~; '. :'..·=, >·:· ;<::;';}~"~: 
. · urbanisation nor: reduced regional. inequality. to l'llY. significant extent. Nort.etheless, m~st· :·: ·).; .. <· .:·· .':>~~: ·:":: 
. . .. :..... :···· 
. ' .. . :.~. ..~:.:. .· .. ··settl~rs of the Federal Larid Development Authority.:have".imptoved·:tbeil'·:standards .of 
. : . 
livings ··since moving.· Yet, 'the benefits: have 'been:restric:ted .to .first .g~·nerati~~ ·.settlers ., "<'.:." · .... · < ..: ·.; .. :· 
.b~~a~e fe~ non7agricultuntl johs,'.have 'been.creaJ~:"\Vh~n :tiie~·~nt~t.'t~e Hibtjµr,rri·ittke~~·~,:· \ ·/ :~. "'.::· .... ·.· ::::..";'. 
. . . . .... ~. 
·most .youth. are ·:expected: .to move:to .trietro.poli:tart ·:centr'es for. jobs: .:·Hence,· ::.:'."·:· ." .: 
. indllstrialisation· in major. centt~s is tbf! .key,··.ni:thek'.'.a~so~·ticin ::a~tl: Mal~tsia·~·,~ut~~~ .... ~ :" :": ... . ··.::";:.··< ~ 
. . . . . . . . . . ·. .. . . ' . . ~ . ·. . . . . . 
:dev ..eJopment in the next iwenty·ye~:· .:. · · · · . . .. ·: .:· << .: ::.: .. ~": .: · .. ·, 
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INTRODUCTION 
. ~ ••. :social :development .has been continuously beginning· over 
·again ..on -the ·frontier. Tht.&--perenniai rebirth; 'this :fluidity of .•. 
life, mis expansion -~· with its new -o.ppo.nu:nitles, its ·continuous 
k1li<!h wi'th me ·si:m.plieity of primitiY.e society, 'furnish the forces 
of dominating {nanontl}-cllalactef (Frederick Turner, 1920:.2·3}. 
Th-e.~an frontie:r~ ro many people, was a vla.ce where cowboys and Indians 
'.fought·wroes thatep-facnnis-ed$e st:ruggle between 'civilisatiW'l' and•savageiy'. Yet, the. 
frontier also ~p-tured tile attention of n ~era.ti-on vf American· hisrorians and 
geographers (Turner. 192.0; il.owrnan. 1931) because it ·was :an area where new 
opportunities were open to lhe$e who could exploit th\! :relatively cersily -~ron.:re-sources. 
While the Ameriean ft.ontier of spoomnoous 'Settlers did not SUl'.vi"-"e :the l 930s, new 
frontiers emerged ~Isewhere, · 
After the Second W«ld Wflt • .newly-independeru ~tinnies captured the interest.Of 
.international economists and geographers. Through their rollective effons, ·they sought to 
transform new frontiers into regions of opporrunities with their growth theories. These· 
efforts were lleighte2led when Fried!nann recognised 'resomee frontiers~ as a k-ey element 
in a conceptual framework for regional. plaJ>ning in Venezuela. Subsequently., :these 
·•zon.es·.of new .settlements in which virgin territory is ocropred and made pr.qdattive1 
were incorporated in fonnal regional planning arr.aogements of .:many deve~ping' 
countties (Friedmann, '1966:42). Buoyed by Friedmann's theories, resource frontiers 
have evolved into a planned environment infused with. soc~~pol.iricai objectives. 
Increasingly. the state has acted as -the ·p.ri.Ine developer of the frontiers, ·replacing 
spontaJ)eoJ.)sly settled individuals as they normally did in the PflSt: 
,," 
In studying resource frontier Strategy, two key issues arise: -why study it; aht1 how 
Q 
does it fit into the broad developmeot·literatttre?These,questions have~ at the core of o 
post-war developmen:i studies. J.Jndenjably , .. resou,rce fi;Qrttiers 'ale '0rt inseparable pa.a cof 
0 
the pursuit oi modemjsation in a great number of developing countries .. Jbeir appearance 
I) 
.1 0 0 
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away from established zones or cities has ORly modified the fonn of that pursuit, but not 
its contents. In a different way, the resource frontier strategy represents a transplant of 
Western development theories to developing nations which lack indigenous concepts. In 
the process, as shown in most aid programs, the intermediaries have been the 
intemational aid agencies and their international or local consultants. 
As research on the application of theories needs empirical evidence to either justify 
the action of the state or serve as a basis for later readjustment, there is a need to 
investigate the cause and consequence of the implementation of theories. In Malaysia, 
there has been some research conducted on either administrative frameworks of resource 
frontier strategies or about socio-economic changes experienced by F.ELDA settlers. Yet, 
the examination of changes in the livelihood of settlers has not been conclusive. Nor has 
the response of settlers to the regional policy of rural urbanisation been tackled based on 
Lheir capacity to adapt to a new livelihood in accordance with .their income levels. This 
thesis aims to fill such a gap and its combines macro·level analysis of the national 
strategy of resource frontier development with micro-level descriptions of the lives of 
settlers. The interaction between super-imposed state objectives and the spontaneous 
response of settlers can, therefore, reflect the shortcomings of both public policies and 
iheir theoretical bases. To study such interaction, empirical details of settler livelihoods, 
based on household surveys in two frontier settlements- Bandar Tun Razak and Ciku -
are presented. Key research questions in relation to a broad regional development 
framework, however, form the backbone of the thesi.li. 
Research Questions 
The thesis raises the fundamental issue as to when, where, why and how the 
growth pole or growth centre concept1 was exported from the developed world for 
A distinction between gft>wth pole and growth centre must be made. The growth pole refers to 
existing or newly created urban centres where economic growth. theoretically speaking. hinges upon 
industry as the main propulsive force. It is sometimes also called a development pole. Conversely. 
'growth centre' has been used more flexibly since the 1960s . .It varies from a major city of national 
importanee (with services as the most prominent source of employment) to rural centres in the remote 
2 
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application in the remote frontiers of develeping countries. In providing an interpretive 
approach, we trace the origins of this concept and its being incorporated into resource 
frontier strategy, study how it was adaptively applied and, finally examine the 
consequences in Malaysia. The argument is structured into three parts and eight chapters. 
A series of key questions are raised and tackled throughout the study. 
Thesis Structure 
Key questions of Part I are: when and where did resource frontier strategies 
originate; and why were they applied in South America and Malaysia? Accordingly, it 
undertakes an examination of the evolution of resource frontier strategies from the search 
for growth theory immediately after the war to the application of the theory over space. 
Chapter 1 considers the concern of the West with the economic development of 
developing nations. Consequently, growth theories were formulated to lead the latter 
towards modernisation. Because of different backgrounds, these urban-based theories 
were adapted to suit the needs of developing countries which had a weak industrial base 
but were rich in natural re~ources. Hence, the resource frontier strategy was conceived in 
the early 1900s. 
Chapter 2 turns to the first application of the resource frontier strategy in South 
America, taking Brazil and Venezuela as case studies. Attentiod is focused on why they 
adapted the strategy differently. Because of the diversity in approa~h, settlers in Brazil's 
Amazonia and Venezuela's Guayana had a varied experience. A comparntive study is 
made on the application of the strategy in these two countries. 
Chapter 3 shifts from South America to Malaysia as the strategy further evolved 
across the developing world. Highlighting the complex post-war situation in Malaya, the 
political economy of the country is initially discussed. Social unrest and rural poverty 
eventually gave rise to a strongly cohesive ethnic-based political patty CU:nited Malays 
counuyside. In the latter case and most typically in the Third World, a rural growth' centre relies on 
agriculwre or small industry as the principal local employment source. ., '. 
3 
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National Organisation - UMNO). In search~f popular electoral support, the UMNO-led 
government, since 1970, used the resource frontier strategy to boost urbanisation as a 
means of creating a strong Malay middle class and reducing regional disparity. 
Consequently, a series of regional development authorities were established to facilitate 
the implementation of the strategy. 
With this background, we proceed to Part II by asking: how has the resource 
frontier strategy been applied in Malaysia under the New Economic Policy; what have 
been the results? Concentrating on the application of resource frontier strategy in 
Peninsular Malaysia, empirical evidence collected from the case studies of two frontier 
regions - Pahang Tenggara and Kesedar (South Kelantan) (Figure 0.1) is used. Chapter 
4 studies the actual practice of the strategy within a prescribed natipnal planning 
hierarchy. Attention is centred on the role of the regional planner in each region, 
including his relationship with the Ministry of Land and Regional Development and 
officials at settlement level for implementation.. A comparative study is undenaken, 
drawing identical and different features in the planner's conduct and duty performance. 
Field observations, interviews and investigation of government reports constitute the 
main component of the chapter. From the interviews, a clear picture about the 
implementation prxess of the resource frontier strategy was acquired. 
Chapters 5 and 6 are devoted to FELDA settlers who were the main actors of the 
Malaysian frontiers. The central theme is to enquire whether settlers have improved their 
living standards while undergoing livelihood changes and, how they adapt themselves to 
the new environment. Field investigations were conducted on two FELDA oil-palm 
based settlements: Bandar Tun Razak in Pfillang Tenggara and Ciku in Kesedar. They 
were at two diff ercnt stages of development and were chosen to provide a contrasted , 
picture of settlers' livelihood. Extensive travel and ~bservations were made in the course 
of data collection. Virtually all settlements within the two regions were visited and 
discussions with local residents were held. 
4 
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Figure 0.1: Regions of Study: Pahang Tenggara and Kesedar 
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Based on the field·'d~. Chapter 5 provides-an ov~ew.of changes in various economic· 
. . 
aspects:as .:experienced ~y .s.ettlers 'in .. Bandar .Tun'. :Razak and Cilru:· Indices of; ~ata 
encontpass. trtotiveB o-Lre.settlement, "Change i~ income levels, expe.nditure patterns, 
possessions· pf ;Consumer :durables, occupational structure and land size·. 1.n ending, the 
. . . . 
fragility '.of settl.ers' "in:tprov.ed· statidards--of living -is. :exam.ined· in· light Qf- the .marked 
fluctuari.on.:of .~otmnodity prices within-the ·current world ·exchange: system. · 
·Chapter 6 is"deV:oted to·.the"evolution:of social:env.ironment of settlers,:Initially, the 
perception of zhange is verified. against ·aspects like ·housing; local access to social 
facilities, marketing and educati..oll,- and regional access in ·terms of public transport. . 
From the mobility.of settlers, .. a.Jandscape·of.:ho~ and where settlers·n1eet .. their. daily 
. . 
needs is shaped. But this is ·not·complere.without examining·the.seco~d ·generation issue. 
Data for Chapters 5 and·6 are based on swvey methods undenaken in Bandar Tun· Raza.k 
and Ciku and were collected-in.the :following manner. 
Bandar 'tun Razak and ·Ciku differed substantia!ly iri .population size - Bandar Tun 
Razak had about 3,200. households \\,'hereas Ciku· (consisting of Ciku I and 2) had only 
720 households. Giv~n the high degree of homogeneity of settlers who ·have become oil 
palm work~rs after reseulement, it .was esteemed that .a 3 per cent sample size was 
adequate for the survey. Nonetheles·s, to make computation easier for a:comparative 
study, identical number of households was taken for the two schemes.·Consequently, 
one hundred househoids were surveyed in each settlement, with Ciku having a higher 
density of sample than Bandar Tun Razak. In selecting theJ1ous.eholds, the following 
features were considered to ensure a vaned background; . . 
(a) Place .. of origin, age and occµpation;0 
(b) Some women household heads, either widows or divorcees, the purpose being to 
examine how they handled the"tough' taskQQfoil palm harvesting, normally done 
by men; and 
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• (c) Non,;Mala,y settlers to reflect yiews.-expected ·to be different from:·Miilay ·:Settlers 
who made up ~most·98 per cent in Bandar Tun Razak: .Jn Ciku however, Malays: 
· constitu'ted 100 per cent 9f the settlers. · 
· · . Before starting the questionnaire .. sµ.tvey. a ·location map :of both selected 
settlements. showing house numbers ~ert studied against background info~atio~ ~f 
settlers obtained from the· FELD A office .. Based on selection .criteria, the chosen lip uses 
were:then marked on the maps. Assettlers·musr go'to the field during the harve.st·periods· 
(twice a month ·and three. to five days each. .. time ).- appointments were =made with those 
who were bound· by. this ·Obligatiou. Thus, interviews were .held at night .where 
ne¢essary. Most settlers .received their"principal income· from <>U .palm yields:· Hence, 
reliable·data on.the main source.of income were able to be.collect.ed as they were tak<?il : 
directly from.local FELDA'office records: Income from secondary occupation-an.a that of 
the children, however, ·had to· be dependent upon oral ·responses:· Before I~a':'ing the. · · 
study areflt data .considered unreliable were· either rechecked with' the interviewees or with 
their neighbours. :this often brought. mor~ · satisfact~ry results. Interviews with 
· household.heads. w~re· conducted a~ home. 'Details: of the questionnaire surYey are gi~~ .· 
in Appendix 0.1. 
Throughout the fieldwork between early of October .1987 and·~nd of March 1988, 
interviews with\govemment planners and administration officials in Kuala Lumpur and \ . . . 
local state office~;were also conducteci· Other observations eonceming local commercial -
activities &ld settlers' livelihood were·also made. 
This leads us to a subsequei:it assessment .of the consequences. of the res.·::mrce 
. . . 
frontier: strategy in Part Ill where our focus is turned _to artsweri11g: what lessons' can be· 
drawn from the Malaysian experience; what are the other alternatives for the next twency 
. . 
years? Attention is concentrated on evaluating the results.of applying the resource frontier 
strategy in Pahang Tenggara and Kesedar between 1970 and 1985 against the prime 
objectives of the New Economic Policy. In light ·of the lessons, further discussion of 
,. . 
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development alrematives is undenaken. Basically. assessment criteria in Chapter 7 are 
. . 
based on rar_gets ser by-the Master Plans and the achievement made in terms· of the pace of 
population growth. industrial develop~ent and· redocritm. in regiona) disparity. 
Subsequently,. it .proceeds to-.question the sustainability of settlers' improved living 
·standards an.d1heparadoxica1 second generation.problem as to theii'furure opponunities 
in· the frontier settlements. Using_ the world exchange system as an interpretive 
·framework,. ·the .failure of rural urbanisation strategy is illustrated. The planner's limited 
role in inflnencing -the-results of the resource frontier strategy is also examined . 
· Chapter·8 discusses three alternatives to resource frontier strategy in a full spectrum 
{)f op1ions: agiopolitan strategy (closed economy), integrated regional development 
strategy and industrialisation (open economy). Attention is f\A:used on each alternative's 
capacity .in retaining the second generation youth in Pahang Tenggara and Kesedar . 
Consideration is. however, given to both technical and political compatibility· to the 
:-Malay.sian:teality.'Finally,' a people-oriented industrialisation is advanced so as to meet 
the empk>y.ment demand of the fast growing population in the next twenty years 
·compatible to Malaysia's current.political,:economic and social s011eh.rre. Such impact on 
regional development and the fronti.er areas calls for furure research . 
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PART I 
RESOURCE FRONTIER STRATEGIES IN FOCUS 
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'CHAPTER 1 
·· ORIGINS OF ·RESOURCE FRONTIER. STRATEGIES 
Theorie's. are often shaped·by historical events. How they evolve is determined· by 
societies'. needs and efforts to adapt them. This certainly holds· true for them1es of 
development. This thesis ·focuses on. one aspect of development theory - resource 
frontier strategies. It demonstrates how theories have evolved. been applied and 
modified, and how they can be reassessed in the. light of the Malaysian experience. 
An investigation of the resource frontier as part of national development strategy 
raises key issues: where and how have the ~deas .on resource frontier development 
originated? As the resource frontier strategy has stemmed from urban,-industrial growth 
theory of the developed. nations, we also need to ask: how has the theory evolved to give 
birth to resource frontier strategies in rural areas of the developing world? 
In tackling these two issues,. we f<;>cus on the international arena after the Second 
World War where a complex politica(situation called for centrally-planned growth-
oriented theories (Section 1). In cliscussi'ng.these neo-classical concepts, we tefer to ideas 
of modernisation and the spatial diffusion of growth - two recipes adopted .by developing 
nations for 'westernising' their societies (Section 2). Simultaneously, the rudiments of 
regional development theories also emerged in response to the need to link economic 
growth with geographical space. Consequently, the works of· Perroux, Myrdal, 
Hirschman and Boudeville are .discussed, outlining the positive and negative effects of 
growth in space. Then. an empirical application of these theories in France is discussed 
(Section 3). Finally, attention is focused on how and why an originally urban-industrial 
theory has been extended to the rural environment of developing countries (Section 4). 
As the argument is comple~, its structure is outlined in Figure l. l. 
10 
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1. DEMAND' FOR GROW'tH-ORi£NTED DEVELOPMENT 
Before the outbreak of the Second World War, th~ fruits of capitnlist developmerit 
were mainly restricted to core nations in Western Europe, North America and Japan. 
Generally, ordinary citizens in these areas, if not all classes in s~ciety, were able to 
improve their standards of living, as a result of the rise in productive capacity of workers • 
(accompanied by their social movements), and technical innovation~ in agriculture, 
industry and commercial undertakings. In contrast, the colonised or other 
underdeveloped parts of the world were 'peripheralised~ as mainly producers of primary 
products subordinated to the core capitalist countries. After 1945, this general image took 
a sharp turn with the emergence of a new balance of power. This section examines 
briefly how this new international situation foi-ced the core capitalist nations to expand the 
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·technological ':fruits of .modernisation, .ence.: con~idered their monopoly. to the 
underdeveloped world. As:wi~essed later, ·the introduction ·of.modem development 
:theories· to the underdeveloped world:l"ias assisted: the latter to adopt .a series. of Western 
standards. ofmaterial demands a,nd activitics;-.Consequently, such introduction has· also 
served· to expand the market interests of the core·-nations. 
The .. International Political Scene ·During.the Immediate Post-War Period 
The year 1945-saw-.the·end of a disastrous global conflict. Subs~quently, two 
important .consequenc:es shaped the post-war era. First, the world was divided into two 
main antagonistic political blocs: the East and the West. Second, the 'awakening effects' 
of the war created new. nations, and released one after the.other from the former. colonial 
powers. Immediately after the war, the old colonial powers in Western Europe were 
preoccupied with their reconstruction.tasks. The United States of America, however, 
emerged from the war strengthened and assumed a greater international role. A new non-
territorial h~gemony began to take shape. 
Under the United Nations. there was an urgent task 'to help repair the ravages of 
war, to promote the development of·underdeveloped countries, and to stimulate 
production, investment and trade .:. to foster conditions of full employment and steadily 
rising standards of living' (Asher~ 1957:371). While Western Europe and Japan 
reeovered steadily, the economic p.ro,gress in underdeveloped nations was insignificant. 
This latter aroused great concern in the Western bloc which was worried about the 
expansion of Soviet influence. It was, therefore, the vital interest of the United States to 
. ' 
,' 
take actic=-t in underdeveloped 'areas now stirring with social 'Unrest and resentment of 
their impoverished material state:. .. [She] cannot stand idly by and w~tness the 
recruitment of the populous countries of Asia and perhaps even of Africa· and Latin 
America to Communism" (Buchanan and Ellis, 1955:429). Thus, providing aid to boost , , 
econontlc development in the underdeveloped world to alleviate conditions of poverty 
and unemployment was seen as a priority for-Q,evelopment (Hayes, 1971:3-5). 
;. <'•" 
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Cle~ly, an orderly progress to social and political stability cannot be assured 
without a reasonable rate of economic growth, and a systematic economic management 
for growth became a prerequisite. In response to this imperative, a report released by the 
United Nations (1951:13-15) pinpointed.a few preconditions which were stroµgiy related 
to the market value of production (Friedmann and Weaver; 1979: 109) .. They included:· (a) 
the desire for material progress and social prestige; (b) the will to overcome Jtature and to 
adopt modem technology and educational systems; (c) the res~ct for private property_ by 
the national government which should also improve its legal stipulatiomi~·:~d (d)a Il10re 
individualistic outlook to discourage large family ties·that tend to obstruct .individual 
achievements. Self-interest was seen as an important criterion of economic .success and 
was to be assumed by the 'creative entrepreneurs'. Further, the report continued 
optimistically to suggest that 'given leadership and the public will to advance, all 
problems of ecqnomic development are soluble' (United Nations, 1951: 16). Basicaily, 
the report hoped that the ··widespread problem of persistent unemployment and 
underemployment could be relieved through . the transformation of subsistence 
agriculture, then predominant in the Third World. Two of the five experts appointed to 
prepare the report were Arthur Lewis and Theodore Schultz .. Their thinking had a great 
impact on the development of neo-classical economic growth models . 
.... . ~ : 
Economic Growth Theory 
MOdern theories of economic development took root in the climate of post-war 
reconstruction where concepts of 'development' were mainly taken as being identical to 
economic growth. Some leading contemporary econoll)ists argued that economic growth 
would also lead to universal equilibrium when lagging nations caught up with the more 
advanced nations. According to ·:P~ul Samuelson (1947) and Theodore Schultz (1950), 
the redisoibution of resources,bel'Ween nations could best be achieved by the free flow of 
IJ 0 () 
factors of production and goods and services between them (that is, the market 
mechanism underlying neo-classical economic theory). Neo-classical economists 
believed in free trade and argued that exports historically had generated a considerable 
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amount 1of economic growth. By imegrati~ the free flow of factors of produ'cuon and 
exponable commodities into:the sphere of·free trade, they asserted that developing 
nations could shorten the .process of 'catching up'. By ex·rending David Ricardo's 
original idea on the theory of c<;>mpar.ative cost advantllge, it followed that· a country 
should specialise in the prod'Uction .and exports .of commodities which they could produce 
cheaply (Buchanan andEllis, 1955; Clark, 1951; Rostow, 1953). Free trade, the theory 
continued~ 
'would raise the participatory country's level of welfare [and] 
lead to a factor price equalization between the countries. Wage 
differences between the developed and the less developed, for 
example, would be released, which, in turn, would lead to a 
more equal international distributiofl'of income, ... trade would 
transfer both technical and administrative know-how to countries 
. that needed it ... [and an] indirect advantage from trade was that 
it promoted free competition. Increased competition was to raise 
efficiency and lead .to faster growth' (Blomstrom and Hettne, 
1984:15-16). ' 
Thus, in a simplistic way, the theory pl~ced de~eloped and underdeveloped countries on 
an equal footing~in a competitive world market system. 
According to Nurkse (1953), free trade also enhanced the real demand for goods 
produced in poorer countries because of th~ir limited domestic market size. The 
expansion of market size, he went on, would encourage inx.estment in capital goods 
which, in tum, would increase the productivity of the labour force and, consequently~ the 
' 
latter's real. income. To acquire initial capital, Nurkse recommended that foreign capital 
was necessary to brealcthe' 'Vicious cycle' of pt)verty before any substantial domestic 
0 
savings could be attained. Thus, this requirement 'is the redeeming force that has to be 
invoked tO break the circle on the supply side of capital formation in low-income 
countries' (1953:57). Once this take-off was underway, many economists believed that 
domestic savings could establish a strong base for capital formation - the most 
spectacular presentation was indicated in the Harrod-Domar model1 of the 1950s. Based 
The model studies the relationship of savings, investment and income. From this relationship, the 
long tenn economic growth of a national economy is projected. The basic equation of the model is IO 
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on Keynes's model of national ~n~me .. 4eI«Inination, this"1llodcl has gaa ;idespread 
influence m· the economic policy £ormul;;ttions of developiryr'narions, particularly in 
proje.ecing the rate of aggregate growth highlighted by Rostow (1960). 
Alongside, the emphasis on free trade, .capital formation and breaking of cultural 
impediments, Rostow proceeded to the heart ofthe~ve1oprtiem issu~ how long would a 
developing nation take to achieve and sustain ta.lee-off? This was the most pressing 
question being considered ·by the anxious leaders of -!he developing and often newly-
independent countries as a ~long' take-off would imply a 'bad' model for them to follow. 
In elaborating his theory, Restow (1960) suggested a generation (or fifteen years) for 
take-off provided that the 'inner determinants of growth' were present. These 
determinants were based on: 
(a) The rate of productive investment rising from about five per cent of national 
income to over ten percent; 
(b) One or more substantial manufacturing sectors emerging to become 'leading 
sectors' in growth; and 
(c) The political, social and institutional framework of the country being modified to 
exploit the impuls~ in the modem seQjor and the potential ~xtemal economy, and 
th'as giving growth an ongoing character (Rostow, 1960:164). 
The role of manufacturing and tbe external economy, as Rostow pointed out, has 
had strong urban-industrial implications. Industry was given a critical role. Funher, the 
neo-classical school was attracted especially to the principle of profit maximisat~on. 
Developing countries were urged to make minimum use of investment funds for highest 
profit levels in the light of their limited national income, expon demand, labour supply 
and available foreign exchange (Chenecy, 1955:452). Income inequality was give.n little 
consideration because 'if only growth could be sustained, distribution measures might be 
determine the growth rate (G), in relation to lhe propensity to save (S) and lhe capital-output ratio (V) 
in the form as G=SN. 
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rendered all superfluous. Growth could becgme a substitute for distribution' (Friedmann 
and Weaver, 1979:89). Anhur Lewis (1955:428) argued that the generation of this 
economic growth might even have to depend on inequality of income because 
·r~asonable' differentials in the forms of salaries and profits were objectively necessary 
to serve the required skills or initiatives. Clearly, growth itself cannot be motivated in 
good order without a regulatory agenL This role is assumed by the state as recommended 
initially hy K~ynes in the 1930s. 
The Keynesian Approach 
Reflecting his macro-economic orientation, Keynes's greatest impact has been his 
strong emphasis on government intervention in handling social crises provoked by an 
economic depression. For Keynes, the level of saving and investment had to be increased 
through stimulation in demand and growth by the government. Economic growth was 
best achieved by providing public overhead capital in social and physical infrastructure to 
facilitate private productive activities. 
The imponance of these economic growth concepts, for the evolution of regional 
development theory was that: (a) they explicitly recognised inequalities in economic well-
being (although among nations not regions) and; (b) they prescribed a series of policies, 
or 'development paths', which underdeveloped nations could follow. With economic 
growth theory so heavily focused on capital formation, invesnnent and urban-industrial 
growth, early regional development theory, not surprisingly, stressed the economics of 
industrial location and comparative cost advantage. Also, indigenous political elites were 
emerging in newly independent states; they were vinually all committed to some sort of 
national development. Consequently, the Keynesian interventionist approach was 
combined with growth theory by many developing country governments to sponsor land 
development projects in order to increase aggregate demand and thereby, raise the level 
of economic activity and reduce unemployment. The expansion of manufacturing was 
seen as the most potent force in regional economic growth. Before examining how the 
growth-oriented theories· were translated into state-sponsored regional development 
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programs, we need to look closely at the 'cam.lyric agents' - modernisation theory and the 
spatial diffusion of growth. 
2. MODERNISATION THEORY AND SPATIAL DIF'FUSION OF 
GROWTH 
Paralleling the close linkage between neo-classical growth theory and r~gional 
development theory, was the influence of modernisation theory on geographical studies 
of developing countries. This 'geography of modernisation' approach placed a sharper 
emphasis on the space economy of Third World countries. 
Modernisation Theory 
Since the Second World War, modernisation theory has been seen as a: form of 
social transformation into a new way of life - the end product being characterised by 
urban-industrial advancement. Tradition and modernity are regarded as two opposing 
forces (Brookfield, 1975; Forbes, 1984; Griffin, 1969; Myint, 1954; Rimmer and 
\ 
Forbes, 1982). Underpinned by the Western experience of capital formation and a purely. 
economic-based theory of growth, the modernisation paradigm has become a 
multidisciplinary complex theory of temporal development. In this theory, development 
is seen as an evoll!tionary process in which less developed countries would gradually 
'catch up' with the industrialised world, by means of an imitative process. 
Modernisation, however, is a prolonged process where old values are replaced by the 
new. The task of modernisation is to replace 'backwardne.ss' .and subsistence with new 
demand and consumption patterns. To make the imitation process successful, it was 
believed that developing countries had to take strong initiatives to discard their 
'backwardness'. Internal factors - conservatism, poor infrastructure, old social and 
cultural institutions and values - were seen as the main causes of a lack of development. 
Economic 'backwardness' of a society has been interpreted by Myint ( 1954: 150) as 
a lack of response of its memb.ers to monetary incentives. Once this barrier is broken, 
'traditional' societies subject to influence from the 'modern' world will undergc a set of 
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changes towards becoming an industriaL~ociety in their own right. It follows that 
underdeveloped nations having engaged themselves in such changes are presumed to 
have the capacity to disengage from thdr 'backward' and 'traditional' features, 
considered to be 'barriers' to modem economic development. Through modernisation 
theory, th.erefore, 'progress' towards a more advanced society was supposed to be 
transmitted to the developing world not only over time but through space. 
Spatial Diffusion of. Modernisation 
Based on the stages .of growth, modernisation is thought to involve ~ spatial 
process of diffusion, activated by expansionary forces through an urban hierarchy arid a 
system of communications. Accordingly, main cities are placed on the top of the 
hierarchy and play a fundamental role in inducing the underdeveloped world to accept 
economic growth (Hoselitz, 1953). They can break the obstacles of :traditionalism otthe 
social values'. Cities, Hoselitz (1953:197) further suggested, 'are the main force and the 
chief locus for t~e introduction of new ideas and new ways of doing things'. Moreover, 
the role of th~r communication system was reflected in the study of 'mo~(;rn.isation 
surfaces' which flowed through corridors - linear geographic paths linking' industrial 
centres (Pottier, 1963 in Richardson, 1973). 
Having discussea how growth impulses are spread, another conundrum was the· 
incompatibility between1 admodem' urban sector and the 'traditional' rurai sector. As an 
economic powth theorist, ArthY?.':Le~is (1954) developed a dualistic model which 
bridged th~ gap between traditional and modem sectors when he studied this relationship. 
' 
He highlighted how urban-industrial activities could modernise the traditional sector by a 
~u "Q 
diffusion rnechanism. Several assumptions were made by Lewis in,,projecting such a 
p~ess. The main ones7Were stat&i as: (a) agricultural production was a stagnant one and 
· · · · -...,,J~t a subsistence level; (b) there was 'suriJlus' labour and 'disguised' unemployment; and 
"···1"""'""--..._ ,,) 
under these conditions, (c) capjtal accugiulation would not occur. Once 'surplus' labour 
i~ l:trans'ferred to the urban sector, the tradidonal sector would be 'forced' to change 
because pf' {abour scarcity. Foll~wing urban-industrial expansion, which required an 
~/ n B 
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increased labour force. the price of food-would be raised. This would create price 
incentives in the agricultural sector and encourage the improvement of fanning methods. 
Food products would be commercialised in an efficient manner to meet urban demand. 
As a result of these benefits from the urban area. the c~pitalisation of the rural sector 
r,woul.d be achieved and the national 'average wage 1evel would be enhanced when 
'surplus' labour was finally exhaust~. At this stage. the national aggregate economy 
would also be raised to a higher level. 
Drawing upon modernisation theory and Lewis's dualistic model. many 
geographers began to study the spatial diffusion of growth impulses. In their 
formulations, the city was seen as the main agent of change. From the city centre, growth 
impulses were diffused outwards, with its intensity declining proponionally as one 
moved further away from the core. In the early 1960s, Peter Gould (see Brookfield, 
1975: 111) first used the term 'modernisation surface' to describe the evolution of the 
urban and transpon system in Ghana Following Gould, Soja (in.Kenya 1968), Riddell 
(in Sierra Leone 1970), and Leinbach (in Malaysia 1972), conducted similar studies. All 
of these studies highlighted that the urban centres developed during the colonial period 
cacted as 'islands of modernity' and centres of diffusion of modernisation. In particular, 
Rjddell (1970:45; 47-48) has noted that: 
'Modernization is a spatial-diffusion process ... Its origins are 
localized to specific regions or zones, indexing a contact 
situation, and the patterns of change move like waves across the 
map, and cascade down the urban hierarchy as they are funnelled 
along the transportation system ... While the growth of the 
transportation system is part of the modernization process, it is 
also much more. The spteading network of rail and roads 
continually redefines the sp~tial fabric of the country'. 
Thus, the influence of diffusion of tl)6dernisation was clear. 
Regional development planping in the Third World during the 1960s and early 
I 
1970s was influenced by these thbories of growth and modernisation. Consequently, it 
•, 
relied heavily on the urban-indushial approach to project regional planning objectives. 
r, 
~ranspon and communication ne~works connecting regional or rural hinterlands with the 
·. 
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primate city were stressed. Gradually, tiaclitional ~actors in the rux:aI sector have given 
way to modern, usually foreign-imposed factors. Modernisation theory and diffusion 
theories, however, have not been precise about 'where' this diffusion should take place 
and 'how' the linkages occur in the process, although cities are broadly mentioned as 
centres from which impulses diffuse. The geography of modernisation was basically a 
description of concept rather than a theory of process. To provide an explanation of 
process and to formulate measures to promote the spread,, of economic growth over 
space, we turn back to earlier theories of location and regional growth. 
3. SPACE-RELATED REGIONAL GROWTH THEORIES 
B~fore 1945, there was relatively little academic or government interest in regional 
development in the colonial world. Most of the efforts of economists, in particular, had 
been concentrated on international issues, such as trade and imperialism, or national 
problems, like unemployment and slow economic growth. In the United States, the 
Tennessee Valley Authority, commenced in 1933 as part of Roosevelt's 'New Deal', 
served as the first comprehensive river basin planning authority. Initially, the Authority's 
involvement included flood control, navigation, dam construction for electric power, 
revitalisation of fertiliser plants and reforestation. Later, it started new town construction 
and promoted urban-industrial development when ample power supplies became 
available. Though its administrative network was taken up later as a model, its concept of 
development per se had not been underpinned by theories Indicating how growth 
occurred over space. The focus of modem regional developmt:nt theories was equally 
centred on spatial problems of Western nations. As even within more advanced nations, 
modernisation was not evenly spread, there were pockets of 'b.ackward' agricultural and 
mining regions. Hence, this section examines how the need to develop backward 
locations led to Perroux's (1950) non-spatial concept being transformed into modem 
regional growth theory focused on the city and its hinterland. 
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Perroux and Growth Pole Theory 
A strong interest in uneven development resulted in the emergence of F:ran~ois 
Perroux as one of the leading post-war authors on economic growth. In 1950, he defined 
'economic space' as an 'abstract space' in which human beings and objects as materials 
find. themselves contained. Within this abstract space, there is a field of forces consisting 
of centres (or poles or foci) 'from which centrifugal forces emanate and to which 
centripetal forces are attracted. Each centre, being a pole of attraction and repulsion, has 
its proper field which is set in the fields of other centres' (Perroux, 1950:27). These 
'centres of forces' were later developed into the 'propulsive forces' (forces motrices) of 
key industries or firms which have multiple linkage effects. As Perroux noted, the 
linkages were geographically dispersed, depending on the prices and costs of inputs and 
outputs of the key industries. As the factors affecting the prices and costs were not 
controllable by the economic plan of the industries, they, as .he believed, were capable of 
expanding and declining over time. When expanding, however, it enhanced the national 
growth as a whole. 
Subsequently, Perroux's non-spatial concept of economic forces evolved closer to 
reality. In 1955, he argued that a growing 'propulsive unit' tended to be geographically 
concentrated and its activities intensified. This concentration necessarily brought external 
: .. . ' .. . .. . . ..... - ~ .. '·' ,, .... · .. ·· ... ,, .... ·-··· ......... , . ,, 
economies and high division of labour into a network of 'collective needs' (Perroux, 
1955:185). The propulsive industry or 6Toups of industries were characterised by their 
modernity in three specific ways: 
(a) Strong concentration of capital under one single management; 
(b) Technical division of labour and mechanisation; and 
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(c) A higher rate of growth in productiOH as compared to the average national rate of 
industrial growth, during a specified rime period (Perro.ux, 1964:180)2• 
Such capital-intensive and technically sophisticated plants, according to Perroux, 
would generate effects of regional disparity. As outlined by Perroux (1955:185), an 
industrial plant which was: 
'geographically concentrated, modifies its immediate 
geographical environment, and if it is powerful, the entire 
structure of the national economy in which it is situated. Being a 
centre of accumulation and concentration of human and capital 
resources itself, it gives birth to other centres of accumulation 
and concentration of resources'. 
This statement of Perroux raised, for the first time, the direct relationship between a 
dominant core and its hinterland. 
Indeed, Perroux's spatial linkage concept has had two separate influences on 
economic growth studies. Firstly, the interrelationship between the geographically 
concentrated industry and the immediate environment has had strong policy implications 
in the implementation of future regional projects. (This relationship was later interpreted 
as a city or growth centre attd its hinterland). Secondly, based on his idea that centres 
were induced by an initial strong centre, Friedmann (1966) used the centre/perirt~.ry 
relationship to develop the concept of interdependent core regions, Before 1,;xamining 
Friedmann's works of the 1960s, however, we proceed to discuss Gunnar Myrdal and 
Alben Hirschman whose ideas have amplified Perroux's ideas in an underdeveloped 
context 
Gunnar Myrdal and Albert Hirschman 
By borrowing Perroux's (1964: 187) abstract notion of 'entrafnement de 
croissance' (literally growth induction) and interpreting it as 'spread effects'; Myrdal 
(1957) went a step further by also clarifying the negative effects of growth - the 
2 Perroux's l955 paper: :Note on the Growth Pole' was compiled into Chapter 2 of his book published 
in 1964 entitled L' Econ<>mie du XXeme Siecle'. See References. 
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'backwash effects'. Myrdal's focus of study, however, was on the flow of capital, 
labour and resources in relation to the free play of market forces. Market,forces, he 
argued, increase the inequalities between regions and, therefore, widen disparities in 
regional per capita income. Because of agglomeration advantages enjoyed by a 
prosperous region, market forces increase the economic return for activities in cenain 
geographical areas and this leads to further expansion. Conversely, a lagging region 
suffers_ from loss of labour, capital, goods and services to a prosperous region. A 
prosperous region has two kinds of effects on a lagging region: spread effects and 
backwash effects. A lagging region, according to Myrdal, always receives fewer spread 
effects and more backwash effects. Such effects of cumulative causation, as he called it, 
give rise to polarisation. 
Polarisation. as seen by Myrdal, was more of a global concept, differentiating 
between a coexisting developed a·nd underdeveloped world. In the developed world, 
skilled labour and investment capital was abundant .and the technological innovations 
advanced rapidly. In the underdeveloped world, capital formation and investment capital 
were relatively small. Little progress had been made. The overall economic inequalities as 
observed between these two worlds had been increasing (Myrdal, 1957:4-6). Free trade 
was to the disadvantage of poor regions whose industrialisation efforts were also being 
distorted. Myrdal, however, did not believe in stable equilibrium between spread effects 
and backwash effects. Any centre of development might either experience cumulative 
forces to expand upwards or lose control and decline d9wnwards. He thought the 
capitalist tendency of increasing inequality might be checked by government intervention. 
MY.J"Cfal's work was paralleled a year later by Hirschman (1958). The latter believed 
growth was necessarily unbalanced and he supported the concept of growth poles which 
would promote development through a 'chain of disequilibria'. Profit realisation was 
promoted by this 'chain' through industrial capital, inducing consequently new 
investment in other industries and cheir expansion (Hirschman, 1958:66). He classified 
the developing region and the lagging region as 'north' and 'south' respectively. The 
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terms of trade were set against the 'south' where income elasticity of demand was iow. 
The expanding 'nonh' would receive skilled· labour, and capital from the 'south'. The 
'south', however, benefited by the purchases from the 'north', and by the increase in its 
marginal productivity of labour through out-migration of its 'surplus' labour., This 
brought about an increase in per capita consumption levels of the 'south'. Hirschman's 
main idea on the capacity of the growth pole hinged on the fact that cumulative 
concentration of growth in a pole with agglomeration advantages would initially increase 
regional economic disparities. In the iong run, however, the agglomeration diseconomies 
and the spatial trickling-down effects generated from the pole itself would reduce the 
disparities. Like Myrdal, if the reduction of regional disparities took too long to realise, 
he saw that the state would counteract the polarising market forces by using its 
'equilibrating mechanism' - a combination of nee-classical and Keynesian approaches. 
State intervention to redistribute inves~ent resources was a strong component of 
Hirschman's unbalanced growth strategy by which he hoped to achieve a 'forced' inter-
regional transmission of growth. Basically, Hirschman's strategy implied that an urban-
industrial growth pole would be the best way to achieve national growth, applicable at 
regional and rural levels, although no mention had been made how that would actually 
occur. This became clearer in the early 1960s when Perroux's assumption was put to test 
by Boudeville in both developed and developing countries. 
B()udeville - Applying the Growth Pole Concept in the Centre 
Boudeville (1965; 1966) confirmed the Perrouxian concept of economic space by 
providing it with a spatial linkage at a regional level. He gave .f>erroux's abstract 
'economic space' a more concrete meaning as ~aving common economic structure and 
characteristics represented by economic variables at macro-economic level (Boudeville, 
1966:2-11). For practical planning purposes, Boudeville turned this 'economic space' 
into a 'continuous and localised' region, a region which could be systematically 
programmed or planned. Consequ~ntly, the growtfi pole with one or more key firms was 
convened to an urban growth centre surrounded by its regional hinterland. If the centre's 
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industry was propulsive and the growth induced was contafoed within its hinterland, 
growth.effects would be felt within ~he whole region concerned (Gore, 1984:94). Like 
Hirschman (1958) who criticised balanced growth, Boudeville argued that all growth 
was necessarily polarized. In his 'operational planning model' used for French regional 
planning (amenagement du territoire) in the early 1960s, Boudeville presented strategies 
indicating the ways growth might be promoted in the twenty-six 'critical zones'. The 
government's role, as he recommended, would be to cany out policies assuring the 
'greatest possible efficiency of the development.of growth poles through the mechanism 
of their propulsive industries' (1966:112). We now examine briefly how this growth 
pole concept was applied in an advanced nation - France. 
Growth Poles and Decentralisation in France 
In the developed world, the concept of growth pole was incorporated into a 
decentralisation policy of France in the early 1960s. Earlier in 1955, in order to relieve a 
highly centralised industry and bureaucracy in the Paris Region, a series of decrees had 
been passed to encourage the location and expansion of industrial and commercial 
enterprises·outside the region (Hansen, 1968: Chapter 3). There had been, however, little 
positive result as most new and extended enterprises were found later to be less than 15 
kilometres away from the centre. A mere industrial peripheralisation, indeed, had been 
observed. 
By the early 1960s, the growth pole concept was again incorporated into France's 
Fourth Plan (1962-65) to promote decentralisation and to counterbalance the dominant 
effects of the Paris Region. Considering that the polarisation at the Paris Region was 
bringing more harm than good, the whole concept adopted a conventional approach by 
classifying cities in an hierarchical order, in accordance with their size, functions and 
relationship to the transport network. Consequently, outside the Paris Region, the rest of 
France was subdivided into eight potential growth poles (metropoles regionqles), selected 
on the basis of their 'zone of influence' and on the assumption that their wide range of 
activities were able to compete with Paris. To facilitate their growth in that direction, the 
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poles were 'given priority in the provision-of equipment characteristic of the superior 
level (culture, research, higher education, hospital eq~ipment, administration, transpon, 
etc)' (Hansen, 1968:235). The favour accorded to these poles faced, however, some 
opposition. The counter argument suggested that, in future, these poles might drain their 
surrounding regions and become overcongested themselves. Further, as pointed out 
elsewhere, the post-war urban dynamism rested with small cities which had experienced 
the greatest growth in France. It was, therefore, more justifiable in tenns of opportunity 
costs to help develop small cities rather than selected poles. Sharp differences in view 
between top politicians and a lack of a general consensus gradually led to the loss of 
favour of the growth pole concept in France. When Georges Pompidou/ succeeded 
Charles de Gaulle as president of France in 1968, the concept, though remaining part of 
the national d~velopment agenda, was no longer raised as a guiding principle. The 
French experience has provided an und1~rstanding that development concepts have to be 
examined very closely against the socio-economic profile of the host country. Often, their 
application and continued use at official levels can be highly politicised and, sometimes 
" very dependent upon the outcome of great debates. With this background, we. now 
discuss the transplanting of an urban-industrial growth concept from the more advanced 
world to the rural Third World·where national growth has been a principal objective. 
4. FROM URBAN-INDUSTRIAL TO RURAL AGRICULTURAL 
GROWTH 
By mid-1960s, the idea of spatial growth had reached a crucial stage. 
Modernisation theory was widely believed by both aid-donors and aid receiving 
developing countries as being able to transmit growth impulses. They could be 
transmitted: (a) vertically from advanced nations to the underdeveloped nations through 
social, political and institutional adaptations; and (b) horizontally over geographical sp~e 
(Figure 1.2). 
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Figure 1.2 
Vertical Diffusion and Horizontal 
Spatial Spread Effects 
Urban-Inmusuial Growth 
...... ~~Pole Theory (Diffusable 
Capital, Skills and 
Technological Innovations) 
Traditional Economic 
Patterns (Receiving 
Beneficial Effects) 
The neo-classical regional theories, hcwever, funher evolved in a different fonn to 
suit conditions in die Third World because regional development and its related growth 
must be regarded as the results of an adaptive investment process (Friedmann, 1966:61). 
Drawing upon the theoretical framework of Hirschman's 'nonh' and 'south' and using 
the idea from Perloff and Wingo's (1961), Friedmann (1966) came up with a 'core' and 
'periphery' concept and applied it in South America. 
0 
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Interdependent Core Regions - John _.Friedmann and Rural Frontiers 
Like other neo-classical theorists in the early 1960s, John Friedmann (1966; 1969) 
initially had the same conviction that unevenly developed regions would ulrimately 
converge towards equilibrium after several stages of development. Core regions, he 
argued, would generate and transmit growth impulses to other pans of the space 
economy. Although, as stated by Myrdal and Hirschman, a centre-periphery structure 
would drain the hinterlands of their resources, manpower and capital, Friedmann 
presumed that interregional imbalance was essential for a 'take off. Only after a nation 
had acquired successful industrial development could a system of interdependent core 
regions be established through active state intervemion. When a final network of 
interdependent core regions was achieved, commodity flows and factor markets would 
be efficiently executed (Friedmann, 1966:54 ). When full integration of the space 
economy was achieved in the form of a set of interdependent urban core regions over the 
whole national territory, there would be a 'spatial equilibrium' (see Figure 1.3). Within 
each urban core region, however, the dominating role of the urban core over its 
hinterland was maintained. On this point, Friedmann (1966:51) asserted that there was 'a 
complete spatial system ... integrated through a pattern of authority-dependency relations 
that is focused on the dominant core region'. The status of dependency was imposed by 
established institutions in the core over those in the periphery. Conceived on a purely 
economic footing, this view of Friedmann corresponds closely to the Perrouxian growth 
pole concept charaeterised by the effects of dominance. 
Figure 1.3 
A Functionally Interdependent System of Cities 
~: Friedmann, 1.9Ci6 
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Friedmann's 'spatial equilibrium' of interdependent urban core regions, therefore, 
fined closely into a comprehensive theoretical framework. This concept wa.s incorporated 
into development programs undertaken by international aid agencies in which Friedmann 
played a very imponant role. Indeed, Friedmann was the first to test his idea in 
Venezuela, a developing nation expected to move towards ~e 'take off stage of a 
Rostovian development path. But why has an urban-indusni.al theoretical framework 
suddenly been shifted to fit a rural frontier situation? Further, how has rural development 
been related to extant growth theory? These questions lead us to a discussion of the 
productive capacity of agriculture and the export-based theory also examined by neo-
classical economists. 
Agriculture and the National Growth 
The eighteenth century French physiocrats srressed the pre-eminent position of 
agriculture in generating national income, but their view was challenged by Adam Smith 
who recognised the greater role of manufacturing in creating wealth. Over the next on~ 
hundred and fifty years, manufacturing became the key sector of industry and the 
mainstay of Western Europe. Heavily influenced by this tradition, Rostow, as noted 
earlier, conceived manufacturing as one of his three conditions for 'take-off. 
Manufacturing, he suggested, should be the leading sector ahead of agriculture. In fact, 
his view was shared by Boserup (1963:205) who argued that agriculture had 'a low 
supply elasticity which tends to act as a brake on economic growth' and, as an immobile 
sector, agriculture's development was dominated by outside sectors. Boserup, however, 
recognised the imponance of the modem plantation economy which, she believed, had 
no problem of inelasticity of supply. Modern plantation agriculture, indeed, was an 
inseparable part of Western industry. It could, therefore, transform itself as a leading 
sector of an economy. Schultz's view of agriculture was even more positive in that the 
marginal efficiency of capital was higher in agriculture than in industry (Jones, 
1952:444). Although Schultz's (1953) reference to agriculture was basically the 
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American model characterised by large-scrue fanning and mechanisation, the plantation 
economy in many developing countries resembled it in terms of the economies of scale. 
Thus, as suggested by Lewis's dualistic model, subsistence peasant agriculture is 
reduced to negligible scale and there is a good chance of rapid growth by relying on 
modern agriculture. This, according to Lefeber (1958), would bring about 'interregional 
equilibrium'. 
Yet, more imponantly, developing countries had almost no solid industrial base in 
the 1950s in view of their colonial heritage. Their economies had concentrated on 
exporting commodities and minerals. Thus, a take-off along Rostow's lines within a 
relatively shon interval was inconceivable if one had to start with manufacturing. Despite 
measures of import-substituJon undertaken as the initial step towards industrialisation, 
the impact of manufacturing on aggregate national growth was negligible because the 
proportion of ma.nufacturing was relatively small in the national economy. Consequently, 
the high proportion of agriculture in developing countries could most effectively bolster 
aggregate growth (Lewis, 1966: 154-155). The role of agriculture to accelerate national 
growth is further supponed by the export-based theory. 
Export-Based Theory 
This theory dates back again to the classical economy of free trade in the eighteenth 
century. Indeed, agricultural produce has been for a long time the largest earner of 
foreign exchange of developing nations. During the 1950s, an important case study was 
undenaken by Douglas North (1955) on the Pacific Northwest Region in the United 
States of America. This studv indicated that the whole development of a region could be 
dependent on its exponable commodities and that the export base det!vrmines the region's 
level of absolute and per capita income. His findings also showed that a region need not 
industrialise and may expand so long as there is incre:.:sed demand for its existing 
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exponable commodities3• The essential facters are the competitive position of the region 
(including cost and technological advantages), the adaptive capacity to external demand 
and taste, as well as growth in income and demand in the importing neighbouring 
regions. For this to work, N6rth admitted that this system was framed and developed 
within the capitalist institutidns responding to profit maximising opportunities to the 
extent that the export base was profitable and a part of the profit was reinvested for the 
expansion of the base (North, 1955:240 and 252). By means of trade in primary 
resources, Pfister (1963) furth'er suggested that a region may achieve high per capita 
income, yet remain unindustrialised. 
. .. 
\ I 
Another identical study carried out by Perloff and Wingo (1961);showed how 
'typical' resource regions of the United-States grew over a period of seventy years. They 
suggested that early agricultural resource regions could grow towards an advanced 
industry and service-oriented ~conomy. At the initial stage, the relative c;coriomic growth 
of a region had to rely on its relative competitive advantages in labour quality, costs and 
efficient transport linkages with the exterior. With these ac;Ivantages, a resourceregion 
:;- -· 
would produce goods and services accessible to the national or interr:llltional lll:arket. . 
This, in tum, helpr,d the region expand in other industrial and service activities. However 
" 
limited the practical use of the export-based theory to the Third World, it still has great 
appeal to many developing countries because they have retained their inherited 
comparative cost advantages from colonial days. Thus, a faster growth rate may be 
achieved by developing the existing largely agriculture-based ~onomic infrastructure. 
Applying the Growth Pole Concept in the Periphery 
A series of positive empirical results had also encouraged political leaders of 
developing nations to accept growth centre theory. The most encouraging one was the 
development of the Tennessee Valley. The experiment indicated that by first developing a 
l According to Nonh, the employment aggregate in secondary and tertiary sectors rnay exceed that of 
the primary sector. The region. howev~r. remaiils agriculture-based if the growth of the first two 
sectors depends on the Jatrer sector. 
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regidh's resources, a depre®ed agriculltir~ regio# could be transformed in;o a 
0 
manufacturing<region. This s~cessful cas~provid~ ~model for de~eloping,n~tiQns.cBy "'"'""'"· ... 0 ' 
,. <· 
the mid-1950s, twell!}'
0
years afre~'its implementation, the value~ad®d in Tennessee 
Valley industries had increased substantialfy. The µiost spectacular force of ittr~tion 
J " 
Stemmed from cheap el~tric power generated ~ a dam in the V·';1iley which served not 
only industrial entrepftmeurs but ordinary househblds. A large en umber of:;people had 
Q 0 .• <' ~ 
been attracted to this planned tegion (Friedmanntand Weaver, 1979:1,8-79)~ ,Also, the 
•:, 
empirical work of Nicholls (1961 ), Berry ( 19~ 1) <nnd Meta (11965);~·<'f or ex~ple, 
.J 
demonstrated the positive effects of urban eentres acting as growth centres in p~~rn,.oting 
, .. 
acgricultural development. By the early 1960s, with the assistance of the international aid 
agencies (particularly the Ford Foundation).f growth. p~Je theory was extended fo 
·~ " .u 
encompass rural agricultural projeets in developjng nations.· 
·. 
In May 1965, the application was further institutionalised by a resolution adopted 
by the Econom.ic and Social Council of the U nift:d Nations. The objective .was to proxnote 
•' . \\ . " 
regional development on a world-widecScale, miiinly in response to serie>us problems of 
rural exodus to primate cities and in recegnising: 
. . 
'the eomrno,g aspiration of developing countries to modermze !! 
their economies through industrialization and agriculJural [ithlics ...... ,,. .. , ............ ··"" 
added] improvement programmes as a basis for raising levels of " ...... ·, 
living of their population, and recognizing that regional ' 
development and an appropriate distribution of population within 
a country are essential factors in achieving such modernization 
and social development; ... [All] these problems can be greatly 
0 enhanced by study in depth of the practical experien~e of existing 
0 regional development projects within counni.es, and the training 
oAnanpower in the new methods and techniqnes reselting from 
such research' (United Nations, 1966:v).o 
·. 
This United Nations document produced di combination of three essential elements: 
agriculture, regk>nabdevelopment and m"&Berhisation. It was also a combination of ends 
(modernisation) and means (regional development) suited te0co1tdition~ of developing 
... ~ ,,..,? !'I o;:. 
countries. Clear])'! agriculture served as the economic base. 
~ 
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S~veral members of the research group requested by the United Nations Secretariat 
··. 
, to prepare.th~, .. report were familiar with John Friedmann's contemporary ideas. They 
··· .. 
were Harvey Per1off, Lowdon Wingo, Edgar Dunn and Joseph Fisher. The report 
suggested five
0
developmental regions (United Nations, 1966), as did:i~riedmann (1966), 
and.,both selected a 'frontier region' as an important area' for development. The former 
defined it as 'a virgin or low-density territoi:y, most frequently associated with large-scale 
nat~ral resourc~.s,·development ... characterized not only by intensive resource 
development, b!,lt alSo·~y indµstrialization·and building of a new town or a series of new 
towns' (United Nations,, 1966:4). The emphasis closely resembled that of Friedmann 
( 1966:42) who saw that resource frontier regions: 
0 'are zones of new settlement in which virgin territory. is occupied . 
aftd made productive ... New colonization will be predominantly 
" agricultural ... associated with large-scale investments in a 
mineral or forest deyelopment scheme and involves substantial 
urbanization ... They ·are inevitably based upon a city as the agent 
for transforming tbe wilderness into an environment suitable for " 
long term habitation'. " 
Notably, cities were believed by both as having potential as 'growth pi;>les' or 'growth 
centres' in bringing frontier regions into zones of high productivity. 
I) .'t 
The role of agriculture was acknowledged. To ensure easier handling of region~l 
, . ..-programs, the model of Tennessee Valley Authority became a prototype .. 'tike ~n 
implementation plan set up by the Marshall Plan in Western Europe, plans for regional 
programs were to ascertain that they 'encompass proposals for resources and their 
utilisation, as a basis for government policy and action' (\Vaterston, 1965:34). Thus, an 
initially urban-industrial growth theory found its way from North America to the Third 
World. The action 'bf the United States was a reflection of pr~gmatism (that is, 
experiments with .a new concept h~ve to b~ te~ted somewh1re to determine its practical 
value). This CQbld be brought about by project implementatibn. Conversely, the positive 
reaction,oftteveloping cauntries arose from ~h~~r.,need for a~instrument to fit into their 
•• 0 
soeio-econo~c framework of ~velopment·- ·~ithi.? an eco~omic base ~hich can be 
either utb;µi-indus~ Ol'>rural;ai¢cul~. More<1ver, to t~c lt developed na.tions ~d 
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panicularly those newly emerging nations-adopting capitalist system~ of production, 
development plans served also a vital purpose of natio~-building and a justifiable public 
enterprise. As noted by Robertson (1984:35), the plans were: 
'both a credential and manipulative device, but it was also a 
means by which each regime could express to its subject 
population its will, its identity and its active concern for 
progress. Without nationhood, without authoritative links 
between the mass of the people and the new and often fragile 
state structures, orderly prc0gress .. was impossible'. 
Thus, the plans were the new credo. , 
As to· the consequence of regional disparity caused by large-scale development, the 
support for·, an 'eventual equilibrium' was not lacking. Both Masse (1964) and 
Williamson (1965), inter alia, argued that raising income inequalities between regions 
was typical ,of early development stages while regional convergence was a feature of 
mdre mature stages of national growth and development. Spatial and social inequality, 
then was seen (and tolerated) as an inevitable consequence of the 'development process'. 
Consequently, with multiple apparent gains, the 'green light' in the developing world 
- ... 
was switched on for a plunge into the regional growt~ pol~ trap. When the source of 
'· 
growth was later modified from industry to agriculture, the0 term 'growth centre' was 
··. 
·,, 
more frequently used. 
Resume 
This chaptei: has examined how an original urban-industrial growth. theocy'·was 
' 
introduced from the developed world to the i:ural Third World to include resour~e 
frontiers as a regional planning unit. Though the focus of re~ourcet~rontiers was centred 
•. 
. ., 
on the city, the economic base shifted from,industty to agriculture. 
After 1945, the Western bloc was deeply concerned about Soviet expansion. Thus, 
there was a pressing need to help ~..estern Europe and Japan recover frorp their ruined 
economies and ·lead :the .~nderd.:velop.e<;l .world towards a growth-led economy. In 
, response to thi!I, a seri~s of·nco-~la8~icil grO\yth'theories appeared.as ·lighthouses and 
.. . . ~ . . . 
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navigational aids to guide the developing- nations. They stressed the imponance of 
international trade, capital formation by foreign investment and domestic savings, 
manufacturing and entrepreneurship to bolster national growth. The Keynesian approach 
was also a useful tool by which national governments might intervene .to promote the 
overall growth by creating general demand. Moreover, modernisation and the growth 
diffusion theories suggested that once 'traditional' values are abandoned in the 
underdeveloped worldy 'progress' from adyanced nations could be transmitted over 
geographical space. The underdeveloped countries, as suggested, would be able to enjoy 
democracy and affluence. 
But there was a basic requirement for a location to stan the process of imitation. 
Thus, urban-industrial centres were selected because they were nodal points possessing 
many advantages as centres of innovations, skills and capital and external economies. It 
was also believed that cities were where the growth stemming from the industrial pole 
spreads outwards. Consequently, the linkage effects of the growth pole were examined. 
Most early regional growth theorists were satisfied that spread effects would prevail artd 
thai polarisation effects emerging in the initial stage would disappear in the long run. 
F.~rther, any government could intervene co counteract such negative effects.· 
Yet, there was still another problem to resolve. Could regional growth pole theory 
be implemented in developing nations whose industrial base was weak? Indeed, the 
argument continued that the theory needed to be adapted to the situation of the host 
country. Only through experimentation could· the result and theory be tested. Frontier 
regions that we.re resource-rich were good sites for such a test. These regions, moreover, 
could be transformed into zones producing mineral resources and commodities for an 
expon matket. Some inflll:ential authors have suggested that agriculture and an e_xpon 
market were able to bring fast growth because-developing countries' primary ·sectors 
constituted the _highest proponion of th~ gross domestic product. With cities and their 
contiguous agricultural hinterland, re.,gionatgrowth; it was ?-fguoo, could .be expected. In 
1966, under the au$pices of the United I'!lations, resource frontiers were institutionalised 
. .:. . . . 
.. 15 
as one of the five developmental regions.Hi their action. plan. Siamltaneous.ly, South 
America's resoµrce frontiers became the first experimental areas, based on regional 
development programs assisted by international aid agencies from mainly North America. 
0 
Thus, the South American experience is discussed before conditions on resource 
frontiers in Peninsular Malaysia are explored. 
. ' 
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CHAP_TER 2 
APPL,ICATIONS OF RESOURCE FRONTIER STRATEGIES 
IN SOUTH AMERICA - BRAZIL AND VENEZUELA 
'The Ford Foundation [has] ... a conviction that mankind has the 
means to liberate itself progressively from poverty, disease, 
ignorance and devastating war and to reach higher levels of 
civilization .... Many of the leaders and scholars ... stressed the 
Foundation's ability - and responsibility - to act imaginatively 
and experimentally, ... to realize its full potential to extend and 
apply knowledge so that change will be directed to the benefit of 
mankind .... In one sense, its mission is to search for ideas and 
for imaginative men and women and enterprising institutions to 
carry them forward' (Ford Foundation, 1962:15). 
Theories relating to uneven spatial development have evolved at an accelerated pace 
since 1945. They have attracted the attention of governments in Western nations e:ver 
since. Based on these theories, industry and mineral resources have been used to 
promote economic development in retarded or backward regions within developed 
nations. In the process, cities were considered as the key to economic advancement and 
the mechanism for transmitting growth impulses over geographical space. Conditions in 
the Third World, however, are very different from the industrial core countries. 
Consequently, policy adjustments have to be tailored to suit specific situations. South 
America became the first 'laboratory' for resource frontier and Third World regional 
development theories. In applying this new knowledge of spatial development since the 
early 1960s, there was active involvement from Western 'philanthropic' institutions .such 
as the Ford Foundation (1962), w~ich believed that less-developed parts of the world 
would benefit ,from its applicatjon. Matching this conviction, consultal)ts from 
international aid agencies and their Western-trained lQCal counterparts helped introduce 
and spread the,growth pole or growth centre concept to the remote frontiers. 
Indeed, through direct interv.entions of the 'MIT-Harvard Joint Centre for Urban 
Stuclies' in the early 196QS, Venezuela's ()~~yana region became the first development 
... 
. . 
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package devised by John Friedmann and his-colleagues from Nonh America. Friedmann 
also was employed as a senior consultant in Brazil and Chile. Although 'he was ~ot 
directly involved in the Amazonian frontier program, his fashionable development ideas 
had clearly influenced Brazilian decision-makers to use the growth pole theory in their 
attempt to narrow the gaps between the mo:e developed Centre-South coastal core region 
and the depressed Northeast. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, this development concept 
prompted a rural agricultural strategy for the vast Amazon Basin. The Brazilian model 
drastically downgraded the original criteria from an urban pole to a rural growth centre. 
This adaptation reduced the financial burden of the Brazilian government considerably. 
Therefore, it is important for us to examine this ~pirical experience before studying the 
Malaysian strategy. We then show how Malaysia adapted the development concept to 
meet local social, economic, political and physical conditions. 
In examining how two different resource frontier strategies were applied in South 
America, we have to ask: why was the resource· frontier concept applied in South 
America; and·how did it relate to other development objectives? Having posed these basic 
questions, we look closer at the host country's more specific motives behind the 
application of resource frontier strategies by asking: what lessons were learned from this 
'laboratory' test in South America for other Third World countries? 
In response, we begin by exploring the origins of spatial polarisation in South 
America and reasons why constituent countries were so concerned about this 
phenomeqon. Initially, the fundamental problems associated with the use of resource 
frontier strategies are identified (Section 1). As it is not possible to study all countries that 
have adopted resource frontier strategies in South America, Brazil and Venezuela have 
been selected for particular consideration because.they ~bowed a vigorous interest in 
growth c pole' strategies during tht ,, 1960s and 1970s. The strategies employed in 
integrating the frontier regions into their spatial structures provide two contrasting case 
studies' -" rural-~gricultural versus urban-industrial. Furthermore, these different 
apJ>roac~s provide a useful background for a comparative study (Section 2). Finally, we 
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draw lessons from a brief comparative aSiessment of settlers' e;icperience in Brazil's 
Amazon and Venezuela's Guayana resource frontiers before attention is focused on the 
settlement patterns (Section 3). 
1. POLARISATION ANO INTEGRATION IN SOUTH AMERICA 
During the early 1960s, the growth centre strategy had been widely acknowledged 
in South America as a useful tool to guide regional growth. Many leading academics 
interested in this strategy had also undertaken research there - Perroux, Hirschman, 
Friedmann, Rodwin, Boudeville, Hilhorst and Paelinck. Influenced by regional science, 
Friedmann (see Friedmann and Stohr, 1966) was convinced that resource frontiers could 
be used as an area for testing regional planning concepts preparatory to transforming it 
into an applied science. Before discussing how resource frontier strategies were 
operationalised, we examine briefly why South America sought a more balanced spatial 
development leading to the use of the growth centre concept in frontier regiotts. Three 
main issues were critical. 
Poorly Integrated National Territory · 
Initially, South America's polarised structure stemmed from its historical growth 
process. From European colonisation to the end of the Second World War, South 
America was a continent marked by a series of dichotomies between capitalist and non-
capitalist modes of production. The gap between these two modes was reflected in two 
distinct living spheres which, in tum, mirrored .different levels of social injustice 
(Friedmann, 1959; Babarovic, 1978). This duality was observed in South America's two 
economies - an externally-oriented economy concentrated on the'coastal core area and a 
largely subsistence economy in the interior. Following independence, urban 
concentrations acceletated in most South American countries during the nineteenth 
century. Between 1840.and 1910, there was a I?assive constrvotion of over 100,000 
kilometres of railway line within· the coastal regionS' which marked the early p.hase of 
spatial concentration. Moreover, this was a period charact~rised by the expansion of 
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peripheral capitalism in South America'.> commercial agriculture and< small-scale 
manufacturing. The latter attracted much inves~ent to its major urban centres where 
infrasttUcture was being upgraded. But these centres were basically enclaves linked 
closely to foreign metropolitan centres having little effects on the internal economy 
(Hennessy, 1978:26; see also Slater, 1975; Gilbert and Gugler, 1982 for a tjetailed 
description on the formation of spatial inequality). Thus, there was an early emergence of 
core and periphery. 
After 1930, the core-periphery phenomenon was intensified by the adoption of 
import-substitution policies as So~th American gf,,ve.mments sought to boost their 
economic bases. Consequently, almost all industries were located in or near the 
traditional ex.port centres to take advantage of external economies, infrastructure and the 
conswning population. Simultaneously, these traditional export centres were also pons 
importing intermediate and capital goods (Melchoir, 1972:85). Meanwhile the relatively 
empty interior or depressed peripheral zones were ignored as spatial inequality in~reased. 
In the 1950s, import-substitution entered~ new phase of development in South America. 
Pulled by the desire for a md~em soc~ety ~ national spatial integration became a priority 
\.. . 
issue for South American poii,ticians. As part of their post-war pursuit for natipnal 
\o'' 
,.. I 
autonomy and socio-economic reforms, a new spatial organisation was desired. Thus, an 
attempt to break ~way from its 'peripheral status, external dominan~e and internal 
underdeveloprnent'....was seen as a new form of integration, closely associated with the 
political mandate of modernisat!on (Wriggins, 1966; Appalraju and ·S!lfier, 1976). 
. '• 
Having this obligation to fuifil, Sou~h American national governments played a; ~ey 
'·, ' 
regulatory role in regional planning and•),n particular, implementing r,esource froqtier 
strategies. ., 
. •, 
... ..,,_ 
'"·· ... ~·" 
.··· 
.Simultaneously,· the political justific~tion ior i"'egional plannirtg -~~§ .... met by the 
desire.,to-er~cji~e poverty that perv~ded non-.capitalistic sectQrs ·'l:lqitec:f .Nations, 
w 6, • 
1963:64)., As a bandy tool, the ~wth centre concept-was used as: a framewDrk for· 
•. 
" ... 
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providing material progress. Apart from t.R-is macro-level objective, another physical 
feature of spatial development in South America - urban primacy - also needed attention. 
Intensified Urban Primacy 
Urban primacy is a direct c9nsequence of the lack of regional integration between 
the main urban centre and its hinterland - a clear chiiracteristic of unbalanced economic 
growth across space (Timberlake, 1987). Often viewed as a sign of underdevelopment or 
unhealthy economic development, the prominent feature of the intensified primacy is the 
continuous influx of migrants fronnural and smaller urban areas to the primate city. In 
almost all cases, primate city regions are the principal core regions 'where economies ate 
capable of exerting a far reaching ... influence on the development of their dependent 
peripheral areas' (Friedmann, 1968:162-163). 
Urban primacy may ·be intensified in many ways. One of the chief factors observed 
in many South American primate cities is th~ presence of a low-wage labour force. 
Gwynne's (1986) study of Chile indicates that wage rates in Sant~ago were lower than 
.,.:-•· 
the national average. Cheap labour was abundant and met th·e demand of undercapitalised 
small entrepreneurs. Also, primate cities have other advantages which provincial towns 
cannot offer such as credit facilities, infrastructure, airport service and electricity. In the 
... ·.export sector, primate cities 'facilitate contacts with multinational companies importing 
local. products. Activities in both small enterprises and the export sector create 
... 
opportunities for other informal activities, attracting as a result a permanent flow of poor 
people from· less-developed and depressed regions. Continued intensification of urban 
primacy, however, created problems for the regime. In particular, a large-scale rural 
exodus results in squatter and slum areas in the larger cities. The challenge to the 
authorities emerging from these areas is only satisfied by material progress. Besides the 
risk of political ipstability, there are .heavy ;(Jemands on national governments to provide 
social and physi~al infrastructure. As the difference in South America between the city 
.. 
and the countryside has become marked, .the focus of national planning has shifted to 
.industry. 
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Pursuit for Industrial Expansion 
--
I®ustrial expansion has been a key policy objective among South American 
nations. In 1954, a report of the Economic Commission for Latin America prepared 
under Raul Prebisch, showed particular concern about the limited income and low 
consumption levels as obstacles to achieving a high standard of living (ECLA, 1954:91). 
This concern was reflected in the uneven patterns of consumption between the upper 
social strata and the lower income groups in Latin America - the former (5 per cent) 
accounting for 30 per cent of the total consumption (United Nations, 1963:6). 
By the early 1960s, import-substitution had encountered a series of barriers 
primarily due to the small size of domestic markets. Consequently, the application of the 
inward-looking strategy of import-substitution was not successful as evidenced by severe 
financial debts and general economic st~nation. Thus, an expanded and integrated 
economy between the coastal core and the relatively empty interior became ever more 
pressing. In South America, however, measures undertaken for territorial integration 
corresponded with each country's priority issues of development. As they differed 
between countries, the imported growth centre theory was shaped according to top-down 
decision-making plans - this was apparent in attempts at integrating underdeveloped 
regions in Brazil and Venezuela. 
2. INTEGRATING THE FRONTIERS - BRAZIL AND VENEZUELA 
Brazil and Venezuela emerged from the Second World War firmly committed to 
economic growth. Although they had many common features, their priority issues 
differed in a way that no ruling political party could ignor~. Consequently, different 
resource frontier strategies emerged from similar economic circumstances. 
0 
Parallels 
CIC) a oo -i· 0 
, e B6th Brazil 311d Venezuela had vast portions of unexploited land until the late 
1?50s. Strongly eonvinced by Rostow's (1960) modernisation concept and the 
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'development ideology' initiated by the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin 
America since the 1950s (see ECLA, 1966), their political leaders shared the need to 
incorporate this ideology into nationalism, for which there was strong domestic political 
suppon. By integrating nationalism, economic development and rational planning, this 
ideology set up a basic democratic framework which could be justified (Friedmann, 
1965: 19-20; Roett, 1984 ). Having set this primary objective, unintegrated frontier 
regions were considered physical entities within which to expand the domestic product 
and strengthen political cohesion. Consequently, the SPVEA (Superintendency for the 
Amazonian Economic Suppon Plan) was created in Brazil in 1953. Having achieved little 
success due to the lack of funds (often reduced ~o 15 to 25 per cent of the initial budget) 
which was again subdivided among regional interest groups (Nascimento, 1985:262-63), 
it was subsequently replaced by SUDAM (Superintendency for the Development of the 
Amazon). Paralleling this institutional initiative - a regional development authorit'J - the 
Guayana Development Corporation (CVG) was created in Venezuela in 1960. These 
institutions became the major implementing instruments for planning frontier regions. 
Externally, Brazil and Venezuela perceived foreign aid (financial and technological) 
as an effective means of helping their national growth. Both, for example, had close 
involvement with the Ford Foundation and the United Nations. In close association with 
leading American universitk;;, such as the 'MIT-Harvard Joint Centre for Urban 
Studies', Ford Foundation's involvement was pivotal in, introducing growth centre 
strategies. From 1950 through to the 1960s, the Ford Foundation engaged large numbers 
of development planners in both its rural and urban development programs designed to 
assist the growth of less developed countries including Brazil and Venezuela. 
SUDENE's (Superintendency for the Development of the Nqrtheast) 'Disaster Relief 
program in Brazil reflected this typical case. In the mid-1960s, for instance, this regional 
authority brought in about 150 ex1 .... ~s from the United States Agency for International 
Development and 120 from the United Nations to work alongside 1,500 local 
professionals (Hansen, Higgins and Savoie, 1988:359). In Venezuela, the Guayana 
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Development Corporation employed a mu_lri-disciplinary team from the MIT-Harvard 
Joint Centre for Urban Studies headed by Rodwin and Friedmann to undertake an 
intensive study from 1960 to 1965 (See Rodwin, 1969). 
Looking at the two countries' frontier regions, there are some similarities apart 
from their tropical climate. Both the Amazon and the Guayana constitute a considerable 
portion of their national territory - the former covers 5.0 million square kilometres or 60 
per cent of Brazil while the latter comprising 410,000 square kilometres or 45 per cent of 
Venezuela. Both have high hydroelectric power potential. Ir.deed, the continent has an 
estimated one-fifth of the world's total potential - a sound basis for supporting industrial 
development. Both regions are rich in mineral resources. The Amazon contains one of 
the world's richest mineral deposits in iron, aluminium, copper, tin, r:"!anganese, nickel 
and gold (Mendes, 1985:44). Similarly, there is a large quantity of high-grade iron ore in 
Guayana and promising deposits of manganese, nickel, chromium, gold, industrial 
diamonds, bauxite and aluminium laterite. Large reserves of petroleum and natural gas 
have also been discovered less than one hundred kilometres from Ciudad Guayana 
(Gwynne, 1986:114). Before we compare resource frontier policies in Brazil and 
Venezuela, we first examine why they have adopted two different approaches to regional 
development. 
Varied Regional Development Priorities 
Beginning in the 1950s, Brazil's development focus was centred on the depressed 
Nonheast region rather than the Amazon frontiers (Figure 2.1 ). Conversely, in 
Venezuela, the Guayana frontiers received special attention after 1959 and were 
earmarked for economic expansion. Using Friedmann's classification, the Nonheast of 
Brazil was a 'downward transitional' region - a result of the once prosperous sugar 
industry being overrun by its more competitive West Indian neighbours. In the nineteenth 
century, Brazil's economic core shifted to the Centre-South when coffee was developed 
near the Sao Paulo i;-egion and became the chief foreign exchange earner for more than a 
century. When Brazil started industrialisation in the Centre-South, the core regional belt 
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funher expanded, thereby enlarging the gap with the Northeast. During the 1950s, the 
Nonheast region, encompassing one-quaner of Brazil's population badly needed 
rehabilitation and assistance due to recurrent droughts. Consequently in 1959, SUDENE 
(Superintendency for the Development of the Nonheast) was established to promote 
economic development. Within its 'Disaster Relief program, it was estimated that 7.5 
million people from the Nonheast region should be moved as a precondition for 
improvi - the standards of living (Hansen, Higgins and Savoie, 1988:358). In order to 
diven this 'surplus' population away from the established Centre-South core region, 
there was a 11eed to open up the Amazon to absorb them. 
In contrast, the Venezuelan Guayana frontiers were set aside for a large-scale 
industrial expansion. Before the dis1,;overy of oil reserves in the early 1920s, Venezuela, 
like Brazil, had an agrarian pattern marked by specialised expon crops such as coffee, 
cocoa and cattle (Friedmann, 1965). Following growth in oil revenues, urbanisation 
accelerated as more employment opportunities were made available in the manufacturing 
and tertiary sectors. Nonetheless, these two sectors were highly dependent on oil 
incomes. As Negron (1982:10) points out, the oil activity 'developed into an economic 
enclave where only direct internal impact was in the payment of wages ••. [T]he 
potentially dynamic factor for the national economy was the returned Yalueof oil exports 
rather than the oil activity itself. Moreover, fearing that atomic energy would replace oil 
as the main source of energy, Venezuela, in the 1950s, began to look for additignal 
sources of growth besides oil (Blank, 1'984:181). This threat was reflected by the 
mission from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD, 
1961:18-22 and 62) to Venezuela in 1959 which suggested that the country had tQ seek 
other sources of growth. Recommending an industrial decentralisatiop policy, the 
mission praised Guayana as a po~ential region for industry in tenns
0 
of ite richly endowed 
miner?. ls, oil and power resources. 0 
Furthermore, during the dictatorial rule under General Per~ JimeRez.'(1952-1958), 
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the primacy of the Caracas region was intensifi~ by a policy which attracted hundreds of. 
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thousands of European immigrants. The Cffiltditrari~n<Was Sb severe that decentrali~tion 
was considered . essential (M:yer.~ 1978:229-131 ). When ° Romulo B.etanCouct's 
Democratic Action Party t~ over in date 193~, they faced a severe ,unemployment rate 
of over 14 per cent. In the tirba'h sector, milllufu.cturing, vihich had a less significant role 
in the national economy, coqld onfy a~orb a small cproponion of the unemployed. 
Moreover, deriving cits subs.~antjiij. suppon fr9m o_utside Caracas, the new government 
had to enlarge its v~ion to the rest uf tbe country. Given their urban middle' cl~ss 
I 
" background, the new n.11.ing<elites, ha{j 'a sense of tllission'. in modernisation. Having Srt 
up 'C9rdiplan' as the .centt;al• planning ag~n~y In fate 1958, the new government invited 
economic elites, technocrats"atl'd foreign consuhants to hel~ pro~ote indusn)r away~~~-. 
Caracas (Ewell, 1984: 134<>137). A finn committnent to maldng Venezuela sdf-sufficient\ 
in heavy industry - steel" consumer durables and heavy machinery - had begun)( 
(Friedalann, 1965:5-12) .. Thus, Gu~yana's resouJ°ce frontiers·~emerged as the regior(fp; \. 
.,• 
... ,· .. \, 
l fulfilling Venezuela's development mission. .... ·· ... 
Assured by'Oilrevenues and having·a much smaller population, Venezuela wa~ not 
as concerned as,Br.aril over the problem of a limiterl domestic market. In 1965, Brazil's 
militipy government created a new 'Extraordinary Ministry for the._Coor-dinati.Q~ of 
. •.·--·---.. ··,.._.. . 
R~giort'al Ageficies (,MECQR}. Apart from pursuing a more efficient regional.planning 
. . 
mechanism and 1Seekir'lg greater panicipation from the ptivate . sector,. -itS regional 
development focus cbas been oeerttroo ·on eradieap.ng rural m~ginality so that a larger 
: . ~ 
prtiportion of the popuhttion<Coul(i be gradually in1~egrated into the moclei:n. sec;t~ .. This _ 
focus is maEkedly .{fiffereflt from. Venezuela's ip6t.e simplified. app_~~~ch. In the ,late 
. . ·---··-·-·------............ ~ .... . 
1960s, Brazils' Ecooorniintnd S~iaI P.lanniQg Institute 0 (IPEA) adopted the 'concentrated 
decentralisation'.conGept as the base.of its ~ero-regio~al policy. This modei'l'esembled 
the French dev~opmerrt :pole ~per!e:nce ·disc·ussed in· Clui'J)ter L It selecte~· seven .. 
r~g\on~nietro~lise.$ a'i n.ew ~wtlt ~entres {Beletn. Fonel~, R~~ife, ·Salvador, j3elo 
. . . " 
J:k>1Uante •• Curlti.b~i.a.Jtd: l?.attu .Ate.ye}:·~gtir.e 2J>~ 'l'hese~~gional .. poles. we,re.as.sumed 
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Nonetheless, because 0f its.large size and aJiuge upincorporated rural; population~ these 
seven regional poles were se~ as in.effective in integrating the marginalised areas, 
\ 
especially the poorly accessible inland zones. Hence, Brazil's Institute 9f Geography in 
1967 assessed accessibility of rural population to existing cencres usin$ central place 
theory as an adjunct to the growth centre coucept. This sy~tem grouped the urban areas 
~ into five categories. The criteria underpinning the hierarchy of central places were based . 
on the variety or range of goods and services offered by each type of centres.' While the 
largest category had a population of one million or more, the lowest category ill interi?r 
regions was comprised of rural hamlets. These selected niral centres.were ,assumed .ro 
perf onn simple functit;ms as points of interaction and contact between the tural and urban 
areas (Babarovic, 1978:221-223). Interior settlements in the Amazonia, how.ever, ·had a 
rural base and comprised less than 20,000 people. 
In Venezuela, the original concept of developing Ouayana coincided with 
Friedmann's (1966) spatial equilibrium theory. Accordingly) Guayana should. have 
developed into one of the three first-order national core regions with a strorig, heavy .~ri~ . 
export-oriented industrial base able to counteract the central core region t>fC~as _-. 
. . 
(Friedmann, 1966:222). Subordinated to these three national core·regions were.a ·series 
of second, third and fourth ordered subregions. Like the urban.hi~rarchical classification 
in Bf<lzil, the f~urth ordered subr~gion co~sisted of local service Gentres ... While:ri')o~t of: .. 
the Amazonia was dominated by:lQCal·sei'Vice centres, the·Gu.ayana.regi~n was accorded.· 
. . 
a privileged position of a.long-term metropolis core region:·T~marked contrast also led 
~- .. . 
to diffe~_nt operatioQ.$ under ~e.two regional development.w~horities in the ~mazon and 
Guayana. 
.··. 
Operations 0 of .. SUDAM {Brazil) .antJ.'CV.q .{y. ~~ezue1a)~~~< .. : · .. .:". ·. .. · 
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. Mineral ·.and ~giicultu~l · expipitation .:in ·:araz·tl.'s .Ama,~o~~·~h,~$ "~·"I~~·g .:hi.sto~·, " .. ::·: -~. ,: . -.,. , .. 
Cnranford -and .Ol~k,) 98S)r··Bu't. the ,new. large:-~ca\e .. ~t~up~t~on: o~·:~l:i~ :!A~a·~on:~,a~: ·.~.... . .. ·. . . . 
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establishment of a specii;tl: federal goverome.nt 'agency - SUPAM in · 1966. a l.arge 
colonisation campaign was undertaken. SUllAM~:S·.rn.ain· t~sk"'Was. to: act ,as. 'a regional · 
. . . 
organisation [for] stimulating the process .. of .the Atna.zon .region 'and coordfoating .. the · .. · 
consequent measures to. be taken by the various. official bodies. -:and .. the .activities ·of 
. - . . . 
private entrepreneurs' (Kleinpennig and Volbeda. 1985:6). 
But Amazonia . .wa~ not attractive to investors. ·As· incentives, 'SUDAM initially 
. . 
offered participating·.Cl;>mpanies ·an income tax.4eduction on .investttients-.of up to SO·pe~ 
cent if the money was -invested in any approved "'projects. In :1970,. Brazil~s 'First 
Development Plan ·c 1970-197.4) foreshadowed the construction· :.of:rhe. Txansamazo.n 
Highway linking the ·Nottheast .and the .South.Amazon. The 'Jbjectlve was cleat. The . · 
Highway would·:make·potential migrants.from the depressed 'Northeasr-.region .more . 
·accessible to the· Amazon frontiers .. Tue·migrants would be mainly engaged in·agricultural. 
activities. Apparently, a nineteenth centuzy .. Amer.ican westward expansion was·.being 
repeated in the Amazon. By.constantly. pushing back the frontiers and.relying on its .. rich 
resources and agricult~ral-:development, the United"States of-America. tiad ·eventually 
created a strong integrated.:industrial·economy. If. the American. experience .could ·ever be 
reproduced., the:.Btaziliampoliticians and: planners·· hoped, the Amazon would produce 
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another story. of success. Ii'· the· American' .:we.ien~e ')Vas :CharaCtelised ·by. a vigoroUs . . .'".""·. ,\~ill 
. SOJlSl'· J>hettlers' ·spontaneity .•1hc:,Amazollian ex.pansion had·strong state ·giiiilance and .. : .:· ·.: < c .. 'i!Ji[, 
·finance. 'lnid:ally, the Amazon-.froritipr·w.·as.:also·:plann~d to be.·inirially -subordinated to:.the . .. · . . .,: ·;;~Ii 
Centre:-South core regioii:°Its:tirba_n:dev.elqpttient was :not intended ·as .-a ch~llen·ge .to.'the. .. :"." ··-. · .''. ·. \;~~ti! 
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socio-e!=<>nomic.activities within ~e regio~k~akowski~ f9.&5:: 19.6). A ~ew "city - Ci~d~d ... ::· :· . · ·:.: 
Guayana - was ·to galvanise altsec.tors. By.·.tlie· ti~e.-.the·region.:re.ached its· industrial' - · 
maturation.stage; as Friedmaitn.Jttgued (1966), Guayana would· become a supplementary .. 
·core :regim:idns~ead of_ haying mainly agricultural settlers ,as:in·lhe· Amazo~ •. G'Qayan~. 
would .. be· p~pul~.ted by industrial-.:w~rkers::.wbo would:Create .. 'a strong, and rising:de.mand 
fot"xaw ·tnatetials.; .. semi·finished ·products.and· consumer goods' '(Priedmann~ 1966:1'85). 
Whether.·agri.cWtural·m:.jndostriaI wqrkers,-Amazon·and .Quayana needed.-.settlers as .they : . ·-. _., 
. .. . . 
were the basic:means .. ~y which 'Plans were im.plemented.-.It is,: therefore. ~ucfal to·study . ~ .. .. 
<· : :: :, : ...... <. ;.'·~· 
the role. of:.s:ettlw :and. the:ir.experience 1n the ·frontier deve.lopment .advenrures.:Attenti~~ · ... 
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is focused .on how :they underwent sociai change ·through their-activ~·participation. · . : '. . . .. ... 
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. · ·. Different.frontieqxmcies have· resulted in varied·s·errlement=patterns and.Jifes:cyles •... <'.<. (:·:·:. ·' .. 
· A·k.e.yfact().f.ln.:the:.'Ainazonian expans.ion'.has been.-Brazil~srural1and·problern'. Tbe·post:" · ·: · '~ :-:'-:'. , .. · · 
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war:.-expansion.·in,,•cash .cropping . .and labour-extensive livestock '~perations has -reduced . ·: ·. · · 
.. 
· subsistence fa.mt areas! ·and :increas.ed :the :number .. -0f · 1and1ess .. :people .and ifUtal. 
. .. ~· .. 
-·unemployed. ·Wbile·.SrazWs.:ur~an :sector".remained-weak in·ab-sorbing migrants, the· . ::·:·:-. .:~::_.;::·.:.~~.· . .-." 
. . . ;: .' . ~ ~. .. . . .· ... :· 
·influx of.-the· .. raral ·:'.sorplus'·;has::de·pressed- the·· real minimum,monthly .. w.~ge in the .. < .. :::.·>;· :·· /': ."'.~ti 
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controlled by. ·less than· 2 ·per cent of laadowners {Blank, 1984: 190-91 ). Ouayana · 
provided settiers·with opportunities for employment. But land was not offered as the · 
basis for improvjng their livelihood. Instead, the Guayana settlers had tc :·~ .. '.bjugate their 
interest$ to the nation's :~onomic ambiri9ns: Because of this basic difference, investment 
in.$ettlers·.on,a,pet·capita.basis was.far superior in Guayana than in the Ama;z;on. The 
difference =w~:=.te~ected in their settlement ·patterns and livelihood. 
Settlement.Patterns· Jlnd -'·Settlers". ·Livelihood 
· ·Basi:CaUy.;.-tbe:Brarltian .govemrnent .. b-uilt two types.of.settlement on the frontiers: 
(.a).urban,l\Ilministra:tive ~ent:reS; ,and.{b-).agrovila1{agricultural villages). Urban networks 
and· equipment in the.regional centres: were generally poor because of the Amazon's 
vastness and . .laclc.-0! adequ~ite. <;apital {mo.st ·being -.loans .taken from inrernatio~al .financial 
institutions}. 'Away -.fr-0ill :the .urban. centres, the picture was again different. With 
emphasis on.land oc.cupation .. tbe·colonisation movement was a highly mobile one~. The 
strategy ·encouraged;spon_t~eous :settlements •. using highways and feeder roads to .guide. 
· colonial penetrations. . . 
. .. 
... 
. ..... . 
There were.:two. ways .. by which spontaneous settlers ·sheltered: tpernsel ves. 'Either · "· ·": :- ·. . · 
" 
-t:hey:built ·their own .. ·ho.ilses.,on:the-land which they cultivated or·were accommodated in 
. . 
.. · ..... 
. . . -~:t;i'.< 
the:afn'Qvilas or·~rural ·growth :centres'.=. "fhe·Jatrer·were .. :settlements built: under SUDAM~s · . 
'Polamazonia :.Progra~\·which. ,beginoing -in 1975, ·had .selected 16 ~growth poles' and 
·constructed ·-more .:t-han '. 120:"r.ural growth tentres• .. _ · agro-cattle and .·agro-mineral 
· settlementS •. iWhile 'the'fo~er .. poles·.were::primarily-. urpllrt· centres ()fferirig hig~~r.levels of_ 
·" goods and serVices.::the=Jatter-·wer~"eXpeC;ted: ·to-:expand: non.-~gricul rural .activ.i °'es:, tlir'ou gfl ·. · · · ,. ;}'.~i!Jl 
. . . . . . . . . : . •, ··,.>:~:~d~J~~ 
·agricultunu.i.mprovemendn:the ·hin.tetla.nd£.L~ate.d at the.,~owest.le.vel:':of·~~ttlement'bu~lt' ·: '. . · ..... ·. ::· .. '.~;;~i~1j 
. . . . . . . .. . . . . . . .. . . : .". . ... · ........ '.t.~:~J. 
-.alo.ng~the'r6ads;:.lhe::rutaI:·c~ntr.es'were,mo$rly:·ta.!cen».up !by sp.ontaneou:s m1grailts:Th~Y.' · : · .· .:. : ·.,.·. · :),ii;:t'.';~\' 
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a:triv.ed·,at:.their,own .initiative ·and= expen:se .and comprised·-the;·largest .. m;mbr:r .of:s-ettle~ .. : _.. :·>"·:. :·. -~·,: .. _'. · •~ 
·,Jn. th~ tllf.aI ·cenn-es: -~h·ere they. liV.ed) ~he~ ... ~ldlls·;:apd: ·i-e~.Q~rces.'.CP~ld ... sc~cely:~t.:.: .:·· ... ;: .::~'_ .. :.:.< ..... : .. : 
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Aim>vilas were often temporarily.OCcl,lpied and abandoned due to defaults on bank 
loans, poor health and edncati~nal services and d,ifficulties in getting agricultural inputs, 
d~spite efforts by INCRA (National .Institute for Co1onisation·and Agrarian Refonn) in 
distributing h.unclreds o~. thousands .of land d.eed.s·(lOO·bectares each) to spontaneous 
migrants (MotaQ, '1985:95-96). Moreover, much confusion and corruption over land 
titles were reported, often :leading to conflicts or eviction by ranchers or other big 
landlords (Mougeot, 1985:66; Nascimento, 1985). Few alternatives .were found to 
reabsorb the displ~~ (Bunker, 1985). ConsequeH!Jy, iiiany migrants took up temporary 
or seasonal jobs in resource-exploiting projects or by providing services to residents of 
existing towns. They became increasingly subordinated to big land-owning groups who 
benefited most from government incentives and the rise of land values (Becker, 1981 ). 
Apart from the small spontaneous-migrants - mostly widely dispersed and subsisting on 
a small-scale agricultural economy - there were highly capitalised large-scale ranchers. A 
few hundred agro-business projects have been in operation in the Amazon using fiscal 
incentives offered by SUDAM .. Between 1967 and· 1982, agro-business projects 
absorbed most of SUDAM's inc.entives totalling US$10-12 billion (Mendes, 1982:48). 
A third type of settlement'wasrelated. to·mineral-.exploitation and the construction of 
roads ·and hydroelectric plants.:Amortg the-hydroelectric. plants, the .largest. one na.med. 
'Tucurui' is being constructed .across·the Tocantins ·-rivet. When completed, it wi,li .b_e the 
fourth largest- plant in· the world;' genera,ting A-;OOO·m~gawatts of electricity. A l~ge 0 •• / 
' . i ;.· ~ 
::!J···'.; 
";J:.i 
.':.<!:<; 
·";i··-
proportion of it·wilfbe· ui;~d foi;,pr~essing:and· reflni.ng locally extra~te~ bauxite int~"'. .':- ·, . · 
aluminium{M~rtdes, 1982:45). There·were:.abQut'35,~ technicia~s andl~bou~efs."j~·'.ili~::· .-.·:. -:'.··:::··::.· · ... 
Tucurui project alone. New towns ·.spr~mg :up :.where: bj~ projects were- established:'.Th~ '.' ... · .. : ·;:·:.·: :, '. .. :: .: ". 
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determined by demand in the Valencia_..Caracas region and abroad. With ·heavy 
investment by Venezuela in a much smaller region, an average Guayana settler enjoyed a 
higher standard of living than most of their Amazon counterpans. In the vast Amazon 
frontier, the residential segregation was more m.arked between towns and countryside. 
This was vividly described by Mougeot (1985). 
Mougeot's.(1985) findings reveal that the Amazon reflected a continuous flow of 
settlers searching for· advancement. Their move was strongly guided by educational 
levels, occupational skills. and: the. will to ~ompete in a complex process of frontier 
expansion initiate"d by.the-state. Economic motives, according to Mougeot, were the most 
important stimuli for settlers who preferred.to live in larger frontier towns than in rural 
zones. Yet competition in occupying higher status jobs in larger cities was strong 
between incoming cityward settlers and rural and urban dwellers o arrived earlier. 
With few skills and lower educational standards, the earlier dwelle.s and their weaker 
counteroans.in urban areas usually .lost out. They were forced. to move to lower-order 
. \ . 
\ 
centres or to 'escape-.tO"'}CSS disputed environments·j· na'rpely the countryi;;ide, in order to 
\ 
hold on·to·previous:attainment:or·undergo ·some prpgress':.'(Mougeot, 1985:81). More 
·peaceful, Iow.er~order cenn:es :provided· less skilled:Settlers with better· access ·.to land for 
their subsistence .livelihOOd whereas ao ·urban occupation :might make 'their life'insecure 
. . . . . 
.· 
. ~. . 
.., 
or difficultto.support:household expenses. ·· ., .. ·, .• :,-!L•·.'·• 
.Comrei:setynhe' Gu ii yana.ftorttiers were. inuCk·less <o:nplel< and ;coinpetitivC\ '. .... : .. ·· <'. 
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also organised according· to,.their incom~ educational levels and skills - a social 
segregation epitomised within a single city. 
Compared to the Amazon's spontaneous settlers, Guayana's migrants had a better 
preparation before heading to their ultimate destination. Comprising rural and peasant 
stock from eastern Venezuela, they were gradually attracted to and converg~ on the city 
through their kinship networks. These networks led them on arrival in Ciudad Guayapa 
to settle in three different types of quarters: (a) 'urbanizaciones' - planned quarters with· 
urban facilities;. (b) 'barrios' houses - semi-planned quarters with some urban facilities; 
and (c) 'shanties' - unplanned quarters with low quality houses and little public facilities. 
Th~ 'urbanizaciones' were first built·in the 1950s by an American iron ore mining 
co~pany to accommodate its staff whereas most shanties were put up .by.·poor. settlers 
. duri1'g the·early 1960s attracted by job opportunities that. the Guay.ana.project would offer 
(Rodwin,' 1969). 
.··, 
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Initially, .Guayana's heavy industrial project .had .little to offer these unskilled 
. ... '.l:(; 
;:;;:; 
. <;~: 
l~~~i 
'squatters'. Given· time, some of them picked up skills and· w~re able to move on. to more 
· demanding occupations . .There wa~ :also a' shift from "low~ranking. white-:collar jobs to· 
.. · 
..... ; ' .;:t 
·.. ..,ti· 
·blue-collar jobs for·higher incomes, though the .Jatter·.ba&lower.spcial··prestige. Hence, 
mobility.was frequent ~s shanty dwellers earned higher incomes and shifted to '·barrios' 
·and '.utbanizaciones':·:The proportion of 'urbanizaciones' increased from 14 per cent ~n .. · : .. · :tn1 ~i'. 
i965· to 3~ ·per:cent.:in. ·1975,:While. 'barr_ios' ·and ·~shanties' each accounted· fo~·,3_· :I· per . ·' . " .·.··.· .·~_·:. . .. )~{~ :-/;~if< 
.. ''!;Iii; 
cent:lndeed, the·populati'!n·ofthe shanties'has·bee.nin~reasingly isolated as.-'siiccessful · · :.- :·:·: >-. ..... ;~·;;JJ~j 
ones' :moved ouFwhenever ·possible.· The remainder.-"Yere 'those· with lowest :stat~5: · : .. :·. ·: .. · · ·'" · 
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occupations, the unskilleo, .non..:~orporare work~rs;·the .fong';"term uhe~ployed,_.inigrant~ .· . ..:. ·:· 
from; ~~al: ~eas. and. those .from: .farming w.i th 'tl~-::prlot. ~x p~rierice'. cM:acJ?c>J!ald, : . ~:·. ·:·~.:\··:~/ ... :~: .. ,: 
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Development Achievements and Coll.itraints 
Both the Amazon and Guayana experienced. a fast rate of population growth. 
Between 1970 and 1980, the Amazon's population increased from 7.15 millio~ to 11.2 
million,....an annual growth rate.of 5 pe~ cent compared with Brazil's national average of 
. . 
2.7 per cent (Kleinpenning ~d Volbeda, 1985; Mende~ 1982). Since .Guayana became 
the focus of migration, its population rose.from 213,540 in 1961 to 391,660in1971. 
Ciudad Guayana alone-saw an·increase of485 per cendn ten years, from 29,500in1961 
to 143,240 in 1971.:(MacDonald, 197.9). This growth provided the two frontier regions 
with the essential manpower for devdopmen.t. 
As stated earlier, both the Amazon and the Guayana regions produce large 
quantities of electric power for domestic.-and· industrial use; Brazil's Amazon expansion .. 
has been multi-purpose - spatial, poli~}cal, economic, social and demographic. Yet. 
; 
despi.te ~~~h a larg~-~cale expansion/he piv~t of Brazil.'s economic develo~ment has . . 
remamed.m the·ex1stmg coastal centres, nonn the fronners. The coastal regions have 
) I 
attracted·beavy. industrial poles based. on the location of the highly preferred automobile . '.~f): 
.industry/With· five multinatipna~s.(Chrysler1:Ford, General Motors, Mercedes Benz and .. , }~\; 
::::;::::::ti::~~;~:::::::~~=~::::::::~: ::~::p::::~~: . . {:~1' 
strong growth ~rnariia' -which· has been at the expense of natural conservation (Mendes, , · · .;,li~!i 
1982:52). ·Focused on agricultural colonisation and mining activities, economic ,growth ... : · .: :·. : : .. ;ii~Ji 
.·on the·frontier has been:·ceiltret;l.on Janns·;thereby allowing the Brazili~n governmeilt·.to. : . . . ._=·, '\i~ifl 
save collsiderable. 'infrasu'uctural costs ... The rote of priville . c~pi ta! has ·been. ·more . : :. :· ~ ' : .. <j)~ 
significant :than iri Gua yana.. By':Brazlrs· overall staJ!dard of ·lirbanisation, the· Arna~~ . · .. · · · · ·.: :; · :> '-~' 
has been relatively nn=ai: Major cities.100.~ted i~ .th~ coastal zone have 'experlenced ·i f~s~e~ .. ·.:: ·<_ · .:.=-: ; ;.·'. -~:. ~ . 
rate.'of urbani~ation .than the·ittterior~~··.utban.~entres, In contr~st~ .. by focusing on,.Ciudad ·:· ·.··::' .. <: .. ,:.=·· 
. . . . . . 
Guayan~ the.Guayana:de~elop~e~t 'h~s.'n~~_gen~tated a strong·arid co~tinuous 'movein~~/ .. · : ··: :·: ::. .< 
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there. Consequently. the public investmen1- cost on a per capita basis has been much 
higher than in the Amazonian expansion. 
There have been achievements on many fronts. The Amazon is producing more 
than 35 million tonnes of iron ore per year. Moreover, it is realising large quantities of 
bauxite and cattle to meet domestic and international demand. Foreign exchange earnings 
have been used to repay and service a foreign debt of more than US$ l 30 billion - much 
of it had been used- to fina~~e Amazonian projects. By 1990, Brazil is expected to boost 
its exports by an annual growth rate of 5 to.7.per~ent (Skillings, 1985:40). Since 1979, 
Venalum, a state-owned .. aluminiu~_plant in Venezuela's Ciudad Guayana, has become 
the world's largest smelre~~ .with an annual processing capacity of 280,000 tonnes. 
Another new indnstriahubsidiary of the state-owned Venezuelan Guayana Corporation 
(lnteralumina) is about to .be launched. This plant will have a capacity to process one 
... million tonnes· of alumina··per annum. When completed, Venezuela will be the first 
country in the Third World possessing a fully-integrated alumi~ium industrial complex 
that is able:to.undertake all-three stages from ext:raction-0f.bauxite, production of alur"ir?. 
and then aluminium. Jn addition, Guayana possesses other basic· heavy industrial sectors 
- oil, steel, petrochemical and electrical supplies supplying inputs for a wid~. range of 
manufacturing sectors in-the<:onntty (Gwynrie, 1986:52). 
·Nevertheless, rhere ·ruive ·been constraints. Amaz-0nian :development has been. 
handicapped:·.by high_ costS"and ~nefficient:ttansp~rt systems-, lack of s~Ued·~anagers, 
entrepreneurs; technicaJ:experts, .. basic--public services and .infrastnicture. ·Because of its 
agricultural character,>~e, devdlopment ·has·suffel'.ed·:from poor and flµcruating world 
marke~ prices· ... Th~:-t~ges.t.towns·have ,been:-.dependent'upo~ non.:.basic activities which 
. . 
merely .-offet"higher· le~ls· '<)f.:gci.o~is:and.:servi~esr -~o -si~ificant indu~tries have been 
established compared tG'ihe .. Oen~e,~outh .. cor~·regiotL· Thou~b the.agrovilas in. the 
. . . : 
Ai1iaZQrt'.~ave. beerr desct.ib~- as ~ru~. grow~-- centres'~· they -~e th~. simplest form of 
· settletnerir f9~ human ·sJt~lt~r.--Th~y· b:Ne,,had.-Jittle:·efiect· rlrt:e{~her.;fonovati~nal~diffu~~on 
-or :ttickle~dm\·n .effects--Jt.om" Braii.l:s :~<:>a~tal :co~· .~egiori-s-,:.Cattle', tjin~lii~g ~ ~d~eo:iti~~ 
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activity - has generated few backward and-fotward linkages. Consequer.tly, there has ., 
been little employment generation '(Nascimento: 1985:.302). As Moran' points out ' 
( 1985:97), 'the Amazon remains a backwater of ~e iran~~·al budget, de~pite the i~p~nt · 
.... · . ·: 
importance given to it with regard .,~o: th{·~·~hievement of greatness .in the natio.riat 
.. . ~ ... 
ideologies.' The coastal core regions would be giv~n even stronger dominance following 
physical integration made possible by ~uge in.._,estments. Perhaps more pressing have · 
' been the environmental impacts. The disappearance of vast areas of trpPical rain·forests 
in the Amazon has aroused increased international Concern abo.ut the 'green-house 
effects' at a global scale, coupled with the irreversible decline in .~pecies and natural 
. . 
.. ··•' 
resources. 
In Venezuela, the national·economy is still strongly dependent on oil which, in 
1981, provided 70 per cent of tax.revenues. Oil revenues are being used to impon half of 
the nation's need in basic food items and to.raise substantial foreign loans to subsidise jts 
industrial projects· (Blank, 1984:3). Having a large share of the national budget, the 
Guayana absorbed almost US$8 billion for developing its industry and infrastructure 
during Venezuela-ts Fifth Plan (1976-80) (Gwynne, 1986). Initiated as a 'dynamic 
growth pole', Ciudad ·Guayana has been effective in creating jobs and high-quality 
industrial and mineral outputs. But without huge investment by the state, this would have 
been impossible. Further, Ciudad Guayana does not have any locational advantage for 
steel and aluminium users concentrated on the Valencia-Caracas axis along the nonhem 
coast. Thus, large users in the north's traditional core regions. prefer to take resources 
located close to their industrial complexes. Due to lack :of.a threshold demand in the new 
frontier" region, Guayana has had to import consume~ go'Gds from other parts ?f th~ 
. . .. 
country or from abroad (Stohr, 1975:154).· Si11ce the 1980s,,~n'Vestments in Guayana. 
have.begun to.~ecline which has affected smaller pr~jet;ts. ~e larger:projects have riot 
. . . 
expand~ ne:,G.uayana region has'.y~t to ge~etate. ~~klt~o\(,n eff~t~. 
Apart .froh1·:the above assessme~·t, eco~omtG.:-ID'.o~th through .th.e use· of indu~trial .. 
poles-irt.:Yene~~ela or rural growth centres irf'Bi'azil m~y'.Qnly h.e one of several overall . 
. . . . . . ·. . . 
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developmait objectives .. :Simultaneously, their frontier activities have served other socio-
political goals. Since 1975, both the ~mazon and the Guayana have experienced an 
increased level of state control in their major economic actlvities. Consequently, there has 
been a serious lacki:of devolutian. In<the Guayana especially, all ma.i9r decision-making 
hinges on Carac~. In the proceS's, settlers Q,ave been the prime-movers serving various 
objectives inclnding their own. 
Our piscussion o[ settlers' life in the AI}lazoniar, and Guayana frontier development 
progr~s, however r, has been 'brief for lack of access of data sources produced in local 
languages. It also lacks a compa@tive perspective indicating how settlers' lire patterns ., 
0 
evolved before and after they moved in the process of being incorporated in their 
.:> 0 
respective country's frontier regional f>lannh1~ program. This perspective will be brought 
·~. ~-,0 
to light when we undertake to study FELDA settlers in Malaysia later in the thesis. """' 
Resume 
This chapter has studied the experience of applying resource frontier strategies in 
South America. The key motivating factors were the poorly integrated 9)ltional territory, 
~ ~~ 
increased urban primacy and the pursuit of industrial expansi~n°0°-wth,e continent. Taking 
Brazil and Venezuela as two case studies, we found that there were similarities. Both 
0 
have vast tropical underdeveloped areas with rich mineral and hydroelectric :r;.esources; 
and national leaders adhering to 'development ideology' initiated by the Economic 
Commis;i~n, for Latin America and close associations with international aid agencies 
offering technical and financial assistance in their development programs. Because of 
differing priorities, Brazil undertook a basically rural agricultural strategy whereas 
Venezuela used an urban-industrial one. In Brazil, the Northeast dep:essed region needed 
·' 
.· 
immedtate attention to redistribute its 'surplus' population and overcome the rural poor's 
low consumption rate. These twin pr.oblems were considered an obstacle to expanding 
the economies of the coastal core regiong. Moreover, the Amazon was used to divert the 
pressure for radical land reform. Although growth poles and rural growth centres were 
established in the Amazon, they only supplied basic seivices. Conversely, supported by 
58 
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oil revenues, Venezuela was committed to bttild an urban-industrial pole in a new frontier 
city - Ciudad Guayana. When mature, the Guayana region was expected to become a 
supplementary co~ region counterbalancing the Caracas region. Both the Amazon and 
the Guayana have experienc&fsfr~ng,-state involvement. Given the Amazon's scale, the 
capital derived from the state has been much higher than in the Guayana. 
In the light of two different strategies, each country's migrants had varied 
settlement patterns. Spontaneous migrants in the Amazon were numerous but did not 
improve their lot tQ any significant extent. They had to work hard to find an appropriate 
shelter. Those without occupational skills and education usuall}' lost out and were forced 
to live in the countryside. Conversely, those in the upper echelons - big ranchers and 
miners were favoured by the frontier policy. In Ciudad Guayana, the mobility of settlers 
also reflected their skills or ability to compete for jobs. Indeed, their social status in the 
city was reflected in the standards of their living quarters. Both the Amazon and the 
Guayana have now C"J'erienced a heavy influx of population. Both regions have also 
been able to boost their share of gross domestic product: minerals, agricultural produce 
and power in the Amazon and, minerals and industrial products in the Guayana. 
Nonetheless, the Amazon has remained a backwater of Brazil's national deveIOpment 
while ~h~. ~u~~na's remoteness has limited its economic progress. These fr 1dings have 
important implications for Malaysia in particular as, like Brazil and Venezuela, it has 
closely followed development concepts of the West. 
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CHA~TER 3 
THE RESOURCE FR()NTIER STRATEG,Y· .. 
:.·. 
IN PENINSULAR ·MALAYSIA 
'The conflict posed by ethnic mobilization ·forces domiriant 
pol~tical ~lite.s to devise. and experiment ·with various public 
pohcy strategies, both to harness.and:to control ethnic conflicts 
whi?h in many cases ·are the product of failed policies of.a~ 
earher era and of ineffective · politica! institutions' .. (Means, 
1986:95). . . 
The precedent of Venezuela and Brazil's frontier experien~~··has paved the way·JO. 
the study of Malaysia's resource frontier strategy: There was a directdi_nk between J_he 
Friedmann package in South America and Malaysia...,... both areas·being-srrongly exposed 
to international development concepts at the governmental level. Exparriate advisers and 
local senior staff at Malaysia's main national planning agency - the Economic Planning 
Unit - placed the growth centre concept on the development agenda since the early 
1970s. This link had a more direct impact than on neighbouring Indonesi~ Thailand or 
the Philippines. In contrast~ use of the tenn 'development pole', 'growth pole' or 
'growth centre' in official documents of those countries was either vague or had little 
meaning in the implementation of their frontier development projects. Perhaps due to 
budgetary constraints, their investment for infrastrucmte and facilities per household was 
much smaller than in Malaysia. Consequently, the ·conceptual and practical link between 
South America and Malaysia was more coherent and vigorous. and Indonesia, Thailand 
and the Philippines can be omitted from the thesis. 
Like those of Brazil and Venezuela, Malaysia's· development strategies reflect the 
country's dominant.problems - poverty, ethnic.-conflict and regional inequality in wealth. 
As a means of combatiilg rural .pove.rtyi FELDA ·{Federal Land :Development Authority}· 
was established in 1956 .. Subsequently, other institutiO:JIS were ·also. ·created to tackle a 
range of problems and promote Malay interests. Then in 19'70, the New ·Economic policy 
(NEP) pinpointed the urban .-and· re~onahlimensions _of poverty, particularly amollg the 
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Malays. This.,p<>lic.~, :higb,l~ghi~ .-t'be.;.n:ee.d-4'or·.new. :te.ctmic,al::.tools and. a~iQ.istrative 
. . . . . . 
mechanisms, 1.'h~:requiremenr-~S:mety:in·;pan; by.a..;resource·.trontiet st;rategy·,.fasltio~ed 
by combining ·the,:grow.th:·ce~tre::ooncept ·with·ftontt~.i\ttgrlcultural ;ptograms·:(FELDA:·in 
panicufar)-'.the·:technical .. tool ... and::acJministrative .. me~hanism respectively • .Jn· the process, . 
regional development authorities were .set up to assisnhe tesourc~· frontier development 
aimed at inducing ·urbanil;ation ·and fodusuialisatio.n. Indeed, they.·were ·the :integral pan 
of the .government's eff ortt<Hedistribute resoUtces: rnore:·e.quhably .among the :different 
ethP..ic groups • 
.In considering·this-resource'frontier .strategy in more detail, two crltical issues ·have 
to be addre.9sed: why ·did ·'.Malaysia adopt a -growth .centre concept; and how has it been 
incorporated into the strategy to fit in with Malay.sia's socio-political framework? Once · · 
these basic questions.have been :addressed, we need to consider a linking issue:·what was 
the source of the ideas ·on the resource frontier strategy? 
.In :analysing these issues. we have to examine the background ·of the adoption of a 
resource frontier strategy in :Malaysia, noting political1 economic and social problems 
before 1969 :(Section l),·.Subsequetitly~ we·examine how-the growth centre concept was 
introduced andincorpotated·withintheNEP to urbanise the rural (largely Malay) poor- a 
task high •on :the agenda of,the United .Malay National Organisation (UMNO) (Section 2). 
FinaHy, we explore why 'l ;.t;10.nal development. authorities were needed .to implement the 
resource frontier strategy in'Malaysia (Section.S}~ .. a prelude to considering tbf.: role 
played by the regiortaldev:elopntent:authorities within the national planning framework 
and how tegionaJ .. pJan~~rs:·perfonn.their :task on, the ·field in Chapter. 4. 
Malaysia!s.: post ... war '-his:to:ry ·tas :been. ·puncru.ated'· :by. 'PIO bletns: concerning. 'th~' 
. . . ... · . .. . . 
.. 
.. 
.. 
: 
. . .. : 
..... 
• : .= • 
. . . ·. :· 
. ·, . 
·. '·:· 
... 
for mea~ures·:t(:;:resol'.\'e·tbese:i~sue~: Thi~~~tion,.·:·th~t<ef~z:e;· s~ts·,·~tr-tJ°':e~a~i·~e·the'.·. · :::'..: .: ..... :··· 
origins of ~eJ ~ew Econ~e.PQlicy.fu.nntJJated·in .:f910, .. w.11kh. c~~::ta:in~q~~ra.te::µld _·: : : ·::: .. ::.:·· '. ::.: .... _':_::{:, 
cry~talise tfil' r.eso.tlt~e:.frontier .. ~tra.tegy. -~TI:re·::6tne-rgenee ;of -UMNO. ·:howevet~-.:w~s -~ : "=···'./-_ ·:{.'.::::>>\: 
. . .... : .... ; . . .... ::;.\. 
. ·.·· . 
.. . 
·· .. · .... 
.. . ::· ... 
•: 
··: •, ,.' .. : . ~.: :: ··::>~-:-
ltnm.!:"dlately aftet·theSecondW'OtJd War.two,crucial.evew' ';f'.~~e:r·:, ·"~ polirlCaI.. . . .. · 
. .... . ·: 
. . . .. •' .. 
scene in Malaya -:the ·Malayan Union Constiru.tion :and the local Chinese .Communist-l~ · -.·: .. : ·" ·' ·:_: ... : .. · 
'Emef.6ency'. The 10UtePtne·oftbese .two incidents laid the founda"tion for strongly ethnic- ~- ::.·_. _ _._/;:"'~ '. ··::" ;J..'.:· .' 
oriented national-deVel:Qpn'lent .policies. · :-' .. . .. .. · " ... -.·· .. ·.·.· >:··.:.:. '.."/ :::;· _:r . 
·in nati:n:::~:::::~==:=~=:~:::in::::u: .··.··:···,'/.":1.·:.·. 
clistrust {O'B.allance, J 966). At this juncture. the British returned, accepting the ,,: .. ~ '- --~-~~:·ii~-; .. 
inevitability cf self•detennination~ .and pr.omoting :i-t through a new M.alayan Union - . , ....... ' .. ·:.}~, · .. · 
. ~.... . ·.' . :: 
"Constitution. Conceived as a preliminary .plan for local self-government on the ·basis -of a · ·. · ... ::::: . ·- _·'.::: .. :}'.; · .· . 
. . : 
parliamentary system {Ongkili~ 19&S; .Sopi:ee, 1974))t the Constitution suggested a ... ". ·: ._<:. {: . 
: ... ..:: .·:~. _: .: .. ~~~-. 
merger of all states in :the Malay Peninsula into one union and offered all races equal ·. _.:: _.. :· .. : . : ·_}: · · 
citizenship. It also proposed to strip off the jurisdiction of Malay Rulers' special rights ... · _·:·,. ::·.· .:· :: :_;_:~"'.f: ·: 
. . ', : · ... .- .. .-.. t~ . : .·.: .. 
over land and thus :diven :the focus c :!traditional Malay loyalty from them 1• To their great . -.: .. : ·: :' ._: · : _:;·:.:~~".-· .. ~,t .. '.· 
disappointment •and fear, the Malay nationalists saw the Union proposal as a threat to the . 
sovereignty of Malays as an indigenous people and :therefore: 
. 'a death blow to theirsr.nus in :£heir homeland. They feel that it·. 
· -would .drive them back w ihe unprogressive kampun¥s, where 
they and their civilization are eventually bound to perish 
(Department of Malayan Union Affairs, 1974:4 ). · . . . .: ··:.". .- ": .... 
. . 
.•·'. 
. Strong protests camefirsrfrom;the Malaye"lites Ied·by Dato.:Onn.bin.Jaafar. Under·<..· .. ; .. :'··:.,"..·;. ::/}:if'''·"· 
. ,: - ·. · .. : \··. _-:: : .. :~· ;~[: 
his leadership, UMNO-was ·created in May 1'946 to oppose :,the Union, Supponed IJ.y .. '.70 · ....... - · · · 
to 80 per cent:<>f.:the ;Malay·:pop.ulation, .UMNO .'succeeded in·.allying the:ari~tocracy aric(. : .. · ... · .· ;:'_: .·"; ~; ·/! . ( 
1 lt was·~klevatDmt~~gtn1en1.- ~pun1nve.~•o~tolAAR•~Ww ljad~I•~~· : ·.·, ·.i·'. 51 . 
. ·with the· lapane$e:d~gztlJe,oe¢.µ,patiS)n'{Sop,~eef l9-i74; P.urce.ll. 1954 ). .: . :: : . · . : . · . · ,-. :- •-:· . · -:· .... . · .- :··L: _;::::;-
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peasantry (Purce~~- 1954:$1)-.In<~he.-fa~~ ~ef,:d~mo~"$tr~ti~.ns:and.prot.ests, th~: B.ritiSh 
colonial go~emmen t was .tinally:forc-ed. _to· withdraw :the -Malay~n: Union· .. Constfru·tj~n. · 
Subsequently in July- .1946-,.a-:Workirtg -Cmnrnittee.was.-s.et.':up to·:am.end the Constit1,ttion · .:.· 
. and reSUibe Malay tjghts.u.nder a new Federal Constitution. Among the 12.merll:bers·of 
·this Committee, none:reptesented the interests of the non-Malay ethnic groups~·{Sopiee. ·. 
HJ7 4: 37). UMNO thus· had used its .peasant :power base to -secure important concessions : · 
. . 
from the colonial state and. enshrine Malay interests· in any future constitutional 
settlement. Moreover, such demands were reinforced bythe subsequent o:utbteak of .the· 
'Emergency1 .in 1948, a rebellion led ·by the predominantly Chinese ... led Communist 
forces. 
The Emergency meant that the colonial government had to choose a closer alliance 
with UMNO and the Malay ,elites. especially as the Chinese population failed to.respond 
to the call. for mobilisation. B~cause the Communist panisans were overwhelmingly 
Chinese. it was also a .cortlmon view for the Malay elites to identify the Communist 
menace as a. 'Chinese threat' (Ratnam, 1965). Indeed~ all achievements .gained ~Y 
UMNO ovenhe Malayan Union issue .could have been lost should the Communists ha"Ve . 
won their cause. The Ernetgency also forced the British to :take interest in transfonning 
the Malay peasantry for strategic reasons. Jn 1948, fearing that their poverty issue would 
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be exploited by the CoOiillunists,·the -colonial government accepted UMNO's demands to ';:;: ('. 
draw the Ma.lay population more fully into the country's mainstream economy by ...... ; .. :.~.'~_, ..... ~:·.:,1\··_·······:···~.; 
gradually-bringing1hem::to the.modem agricultural and urban sectors {Antrobus; 19.89:6}~ :.. I 
A grant of 10 million pounds. was--also .requested for assisting-the ·Malay,pe.asants .. ·· .. : ): :_'.:·::; ·;:·~~l1i\~ 
. . I . "';~ ~-.;.{-'·! 
. (Ratna~, 196S:!46), and .me.Rural 1U1<Undusrrial Development Audtority (fUDA) was . , · . . 1 .. : !'___:· -~~-.:::;:_\~~< fio.·-ed tn 1'°50 . . . . ·. . .,. . ·. ,,;y,. ~·l.U ·~ • '," • • •' • •• ,• • ' . . • :." ··•r'~'~·~· 
. ·: · · '. , · i ·· ... , ,_ ..... Htj~ 
. . . . . . ·:-· 
• o •'o ',0 •'I ':. 
2 There were ·p,rotests from-'non.::.M~~ ,i;ganisati9ns.-such.as<lh.e P.an¥M:alayarr:Council .0.r Jo.int.~Ac~~-... :_ .. : .. ~· _·:<:· _;_::'_ .. _-;· :'~'.;:f 
(PMCS AC). formed .in:·:Dee~mt>er ::t,946:.·t~l>:e~pr.ess--'lheit :disagr.eeme:nt .t(> lhe·-Feder:atipn ,aJtei;nau:ve~ ·. · ~: :· · ·' >: :".: · ;. 
·.WiU1 Tatr.·Cheqg Lock-u·cb~~,;·tl).~ qi;gan~aUoo;~mprised vecy :diverse..'.po"litjcaLgm~ps aitd was . .: · :"'.' ·. · .. ;': ::--',~: 
. :.too .-loose .,and 'di'lid:ed :to. ;hav.e·;:any ·'i.Jl'fI~~nl3~_;;o,t1 ·tb~ .W;otking .. :Go.tnm•tt~. ·Whe. .,~ew·-,F.~et~l: :--:." , · . . :'. ''·; :.:· 
Conslitution ~a.s.-finil:lty.-p~¢<h\n.F.e.b.i::1).3F)' .. ~9.4'.8.. · . · · · .. · · · · ·: ··. .: .. · ,- _;. ·. : . .'. ·: · 
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insurgents :needed. :·to, ,:be .. ·dealt ;wi~ · fromoa···poHtical .. ·~nd- ·military :pei;specdve. 
Consequently.~ <Clearh~g>thejuttgle. and= :securing ·the ''frontier wa~ part :of the ·strategic· . 
deployment ·to combat the Communist partisans .and strengthen the.:state {Bahtin. and ""· : <.: ": :. : :; :. ,:._", .l: " 
Pareta, 1977). .... · .: .... : .. : . .:._.- ;.·: '.T-
. . " ... ': .. .. . : ~ " : . '. . .: . 
Thus, political fostabilirybefonHndependence in 1957 provided a slrong ;mpems ' '> .·. .. ·· <: '~~. '· 
to the-adoption of .a resource frontier strategy. Ethnic politics and the rise of UMNO 
pinpointed the Malay peasantry as the main .·recipi.ents .of any strategy while the 
........ ~ .... :.:.<t{·-. 
. ". •·. .. '· . ~:~" ;. . 
. . . .. . ;~-.; . . 
.. ·• '. '.·, :~. : h~;_.·: 
.·: :." :· · ...... :. ·· ... {~'..~ .. 
Emergency.highlighted several other.concerns: rapid economic growth would have to be · ·~_'.;:··':"<:·: :,- .ti~·'.::.· 
pursued as -an alternative to the ideological challenge of Communism; and the remote ···<· ·:-' · .· ··. ·7:> = 
. ~~~~~i 
Poverty and tbe Malay.Peasantry, 1955·69 . . · .. · .. · ,; . ' ; ~' <!::L'/·~<:) 
··.· ...... :. ·.' ... 
. . . · ... : . ::. '(.:'·: .. :' 
·With the approach .of Independence and development ofethnic politics, another key ·· . ~ · : :-.. -:"<~:<."' ·• . 
. . ...... : .::. :·: .< .. :~... :.: 
· problem - widespread poverty.among the Malay peasants- achieved prominence and· . . '. .. ·,:':'.·i>·.-~~;.:, ··, 
: .. ·:.~ ~ .... :~~:.: -~ .. ·::.·:~·'. ~i 
attracted the attenrion·ofhoth colonial and post·independe.nce .governments. It needed ··. >· t~<: ::( ··:: 
• '• ·._: OM •• :: ~ •• .·, )(: ?i 
more attention because the ·peasantry was able to exercise its considerable power through · :.. ., · ·<: ·; . ;: . . t : . ··:;r :. i! 
' . - 3 . . . .. " .. \:: : ... ·~:· ~ :·~··_· .. ~-:.~t.::· (~ 
thepoll-the1mpactwasfttstfelt1nthe·general electtons·of 1955. . .. : ·.-·.: .... : :·> :,-~<-" .. :··'·l·' ·::i'f t, 
During me coJonW p~~ mere were ~cally two contrasting secrors wi~ th~ ..• ·•· .• -; , ;,,'-~-};iflJI 
rural economy: (a) a slowly ,growing modern plantation and mining sector buoyed by . =· .. : ••·• :, '··ffC.,;:t;~ 
. . . •• ..,. ........ , 11·.· \· . 
. improved productivity based on imported technology; :and (b) a stagnant .traditional· ·:~' _ <-r, .' .. · · .. ·.-;/:::;}~{~ 
. . . ... . u. ·":oi"·I 
peasant sector {Ness,· 1967; Sundaram; :1986). ·Being.·neglected ,and :petipheralised in. :the.·; ·. :'. :·. :::,:.·:.:,;~:··~· .;'>~':;:;,; .:J,ti'.~i 
prooessofmoder.nisa:tion~::the.~pe;;tsartts lived· .. fa,.su:bsistence and were:imd~r constant:.:: · · ... · ·;),.,Jt~l'. j 
. . ... . ". .. . .. ·. ·.:~- \:·· . 
:: . 
'. . . - . ; ·'.'.: . . . , .... 
3 The 1955,genetaI.electio~:aciuai1~;~ai~¢d:~tii~·;pea.~efvl·:~sfer;~·r .. ~~e/rr~~·~e'nri.~sh t~ ~e::l~~: -:; ··<_:'.·.,: .. :·;. "· 
, elites.-rellfesented. ·in·.aMlllia®~-;~hictv~~·too:b,y; Uniied:Ma~ys Nai.iqnal;Qr-garti~tion:r:put 'incly.ded · :. · . ."·.. · .':~ -":.:· .: :: ,:--·: 
lhe Malayan Chinese-ASSOCiation~ancI M~day.m.1Jn9.ian.Coi)gress.:·:Followin,:g tl:te.ir v)~tof:Y..J.he ~.see~ ... · : ".· . ";:; '. )., -
-[wl\~~(~i-N~;·;~;; :~'I_f ,,,_rjt_(,i.:,rL;,::);,,::,5 '.:~~'.,;:"; 2:~!,;,·~;;,~ 
. : .. 
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.· . 
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.:·.·· 
• . ! • .. 
. . . .· ·: ' ... : ; '. _.: .::.. :: ... : .. ·\: ._ .. : ... ::".<: .. ;, .:;'.:'_:" ~· 
• • . . : •. • :: • : •• . •. :-= 
.. ':.· ..... .' .· . . _·· . :., . ~·:. 
- . : · .. ·· .. :·.: 
.. · .. 
•• • • • 1 •• ,_· : •• " .. ~ • ~-:· •• ; •• ; • : .' •• ,' ' 
· .. t~eat ·:of,::irtdebt~dness" ·low ~pt<;>ductivity ,--H~favoutable· :tti4i'keting artarige~eni~·:,atid. · <:. ;.·. ":_..- · .· >·:: 
insecurity of:, te11ute' {Lim, 1977 :225), Genera.Hy, pea:sanrs .-;w:ere.jsolaceJ .: fr~m:'. :-.:; ':- .~ ·. ~ .. ~~ ·.· . 
. ·:'>'."., 
mainstream economic activities .and lack of suppoiting-infrastrncture, some with $Utplus· · :·; ... ·.:., 
. : ·ric.e or commercial crops benefited marginaliy.from the exchange economy. · 
•• = ::. • • •• 
. . 
Added to this problem ofsubsistence peasantry was .. the fragmentation issue-rooted 
in land inheritance.· Whether by Islamic .law of inheritance or by customary law. the size 
. : .. ~. ~--.~·· : ·: . 
of inherited land shared among heirs often became uneconomic (Wilson, 1958; Aziz, · ... .-
· .. · 
1965~ Fujimoto, 1983). The 'Agricultural CensusofMalayar conducted in 196Qreflected · · .. <'.:' ... · .... _. 
· ... :~. ·~.· ·~·::. 
the land fragmentation and landlessness of ·.the post .. war peasantry. According to the ·t'.'. · , " :::.: ._ ..... · · 
. . ; ...... -<·:: : ... ··. •' .::::::.t 
Census, there was a marked disparity in land ownership. About 55 per cent of all · . · \ · · . .'· .~ ·. " .·~ 
'• ... ·::: 
cultivated land within the country was owned by 20 per cent of land owners (estates of .. , /:<·;:.·:,:·:·'..·'. ,.:.·,} 
• !· • :: ~ ... ; ~: : ,\ ... ~ 
over 40 ·hectares) (Bahrin, 1975:2). Conversely, there were 545,000 smallholders in the ; . : .·: .::· >. .. · ·:· :· :J j;i 
: · · <-·:·"~:'ii .:.': '. T :~~f 
country whose land size fell below 40 hectares. Almost half owned less than 1.2 hectares ... -';- :>:··· :; .. /l :':~j~ 
. . . .•• ., ..... ·· ·. ; 1· ~ !~ .~+ 
and the majority of them were Malays (Ali, 1983; Wafa. 1972). Moreover, most of these·.·-..: .. \·:.·-_:·:\: >::)f);'.1~ 
'. . ":· .. .. : ·:.:'> ·. ::'.~ f;:'.~·~ 
small parcels of land were concentrated in the rice growing .areas in Perlis, Kedah and : . _:" ... ;:,'..-.:/fl\~~; 
. . .'· ..... ' :: ';.-<< '(~~! 
Kelantan. More than half of the rubber and rice fanners were tenants who had to pay ... :;·:.· '·:-"': ;·: >,:,.::.(j'.:'.~1 
. . ... '· .. - . : . :\~·:> .:: -; :lj 
from one-third to one·half of their harvest to the landlords. Indeed, more than 400~000 ". · .:·-~ : .. ' .... ; .... : .. ,. '.'J(;;)~ 
. . . '.: .: ·: :' : .. .'::~:l~~.\ ;-~~;. ~ 
(i.e half of -the Malay working population) depended on small rice farms for·their. · : .. ,;; .. \f~;;::<,~ 
. . ·. · ... :.· ?:~·/.:·.;2:~ ~·~. -'~ ~:~ 
liveiihOOd .(Aziz, 1975:21). :,. :J. ": · 
" . 
... Poverty and .lanii hunger .problems ·were .. particularly .widespread:·in rural areas .. :· · 
:where Malays wcre·dQminant. Underem.ployment w.as common and·demand fodand had 
not been met ·By the·mid-1950S.-there were 100,000 .or more applications for land titles "·: ·. '. · ·_. ..... :,:;_C 
held up in various land offic.es in Malaya (MacAndrews, ·1978:6). Under the.colonial , . ''..'.{;: :<:: .. ?(·,::·: 
rule, relief.of land hunger by redistribution of large estates owne4 by·foreign· interesrs.o~ ·: :. ::". ' .. :" : ..; :-· ·::: .:; ... , ;:: 
•.. . . . . .. ~ ·: . . •. ". 
any ·other.:foll'Il·ofexptopriatb.m,was..avo.ided.:Consequentlyy..-the state sought tQ·Open :u.P. ". · ")/-'}.. : 
.• ··.·· . 
jungle .:land&'-which ·still covered:80;p.er cent.of :the .~alay Peninsula as an· alternatjve:~·.and· · -..<·::\·:·: · ·'.· · ..... :.::.;: 
: modem cash ;ci:op· agricul~ ~~,ad(\lpted :tQ·'·P'.roniote,Malay .. ·~gncultdt~,deve-iopitient~ · :' .. :~. ··:;_.:~ .. ~::·.-:~~:(:;/.~::~'.t:'. 
. · · ' •. · • ~ · · • . ,· . ':. ·.: ,.; ·.:\~:.~:,-~:\r .r. • ·:: 
·.··· 
· -·.•· :.: · < · . ·. : <: ·; .. ;::: :? : : /t:·'. > ··L,··:: 
. · 6S. · . · . · · ·· . . · .... · · ..... · .......... "'·~\:: 
. . . . . . . ·. : :... ...}:<:~ ..... :. :: ;: : .. : ........... :_ ..... ;. / ..... : ·. :: < ..~;. :: > :. ;:~:1:: ..... : ..:<.f ·: './:/ll>·. ~~:.::\ 
. . 
.. 
. :. · ... 
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:":· •, ..... 
. .. .. . . ·:... . 
. .. ·· .... 
·:. . . . .. 
. , ·.: .· .. : 
. ·. 
•,1 •• ·:. 
· .. : .· :.. . . : :· . .... . 
. .. · .
. . ~- .· 
. . . ·" ·. . . ~':.· . :- : : \ . , . 
• '• •' • • ' .•,' •I• . .~ 
. :· . " :,:: : . ..... :.: ~ .: . . ... 
. . .. ·. . .. : · .. 
• •J • ... 
.remained::t>lecettteal :and lacked:spatialf«us. This defici:enc;yhadJ~s,odgin:fu)ni'the J1ost .... '.· .. :.: :< :·. :.: : ; :> ::;;:: 
... ··. ~. _.,. ..... .. . : .. :·:·' ·?J 
war Draft Development. ,Plan :of 1950 whi:ch concentrated on.-;:sec:tor:al development - · ::· \· .: .. ··:<·.:; .. :::_ ·1}: 
basically agriculnrral =(MacKenzie~ 1951 ). The Plan was.:s~pplemented by a Mission from ... : :.: · .. ,. · .. ,. ... : ;:_/{k· 
::::: ::::::::~~=:tb~::::d:::~B::f:-::;: ··;;:'/ ·::r. 
existing ·economic potential, the Mission recommended to boost aggregate growth - a :·:: /: / /·: .. '')/ . 
: : . :: ·~ 
typical macro-strategy of the 19.SOs. Impressed by agriculture's position in the .export .... :.· .. _::,/~ ... :r. ::-: ~t{: 
:::g::;;:;:::::~~:::~:::::: :::;,:::: ;::: ··.• C.:\\.K: 
~=::~:~:.::::::::~ ;::~2:,. Consequently in 1955, the Econo~c;,• •·•••• ,;;:X.i l'.: . 
. 'increase National Income+ output and wealrh- and to do so in· ··· . . : _, ... · :::.':_· :·· }.; .. :· : 
· ·directions which will contribute substantial Revenue to the . · ·'. · · : .'·., '"·. ·:" -~ ... :. :.;: ·, y .... . 
· · Budget. This means Rubber. Tin and other Mining, new ... · · :: · · ·. ': :. ~; ·:. ; · :'. .... .;, · · 
·· · .. ]ndustries and the opening .up of new land I italics added]'. ·., :· . . :: .. : .... ': :. ; -.:_ .·; · .. ::· ·. :~·. -~'_.\.: ... ~ .·~· ; 
Thus, on theM'Q} front. FELDA was set up in 1956 as a stare-sponsored operation to :· •. .,l .. ··· .. 
manage smallholder development to bolster growth and to relieve rural poveny. lt had . : ::: · .... : .: .. ~.:: · ... ·• . 
::c::::;:::::::::::P ::.:::'"::~ anu~d:::~ ~::::li:: ·• •.. : :~;~J .. '.U'.I:; ,;i: 
traditional spirit of tgotong royong' (mutual help) and to avoid field negligence; and, : =: · ':: .. : /:,-. . ..-=: · l:\~!;~:.~ 
•• ·• • •• : . ·! • :: . ;. ~. };~~?>~~~~:i~:R 
because of its relatively large scale. the scheme was operated as an agri-business. ·· ·:· .>',::-_. · .. ·3:\;~\)§ 
. . ··'.:· .... •·. ··:';:;-:·- ;(~>~ 
Besides FELD A, the UMNO· led :govemment also created ,other institutions to promote . / ~.; . · ·'. ::: : ( ·' .: ~f ::,;·'.'.if~t!~ 
: . . .· .· ,. ·: : .. :~·; ''.•:f ::J-i 
rural development~.especially .after the 1959 general election, where many Malay Votes .. ·.···:: .. .:> : ... : .: r~ ):~:~1.~ 
• • • :'> .. •' • ,,., ·~ 
. . . . .i.... ~ '"t..,,.,.a. 
were lost to -the challengiitg P:;m Malayan Jsl.amic :Party in the rural areas (Kassim, 1979). · . · . · ·· · : f-,:('i,}t:!!t 
. · .... : .. ~ .... ::_.· ::. .. ~ _:: ·. :~'.:;::;}~l1.~! 
Among them FAMA.(FederalAaric.ultural Marketing Authority) was set up in 19.65,to · "' ''. ·:: : :.·:'·· · .. ,;_::h";\jrJf 
, . . . . ·' . ;e.• 4' • • ·..• • • • • • f":r·"~':"i~Pf/t,'1~ i1 
promote marketing:-of tnral·produce·so-as.-to. improve fanners.and .fishertnen~s;bargaining · :_ -~ -~·,··. ;,:· .. , .· · .··.':::\f' 
. ' . . : ... . . . . . ' ~ : .. ~. . ..... ": 
.. •'······ ·. 
4 Self·.suffi:ciency in rire:produotion.-:a~ording tothe:Misston'steport,was not encouragedmainly::tiue · :: :, · .. · .... oi;'_ ·. 
to'financial:and.soihuitability::~ns. .· · . . . . . .. ·.. ·· , :·. . .... , , · .,: ··:· :''< .. · · ... 
. ' . . . . .. . .... . 
', ' ' ·> ' : ' ; ' : ' ' ' < ' (,: ::,:,< ': 
• • • ' : '• • • •• • • • • : • • ' ' ,".:' ~· ' • ;> I 
. . .. .· . . ... ···. . . 
power~ .·quality .. Q.f ;qutlut:;·an·d::'ft):;~_re-~::;mµldl~m~~~~::::~~nop~~tiy.:·.in,· l9~6.~··FEL~·- >::~._ >'. <::·->·(. :;.:·_' : . 
(Federal La.nd:ConSQlidauon:·.and·:R:enabili.tiltirr~ A.uttrorlty):w-as e.reated :tt);tehabili.~re ,~d:: .. ·~ ". ·. · :.. -.·:";"J.:>.·;"'; ·: 
imFt-c'.lVe a_gri:culrural :'holdi'ngs. :ihy introducing .mod·em .:a.grlc·ult-l;lral ·:prac:ttces. ;~,.a.i .:._ ... ~·· · .:,:· ... _,\:: .. · .._·:·, .. >t 
developing :new :~w :onthefrln.ges.·Futrher~ MAR.nl {Mala:y.sian.Agri.cu:ltutal.-Resear.;h .. · .. :(::.,. .:::<·;:: ·/ .. :'.=~. 
and Development ln:®tme) emerged in. 1.9:68 ·to undenake-rese~ch ·of :vari-0.u.s :crqp:s ·~ .·:· · _._. .. _: .. ·:~· ~:. :>:·::: ... \' ... , .. 
from rubbert liv.estocl4 pouluy and fre:shwa:ter :fisheries {Ongkili. 1985:225). . ··. ·. ;, · ... :. /i::: .. · · · 
. .:.': .. ' .>·::/.\'.··, :'.·.-. .. >:~:_-::::-:::;~:. 
· There was, lmweveti. less :effort being made in $he ·urban areas ro promote Malay. ·:-":. :·::"<(:':. :>~~ · 
interests in eommerc·e anti industry. :few Malays !benefited &om ihe adoption ·'O.f the .. : :~· :.::;.;>: . ::.:t. · 
'Pioneer Industries Or-dinnnce in J.958 which provided .inoenth•es for manufacturing : < ·.': .:. ·: ::\<:·. · .. 't 
impon~su:bs.ti.mtion goods. The:sarne was true with the creation of the Malayan .lndustriai . . . . "·: .. ;·: ... :'. "" . " }~;· .. 
. . ~ .. , ....... :. .. ·~:. . 
Development finance Bori>ad (MIDF) in 1960, whose wk was "';provide medium 1illd · : , ,_·"-~- : 
long :term .-capital ::to 'entrepreneurs of manufacturing. In 1965. the Malay entrepreneurial ... . ... : '.. ~~'~ 
class within UMNO demanded that unless the .government intervened in the private · .. · ··.·:'..':f. 
sector. they would have little chance of success in busin·ess (Baharuddin., 198'6: 190). 
. ··:.: ·. ~.: :~·.·~ .. ~_ .. ::: .. ~-. 
Their demand :accelerated .the ·establishment in 1966 .of Majlis Amanah Raayat {MA.RA}- : ,,- :·:. ::.; : :·:· '::" .£·.''. · j 
the Counoil ofTrustforlndigenwsPeople.. ltreplaced:rhe:ineffecriveRIDA. With:anew. .: .' ·::.-:::'~>.:"_:£· .. · ..... · ~· 
organisational stroctore~ MARA's responsibility has been much larger. It has since···:'. . .'.. ?'.:::·:. ;; ··:~t . 
. . . . . . 6 .. . . . ...... /y~: ~ • .. ; ... 
become the largest :supplier .of loans m vanous forms to Malay 'entrepreneurs . Wath 11ts · .. ·... . ·: . ._::. : ;: ,. 
== t====::;~:::::~:).•d~wcy. ~mn~, .•... : : ..•• , .•.• : ···'.'.Jil;·~!~i 
· · Desnite these ·;efforts promoting Malay interests in both rural and urban sectors. the.. ..:.: ~:: :·· :~ }:~···\:ii:~;~. 
i· ~ • :•, •, '. f,; '.!ff..r~:"C' 
.... -:. . . ·;: ... . . . . ;''.;'.:·~~· "; \~:d?~{: 
economic :gap 'between .Malays and non .. Ma1ays as :a whole remained large. 'The -. <· .. : · ,,:,.::. '. (:. ":;'.~i:ii 
. . ... ·. ~ . .::· ...... , ..... ;_-~~¥: ~;·><:~!~r~-
·1nv.esttnen1 .Incentives Atf ·of 1·968 which granted !exemptions rof r0ompany tax, relief ', '" . .":",,;:. · ..,:,.·. :::.. ;'}:; .-' 
. ··:.:: .. :·_,::>/: /X 
from pay-roll trut :and ·export incentives t0firms 1estabfished ourside the Ke1ang Valley had · · · · .... 
... . . . . .'\}_;~~;!~' 
benefited more forejgn .and non-Malay .investors. Y.et, large numbers of Malay peasants ·· '. ;-_ ... · :;·~: · .: : /fi 
. . ... .. ....... · .. ·: ..... · ... " ' .... :.. . ... . .. .... ; ' .. :.~:i:·.~~: ··y .~·~.\ 
______ .. "· : . : ' ........ ,:· :<.::" ."·/·' >" <::<:\.;:· \:·:·:>.>:<. ;<'. ·:··: :<;: ........ <:': 
6 Up .w 1'982. MAAA:lli>,fntM'.il .. 60;260 Joans:~un~n.,g to 'S388 .million-·muSt ·of lhese .loans were~· · <_': · ... · .~ '::.:.'. 
· lrowevet;oU~.lhaw.SS~000.~:60·iPei"·~nt:w.iillout·seouti.cy~f1ee., 19'86!92-'93}. . ·:. ·: . '.· . ·'. ·.: .. _::'. · · ..... ._ .. :-:; 
... · .. · ........ ··,, .•· .. :, .. : ... ,., ... ··:' ,·, ~ · ....... ~-.-.<: ... ·~·~-.:·~.;··· .. ·;.·~·~~:·~~ 
. . .. . ... ~ ·.· . =-. . .. .. ~ · .. ·. ' . . " ·.· .. . . \ ........ •·. ,.· ,.-.. :~ : . ·. :'· .. : ..... :· .·_ ...... ::~:;~ :~: :.~ .. . ;::. . ~ ·· .• 
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. .'. : : :". .. 
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. ....... . 
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0
:::::.=:::::.p;'8aJ'Theyrernajned poor and·. ):h1t·• 
.. .. /·: . ._:: .. · :·\::\ ./': .. ·; 
.... :· ·:-:·. '..· .·· ....... ~ ..... :· ·.:'. .. <;·~" 
Racial I~equali.ty:·and the NEP · · · .. : .. : '.' < . ··,,.-:· ... :. ...... ' . .:'~·, 
The-relative. tack of achievement made by the Malay p~as~trY~ ~dclle clasi·~~'. ·'·"' ~-~-': .,:. :<'· ;\_.. '.'.~::.t:,; 
UMNO's elites ~ontributed to :mounting frustrations in the face -0f :a .rising inter~··:"·"/.::~:·~;.,.:::::):··_}\:} 
communal inequalities. Their dismay was further agitated when the economic.ally > .. <::~:_'..:· .. :.;.,::"'/;:·~.:f · · 
.·. . .. 
stronger ethnic Chinese demanded a greater share of political power as reflected by the '. :;:~ ... :::·: .. ..... -.:::· 
·.. . . .... 
Democratic Acri on Patty's winning of a large number of parliamentary seats in the May .. :. · ."· .. :'/.. : .. :<;· . 
. : : : .... , .. , 
. . : : : . •\ <·: ·~·~.··~;.· 
1969 election (Gale .. 1981:26·29). When the racial riots broke out on May 13, .. · ·r. 
: . :~ ·"._:.:.~ ... ' ,... . , .... ;; .. 
. . . . . 'ff .... 
· parliamentacy proceedings were suspended and an decisions related to national matters_ : '. :.,/= :'.,::.;} .iJ.. 
were assumed by. the .National ·Operations Council headed by Tun Abdul Razak7 who ... ·.--.:· /: '.,.;. .. :. ·: .'{ · · 
became Prime Minister from 1970 to 1976. The Council's primary task was again to put · · .. = .. : •• ·: "<") .· · -.;;.,:· ·: · 
the Malay poveny issue on thefonun. . . . .. : .':·/'. ::-:-"':~· ~\-. 
........ ·:<.· ':·\;'.:.; ..... :~{~'. 
The magnitude of inequalities between Chinese and Malay was apparent. Their.:··: .. ·:· · ::.· .<'.::·· · ;.f 
disparities also had ·direct regional parallels (Table 3 .1 ). In 1970, the per capita income in . . · .. ·::,' .. /.· ~ :.:~: .. ,. 
Peninsular Malaysia :was lowest in Malay dominated states - Kelantan, Trengganu, ... 
... 
Kedah and P.e.rlis. Between the richest ·state of Selangor .and the poorest state of · · · 
", .. : 
Kelantan1 .the disparity was 3.5 times in per .capita income. The Malays made up 7 4 per 
cent of poor households compared to -17 per cent for Chinese and 9 per cent for Indians 
and others (Government of Malaysia, 1976:180). Moreover, about 85 per cent of the 
' ,.•I•' • 
Malay pOpulation was rural compared to 48 per cent for the Chinese and 35 per ,cent for ... ' .. :.'· · 
the Indians. The Malays owned only 1.5 per cent ofall share capital of limited companies · :·~ : ·:: · }_ ·: .'> ·I;~\t 
·~ ... ";; /·.:':. . : y : ·.,{;.f i~; ) 
compared to 62 per cent-0wned by foreign companies and the remainder by local Chinese 
. . --·~· ···. 
. ". 
..·· 
• .. - . 
. . . 
.. ··• .. . .~ ; .. 
.... 
. " 
·' •,: .. 
·<: ~-: 
... : 
.. 
. ,• 
·-. ?/fable 3.1 · 
.. . :· ·.' ".:· 
.. 
·:·Per .".Capita: J,,~mne.:by .St.a:te'.~md:::Ethnicity in.·Peninsuiar ... ·Malavsia, '.1970 · 
. . . : 
-Sta1e. 
Job or 
·Kedahl 
Perlis 
Kelant.an 
Melaka · 
Negri 
Sembilrui 
Pahang 
Penang 
Perak. 
. Selangor 
Trengganu 
· ..... Gp~~ ··: "Population·: :.Per :Capita .. :Rati~ to ... ;:.Perce.ntage · 
.. ,.{$Malb()n), .(000) ... :GDP :($). ·Malays~an .'of.·Malay .. 
Aver.age . 'Po.p.ulatio~ . 
.. 1~193~9 . 1~277 900.4 .. 0.91 .. : 53.4 
743_3 1;;07·6 
.. 
"'329.6 686. 
334.5 --.404 
·489.7 481 
512.0 -sos. 
794.7 775 
1~598.2 . 1.569 
2,736.7 . . : . 1~631 
249.1 :· :406 
·665.4 
462.9 
798.3 
... 979.4 
975.2 
987.2. 
. 981.1 
1~616.S 
. . 591.7 
·0.67 
0.47 
0.'80 
0.99 
·0.98. 
0.99 
. 0.99 
1.63 
0.60 
· ...... 43.0 
34.5 
93.7 . 
' ' ~:u ·-~:·~:':( . 
. .· ·: .. ·~ .. 
. · .. 
,•, . . . ·. ::~ 
" : : . ~ .. : .. 
Total 
Note: 
. 8,981.7. 8,810 895.8 
a Gross .domesnc product. 
b Average for .Peninsular Malaysia. taken as 1.00. 
Govemment.:cfMalaysia.-197la~ 1976:2.01 (adjusted). 
1.oob 53.1 
.. . .... :. 
and Indians (G.wemment of Malaysia, 197lb;40). ~en~ M.;aysia's povert)'pr~~I~ ' ?;fr}\~~! 
:o:::u::red ~ili·~ •. ~d ~~upatlo~ but wasreflecwd in~-"\ .7:.:":;~;'.;;;'.#lii .• 
By 1970, indeed, the UMNO ruling elites and their supporters owned little of the .: , .. ·>_'.' '·, ·~t : 
.. _- . :.·. :._ :: .. l::/L : 
• • • ' ' . I . : .~ ' ,• •: :."'•{ 
modem sector~ a situation in sharp contras.tto the MCA (Malaysian :Chinese Association) . : :. · "-· · . · /., -:_·:,~·,J;}· 
. .. :,,, ·. ·. ~ ' . .'..' ::; . 
leaders who had originated from business circles. UMNO's small economic gains were :. _'·: ·. ~·~(:· ';, )i; 
. . . . ·. : _·· ,· ~. :. . .;. :. ·. :;·:' 
.. ·.· 
· ..... 
· .. 
: 
•' • '.· I• 
. more secure inJh~.Jate·J;960s;-Jt:.~s:~c'.tfo~ger rieceS;S;irr: for .. lJMNO.etttes· tcf:keep·~~ .. :.: :. -_:.: '. ... : .: .. , . 
'compronrlse1.:with·;a ·weakened··MCA'&'. · · . ' . . .. :. . · ·· , .. ·· ·. ·. ·. ·,-. · .. : 
.· . 
. '• ... :· :' 
. . 
The modem -sectorst ·however .. ·were largely urban·bas~d. ·nus . .- ·the N~~ '.": ,· -.:._.··-, ·: '.Y.J.-
.... •, 
Economic Policy (NEP) was formulated in 1970 toimensify,.developmen.t.programs to. .. -.· .. : ... > :".,, ·!·: . 
: ." . / ) , ..~~ ::· .. 
benefit UMNO's ·supporters-through a sttongly.imerventionistapproach. The policy .... 
. associated the Malay .poverty issue with .spatial ,and ethnic features in ·stressing two . 
. objectives: (a) to·,eradicate-poverty·regardless.ofrace; and (b) torestructore society so.as 
te>.eventually eliminate theidentification,ofrace with -economic function.and geographic · .': ... 
. ... :· {:_: .. ·,\::: 
::::: a~:;:::~:a;~::P:::;~;; ~~: :::::i:•:l::~::: ..•.. · ..•. >:[:·~· 
urbanisation process •. Enhanced access to modern urban services. therefore. was .. ,.. ·· 
interpreted as a method ofreducing the incidence of Malay poverty. The NEP became the ·:/.'·~ -~~,;:>· 
. : ... ~·{~: . 
blueprint for government policy which thereafter was commi~Led to both economic . "· ·: -.· .. :::_".;.: .... ;_'!:'..r.::.·.: ... :> 
modernisation and ethnic: redistribution. 
Hence. by 1970, Malaysia faced a number of critical problems. These were issues . ..·· ;_ · ir i 
which had.arisen in .the post .. warperiod but had not been resolved. and in some cases, . : :.:·> 'f.:/·,. 
had even become tnore acute :after a decade of Independence. Poverty and landlessness .· ·::,:_ ·:; '.~~\'. · 
still haunted the rural masses and new land settlement and improved standards of living . . , <:,-i .. ';il ... 
were vital to their .alleviation .. Such absolute poverty was compounded by distribution in . : .. : . .:-_- ._. .' :. ·>:~/ ·: 
1
1;p·., 
. . ... :. ::· ·.~,.::::!ti·~·-~ 
both ethnic and spatial tenns. Malays fared worse than others; rural areas lagged behind ". ~.' :.·'.:::·>:: ,,_ t~~}ij\J~ 
. the cities; and regionally, the Malay-dominated east coast states ·Were poorer than the.: · .. ·. :·' .:· ' ·: :f:..::·,:,:,:~ 1K~ 
. .• • • . ~/. · .• ;.~_;1;_'.:~ ·,3 
Chinese-dominated west coast states. There was also a political dimension: the Malay ... ::.::·:·:.:.·, .•· _f;)M'.l1! 
.. ·. · .. : > <::.-::{_::·\;~~-ift~ 
peasantry was the basis of VMNO's support and they had to be appeased if UMNO were : '· · .-:::... · '. ', :L<3~1;~ 
._: . . ' .. : .· ····'• ;. :~·;:i~~~-~f#jll 
to stay in power. The ,stage :was. set for a ·new policy initiative heralded by the. riots of .·. . ·/ · ·: ... ~: : :' ': }?:-;]~~j 
. . . · .. ; ... ' ••I] 
1969. The NEP fonnulatedin 1970 had to target the Malay peasann:y..and the east coast: :, .". ·:·'.·:.'· r: \: ·::: ·~ J:f ~~'lfli 
. . . . . . . . . = .. :: :· ·:·:· ·.: .. _. ..... ··: ... ·.:·.·,_~~ ....I.~.·~ . 
. · . . ... ~. .. . . . . : .: ·=~ ·. '. .· . ·.· ... . . . -· .. 
8 The ~compromise.'.:between UMNO ,and::MOA.:.as-:politicatariiance·:in.:the:.19.SOs· was,'.lll~n, ihe.:Nrttlay.: ·. \ ~:_,: . 
should ·maintain ,the :control-of :political .:system :and ospeciaLrights wber~:lhe :Chlnese.~flo~.rd::be.. . ·.' "> .. ::· : · 
•
0
.giventreebantHnmeecon()my{Means.l986:lOO'-l01).. . . . .. . . . ".- . .. .... ,. · :·-.-: :\::·~ ·:·: "·': ·· ,. 
' . .... . . . .. -..::.-. . " ..... :-... >: ..... ·: .: .. ": ....... ; \." -~::::<·~·=>:·: .. ::···:•/./. :.;.~: 
.... ': ~ .. : ..~~:~,: .. :::i .. ~:;"~~"*'~.iSJL2~-J~t121.·~~.,~,i,_~f .i:L: .. !dG.:i ·. -l~~~-
... 
. . . 
. . 
Despite the heavy hanct.:ofinterve11tionin the private sector, it also embraced a ·ccmrl,n~ed : 
commitment:. to :·capital~sm !Ind. export-orientation. Y. et, the NEP ·and~ problems:·th;t 
foreshadowed jt:·require.d -~ .. strategy to. translate political objectives. into .social· and 
. ' 
economic realities. :Where could. such ideas be found? 
2. ADOPTING ·THE·iRESOURCR:FRONTIER. S'.fRATEGY·.SINCE.,1970 
Towards the .end of the 1960s, the :needs .or°:the UMNO-led government r~· 
restructure society were .clear. They had to respond to a plan for .ethnic and 'regional 
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redistribution of resources, in particular for the peasants. ·With this· end incorporated in .. _:_ .. !_i.: . Ji ... 
the NEP, planners began· to s~ek ne~ means of facilitating Malays, in generalJ access to · ·· 
.· .. · ...... ··. ·;:,:.·~.-.... ' . 
. : . . ,,. : . 
· urban environments. · ·· · .,. Y ·.·~ · 
::, .. 
. ·. 
. . . . 
· .• · : .. .,. . .. 
Coinciding with this search., the state. of development theory at the time meant ·there .···· : .. :_~ .:··· .. ·_ . ::'·.·.:·.:·. :.:·~,:.·::,_.::·;··.::;:·~.:;_._:_··:.--~.·:: ··:.· : .. · ._ .. ' :
was a ready-made solution -the .growth centre concept. This encompassed a Jar.gely neo- . · · .·::_ ~, . 
classical model of growth {though·.d.ispensing with the crude faissez .. faire·prescriptions of... · · .. ·: :,\~.:.·:· · .: ) 
the 1950s). By incorporating the growth centre concept within existing resource frontier . . .·· ·:. :·-:~:: ::,:. :~:/~;.: · ·· ·• 
programs such as· FELDA, this new.resource frontier strategy was specifically a measure : · :,: ·. ~: ;.: .:-:··:?tf ~i:; 
for regional development. It called for the exploitation of Malaysia's largely .untapped . · : . .. . ... >:.:"' ;·f~{~:~ · .,: 
frontier Ian~ yet itinvolved ari .urbanisation strategy. In short. though in.different fonns, :: ..... ::.:·:·._"::.-:::: .E6 ·. \;;. · 
thls new iesource frontier sttmeM had already .reen tesred m Souili Americo. , . . . ·.• • '. '.''. t:'·/, ~tJ;j1J 
. ·But the crucialissueds: 'how did the .. resource frontier ·and growth .. centre concepts ·:. '· ·: : ·;. ~::;:; :.:.:: ·; .~!;:i;.t"J! .1' ~ 
. :· ~. :..:.::··:·:-.J"i.~.: .. :···~i-~:~~ 
get to Malaysia; and ho_wwere they .incorporated within.existing planning.and o~ration~ : .. :·:.; ·:. :_:.Y.: ·'.~ .. , §i:~:::·:~iL: ~ 
. :::::ica.to .Southeast.Asia: .TheTronsrer· Ot·ldeas .•. ·····;· .•.. /·'.',-.• .\ .··.; , /,'.'?·';: .• >::.l~;1j:;1 
As noted~ Friedman.n's, ·:resource ftontier :strategy .had '.been ·applied· ·~n ··so.ut;h ·.: .... ~: ;:: ... ~>'.:".>-': .)~~ 
America in·the -early 1960s. ·.·Friedmann, ;b~wever~:.:deve1Qp~d:his ·'ideas· i~t::fu~t :'.ti~~·:jj) ~1( ':_ · :: .. \· ';~;.:\\ :~'..)? 
climate .generally-~pathetic. to,neo:ctas~fcat:.:grow.th d1eoty·:irt'beJiefdf:th~·~trick~.~dp~ ·:.,~: :\:~ ~:_:·:-:>->/:· ;;~:~}{ 
effects .. <By 1969; ·,rhe app~o~ch ·.h~d, ;~ti.us~d _·increased ·~P·rt.ceri-·~f J~s,·.<f1s~:bUtjo~~f <. _"t/;:~ .. : <.:·.:<;.; 
I • ' • o • o < o•' ',' ' ' o o ' o•' o ' o, ' • ' • o o o o o o ::~~ 
. . . . . :· _;:.:.;: : .· .. : :·.. .. . ' .. 
. ·; .. · ... :·.: ... , .. ·:. :,~.,::.~~j;(,.~~w·;;-l~f ;;~~~~ii~~faji,;:;'.~ ··:: ::.:~,;;.~:~;,.~; ;;~~f ,;:~~~:i~·r;ir:~;.: 
effects. The emphasis solely on economic gm~ had led to .widening ·gaps ·~twe~1U'ith 
. . . .., 
and poor countries as well as between individuals. The appeal for a mare just ~ociety 
resulted in a requestioning of the real objective of developlfient (see ~eets, i 969~ 
Friedmann and Weaver, 1979). Th~1·e.was a ge.n.eral.detnand among·manysb:holars who 
wanted to -see a more equita.ble and t=edisttibutive &ystetn to be bltr,o.doced. within t:he 
capitalist s~iety they tt1emselves·Hved in (Meadows et al. 1972~ Cbenezy·:~ af. 1974). 
More critically perhaps, the ideals.of·the·ChineseCultural Revolution, Paris student riois 
0 
0 
and anti-Vietnam wat campaigns of the late 1960& 'had major impa~ on ·Western· 
intellectuals in .that the old ineffective :development policies had to.be cbanged. this:· · . 
thinking simultaneously influenced Je-adersof the.developing countries~ where they :were 
. . . 
often invited as· advisers or patticipants in ronferences on development issues. · : · 
... 
. . 
In Malaysia itself~ the NEP planners set out to tac:kle Malaysia·s problems:of.:elhnic 
and spatial inequality. Detettnined tO·enhance 'the soci.o--economic status of tile Malays~ · 
Tun Abdul :Razak was infiuenced by the growth centre concept through foreign and ltieal 
advisers in the Economic .:Planning Unit. This preeminent Unit of th:e Prime Minister's 
Department had ,a·'tradirto·n of inviting Wesiern consultants to assist in ·fonnulating 
national policie5. In 1-970t 'thron:g,b the Canadian lncern.ational Development Agency wme . 
Benjamin Higgins; Ove -Simonsen .. Anthony Peters. K. E. Haynes) Rudy Ro-gats.ky who 
worked wgether with local <:ounterpans like Tong Yaw Hong~ Ahmad Sidek and t..ee 
Peng Chong. among others, for the Pabang Tenggar.a Development Project In the·earlY 
197-0s~-there werr; Jar.ge,,and :senti"'pennanent :reams ·of foreign de-velopmeot <economists 
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. such as ,Warren- ffunsbut:ger, Donald Snodgrass ,and .Jack· il{ne~hl ·from ·>the .. ffarva:rd 
Developmc..nt ·Advisory S:ervioe .... later·known ·as 'Harvatd Institute for lttter:n~.onal : \.,;;.\(t<:'J'(~ 
Development '.(f,tansen. Hlg:giruu1nd Savoie.1'9.~8:304}, :fa 1914, Lloyd !:odwitl.:a ... : ':.;·: .; .... /~::·:::'·J/~_th~t 
• • • • • • • 111 • • .:··.~ •• ::.·=· ~:··: . .... ,:"' 
p1oneer·of Venezueiats Guayana 'regional program of the ur!y 19'60s w,as alsa :uwlt~ 1by -:._-: -=;-'::: .. ·. . 
··.· .... 
the Malaysfatr g.o:vetrtment-,to :.devise.a national ·:urban:i.sa-tion srra~ ~odwm;: -tn4)... . ··· .. ; ·:.:·:: .. ;>{-
. .. . .• . " 
. . ' 
Ba.ck .;fiom,,'·abro.ad; ·trtany·''Sltldertts .. 'bfid.eve.t:opnxem,'Studie.s ~Ka'tllln:l1Salih~~fo:r..~$~Ut,~) ~ ·; · ;,:. · · 
retnming.;fr.~in,~~i~et$·i~s:1tlf~Wesrenu~®~me&·in'·tlle·r.¢a~ ·1J7~j)~ddx~~~~'fl.~~~ .. :·;·~:.::: .:~.:· : . 
.... .. :.,,~:,:i:1{~0.::j·.::~f i;,'.~,t.~:,~,i~~jfil~~£~,isiilt~/l~-I~.1~··~:;:=:.\ .. · :c:'" 
by regional theories in vogue. They lat~ became leaders in regional development 
planning. 
Both ·foreign and Malaysian planners were basically versed in Western economic 
~heory with cdevotion to capitalism but a new concern for distribution. They were 
prepared (or because of the jobs they had accepted or they were already in) to 
.aecomi'fiodate a direct role for the state in regulating economic znd social change. Among 
tho~ regiona1 planners, they had almost the same basic knowledge of regional science 
aotl were ,familiar with the growth pole or growth cer1tre concept (See Hansen, Higgins 
and Savoie, 1988:315-318; Higgins, 1988). Foreign advisers had more particular 
influence as they were seen by decision-making politicians as enjoying respected 
international status. Sometimes, their consulting service and experience cut across 
different cQntinents. Benjamin Higgins9 and Lloyd Rodwin, for example, had worked in 
Brazil and IVerfezuelacrespectively in the 1960s using the growth pole concept to tackle 
pmble'ffis of regional disparity. Thus, this concept became a conver.ient tool to use in r.!:e 
planning ef Malaysia's frontier areas and as a means to decentralise industry and modem 
Jctivities from more developed regions to underdeveloped regions. The ideas then, found 
:Jt. 'direct and ~ff~o.tive route from the frontiers of Brazil and Venezuela to those of Pahang, 
Kelantan al\9 elsewhere in Malaysia. 
:Frontiers and Urbanisation: Adapting the Growth Centre Concept, 1971-
'85 
Despite ~e apparent suitability of the growth centre concept, some adaptation was 
necessary t0 mopld it to the NEP. In particular, a key concern of the NEP for 
lfi'banisatiQJl was to develop a Malay urban middle class. Hence, in applying the concept 
on <tbt<resour'e frontiers, principally FELD A, some adaptation was required. 
9 My interviews with Higgins in the Australian National ~?iversity in early 1989 ~onfirmed. the 
transfer of the growth pole concept to Malaysia. He clanf1ed, howev~r. that technical (~hys1cal, 
engineqing and.land use) considerations of the Pahang Tenggara consulung team far outweighed the 
application ef economic theory. 
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The reliance on the growth centre concept was particularly important as Malaysia'11 
politicians were concerned with cities. They saw urban centres as the huhs of 
·nodernisation - a rapid rate of Malay urbanisation not only would bring abo: . •.i.:·•1.' 
social change but make the country's cities less marked by the image uf 'coloni~ ~­
immigrant complex' (see Lim, 1978). Consequently, they hoped mor~ centres with 
overlapping racial activities, trade and invesnnent would emerge. Moreove;, there was a 
counter-consideration. Their political support was t0Cated in tl1e rural areas which were 
the 'periphery', dominated by peasant agriculture, and a disadvantaged hinterland in 
contrast with the urban core. Therefore, changing the inter-ethnic rural-urban and 
regional relationships became critical in the pressing neeo to develop a strong urban-
based Malay middle class. 
For these reasons, the original concept of frontier development programs had to be 
modified. Before 1970, FELDA'~ frontier development had pl'Ovided settlers with public 
ameHities in small S'!ttlements of 400 to 500 families (Mat, 1983:96). Despite the aim of 
planned development, overall plann:ng was not integrated, leading to isolated, remote 
frontiers. The expansion of FELD A settlemerii.s was dependent primarily on the free play 
of market forces. There was little regional focus. The new resource frontier strategy now 
aimed at much larger settlemeilts which, given the economies of scale, suited the need for 
a rural urbanisation strategy. Hence, Malaysia's resource frontier strategy was a product 
of state-spon.mred large-scul~ commercial cropping as an economic base, incorporated 
with a growth centre concept to promote urban-~ed secondary and tertiary activities. The 
resource frontier strategy, however, remained pan .of a national urbanisation program 
within the NEP. 
Under the New Economic Policy .. the growth cenn·e concept was applied at both 
urban and rural levels, and a variety of public institutions were created to help transform 
the tntditional ecoriomy. Functions of some key institutions are described in Appendices 
3.IA and 3.IB. 
. . 
As the appendices show, there were . .PERNAS, UDA. MIDA, ·BIF and SEDC in·. 
the urban areas - all aiming to promote Malay involvement in urban commercial and 
indusnial activities, acquisition of corporate shares. land and premises for subsequent · 
resale to the Malays. Paralleling these in the rural :sector, RJSDA. LPN, Bank Pertanian 
(Agriculture Bank), LKIM. MARDEC and FOA were the main organisations. These 
institutions provide a wide~range of services: credit to padi f::trmers and guarantee of 
stable prices; assistance to smallholders in marketing their produce und provision of 
extension services; promotion of modem methods of fishing and others. Consequently, 
as argued in the Mid· Term Review of the Second Malaysia Pla:n (Government of 
Malaysia. 1973: 14), the activities of these public institutions: 
'are wide-ranging and comprise, inter alia, the development of 
modem activities in the rural areas. new growth centres and in 
existing urba1 centres. They have an important role in expanding 
opportunities for participation of Malays and other indigenous 
people in these sectors through financfal, technical and other 
assistance to help them start and sustain their ccmmercial 
ventures.' 
Thus. the New Economic Policy used the growth centre concept for both existing 
major centres and new rural "t:enttes to promote Malay urban growth. Figure 3.1 shows 
how urbanisation was seen as an integral part of the NEP. There were two paths to 
transform the traditional Malay subsistence sectc:r. The 'vertical' or 'urban' path would 
promote mrect rural to urban migration, and thereby a closer involvement in the national 
and world market systems. Conversely. the 'horizontal' or 'rural' path was built on the 
dev(::Iopment of modem cash C·ropping (mostly on the frontiers} by means of a rural 
growth centre s~tegy to activate rural urbanisation with the provision of government 
services and man afac:turlng enterprises. Again. such an economic base WO!.!!d need to 
develop stro_ng links with existing urban areas and the world market. Thus, the 
'horizontal' path drawing on the growth centre concept to induce non-agricultural 
activities on the frontier areas represented Mal?ysia's new resource fronti~r strategy. 
. ·~~· 
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. . . ·· .. :,·:.Rural- Urban Transformatioti 
. ·:··Through Growth Centre.Strategy · 
The resource frontier strategy was pm into practice in the 1970s as part of 
Malaysia's decentralised urban policy. It had a strong regional development dimension 
with a focus on the balance between.the east and west coasts. In the policy, Kuantan was 
selected to be the main development centre for the east coast states for reasons such as 
access by highway to Kuala Lumpur, a seaport and economic benefits from Pahang 
Tenggara development region and offshore petroleum (Government of Malaysia, 
1974:Patt ill-16; 1976:209-214) ). Later under the Fourth Malaysia Plan (1981-85), in 
incorporating Rodwin's (1974) generalised national urbanisation strategy and Katnal 
Salih's (1975) •ratiorudised grawth ~e·ntre strateg) ', the Economic Planning Unit 
conceived a more icomprehensive urban StrUcture for the whole Penifisulat' ~laysia, 
based on a 'development corridor cortcept'. A new regional develQPment strategy was 
devised, giving rise to four differentiated major growth centres (Kuala Lumpur, Penang, 
Kuantan and Johor Baru). These major cenn·es were designated to use the existing 
transpon axis within their respective :regions to lead other centres. They were preferably 
supported by secondary regional towns in the range of 40,000-75~000 (Government of 
Malaysia, 1981: 1.83-84). Having discussed how the growth centre concept was 
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incorporated in Malaysia to facilitate urean -growth, the examination of why. new ... :· . 
institutions were needed to promote the resource frontier strategy is now made. 
3. INCORPORATING THE RESOURCE FRONTIER STRATEGY _. 
Before 1970, there was no national regional planning machinery in Malaysia. 
Policies on regional development issues were made on an ad hoc basis between the 
Ministry concerned and individual state governments (Omar, 1978:70-71). All land 
development was operated on a project basis and conducted by individual agencies which 
were often manipulated by special interest groups or for particular political 
constituencies. Consequently, the projects were not integrated and wasteful because of 
duplication, administrative defects and unnecessary competition {Kuntom, 1967; Mat, 
19,23:74-76~. Structurally, this poor coordination was vulnerable to malpractice. It had 
stemmed from two planes of action. On one level, sectoral decisions from the central 
government had not been adjusted w•!ll to the realities of field implementation. On 
another, there was a general lack of effort to bring together different sectoral projet.::ts to 
produce desired aggregative effects (UNCRD, 1977;23). 
After 1970, having settled on a resource frontier strategy adapted to local 
situations~ the need for a new organisation to incorporate it was even more strongly felt. 
But how could the .acdviries of related government deparlmems and agencies be 
coordinated? Thus. we need to examine the institutional options (e1dsting or new) that 
faced Malaysia in the early 1970s aruJ how their different activities could be regulated. 
Using Existing Institutions? 
Within regions in Malaysia, there were a series of development agencies or 
corporations- public9 private and joint-venture. Some ,of these might have provi_ded roe 
organisational framework for the new resource frontier :strategy. Private and joint ... ventut:e 
corporations, however, were :excluded because they were business~oriented. Existing 
public agencies, on the other ,hand, had :specific 'functions. For instan¢t~ FEl..J)A';s 
··"':·-. .. ··. 
.. ..:.~;..::f::.: 
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primary task was to recruit :Settlers fot:tesCHlement and engage in cash crop production 
and other offwfarm .activities .. As an institution specialised in ·agri~husiness, its daily 
operations were :already very large (see Chapter 6 for more details). Though effective in 
managing agricultural ·e.nterprise, it had basically no experience in developing towns and 
new industries. None. if any, of its professional staff was trained in regional 
development planning. This was also the case for RISDA, FELCRA and other existing 
rural development institutions and government departments. The Ministry of Agriculture. 
howev1:r, had a traditional attachment to food crop projects and had little association with 
agencies involved in commercial cropping such as FELDA. 
State governments were another alternative. Indeed in 1967, the Pahang state began 
the Jen,gka Triangle project10 - a first real attempt at the frontier resettlement. 
Nonetheless~ their financial resources depended primarily on allocations from the Federal 
government. Restrictions resulting from the shortage of technical expertise and skill!; 
often arose, thus affecting their implementing capacity. Mor~: importantly, the Federal 
government was not teady to devolve power over the critical spatial redistribution issue 
of the NEP to the state govemments. As post-1970 regional authorities were created to 
r.annage an increasingly large area to take advantage of the economies of scale. it became 
even more unlikely that the state govemments could handle the task. 
What was ·needed, therefore, was a new institution directly responsible to the 
Federal government which could plan. coorclinute and implement national and regional 
p:olicies by controlling the various programs within a planned region. There were 
antecedents - the Teanes.see Valley Aurhoriry of the United States, the SUDAM and 
SUDENE of Brazil as well as the Guayana Development Corporation (CVG) of 
Venezuela. They served as p.tototypes for Malaysia m follow - evidence ihat Malaysia 
turned .nver·seas for the itistitutional model for its resource frontier strategy. For 
Malaysia,, such .an if!Stitutfon could :avoid the bureaucratic hindrance ,of District Offices .· : 
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that a multi-district development program U6ed to face. It had theadvanta:ge of reducing · '· .. ··:'.··::;~ .. · · ~;. · 
·. . : .. ~--. . {· ... 
manipulations by interest groups and improving the coordination between different 
government departments in implementing projects (Omar, 1978). AH lessons derived 
from the past experience had called for autonomous regional authorities. In 1972. Pahang 
Tenggara Development Authority (DARA) - the first federal regional agency - was 
established. Regional authorities had several feature:;. They enjoyed certain 
administrative devolution in carrying out their operations. Administered directly by a 
federal ministry, it also received direct fund from the Treasury for th~fr development 
projects. Although identified as semi-autonomous 'corporate' l odies •• ~ ~ir prime role 
was to execute state policies within their respective regions as implementors, 
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coordinators and planners. Currently, there are seven regional development authorities in .. ,. 
ML1.1 ~~}sia whose specific areas are shown in Table 3.2 and Figure 3.2. Among them. .. ·.· . 
JENGKA, DARA, KBJORA, KETENGJ. q AND KESEDAR are resource frontier 
development authorities .. 
Table 3.2 
.. Regional Dev.etopment Authorities in Malaysia 
Authotiti' · "' · · y,ear' cre3te3 Area {heetare8> • 
lengk'a Triangle" ' 1967 · ' ' 120.000 
DARA (Pnhang Tenggara 
Development Authority 
KEJORA (Johor Tenggara 
Development Authority) 
.· 
K.ETENGAH (Trengganu 
Tengah Development Authority 
I<ESEDAR (South Kelantan 
Development Authority 
KEDA (Kedah Regional 
Development Authority) 
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Yet, given the large number of development authorities (each being guided by a 
master plan), ensuring that national macro-economic planning was consistent with . 
regional planning within the country was also a high priority (Government of Malaysia, 
1974:Part IV). Consequently in 1976, a new Ministry of Land and Regional 
Development was established to replace the Ministry of Land Development. Its new task 
included the monitoring of the regional development authorities. and their relations with 
· .. ·:.:· 
: .. 
. ·,I 
:, . . 
. . . ~t :·: FEIDA, FELCRA and RISDA. Hence, the planning and guiding of development ofnew 
townships and growth centres in the frontier zones were ensured by the Ministry through i.;.· :~ 
its links with the regional development authorities. ·... . .. ~· . : r·~:. ~" 
:: tL., 
From the above, we have seen how previous handicaps of coordination and •• ··.: • ~~ '1 • ~ .... ::~;'.·' .· ··-·.:. 
implementation of regional projects had led to the formation of regional development . 
authorities. They were. in tum, manag~d by a new Ministry of Land and Regional 
Development to ensure national policies were implemented on ~he regional level. The 
adoption of these two levels of institutions provided the organisational framework for 
implementing the resoun:e frontier strategy throughout Malaysia. In theory, such a 
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structure provided special planning functions, assured coordination between Federal and · ". ": "· ·~, · .:._-:: :· 
'•'.: ·:1 .. 
state bodies and overoome the fragmentation of effort, conflict of objectives and overlap . · .... 
of daily taW. How this planning and implementation worked in practice is the subject of ... .' · :.. [··,>·':r "· 
.· , : :' >..;: .· ;: . ; , . [,;·:··.··.:··~-~-.·.•.~· .. f..f•·::,:.~.·.·.:.:.::.::··.4: . ,.·.:. .:.': ·,·.:_:·,r'.'.;.: .  :••_:_::····:·_····.:·_:.•.·.· 
"·::'_ :. ":::/_:._> .... \:,·:-.. .. ~:-- r ..... -
:: •: 
........ 
the next chapter. : . 
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This chapter 1tas examined how Malaysia adopted a resource frontier strategy. · :<= .,::" ... ·:: 
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The post .. war Malayan Union crisis and lhe 'Emergency" had strengthened the ethnic- : ": ·:<: :'. ;' 
.· ... 
oriented position of UMNO. As an insepatable ally of the Malay peasants, UMNO 
helped to provide .a series of measures to relieve their persistent problems of poverty as 
•I•. 
: .. ~ :1: .. . .. 
pan of the national pursuit for economic growth.· Yet, the neO..classical approach did ·; ,~:. "· 
little to reduce the inter-ethnic gaps in economic terms at the eve uf the racial .'. :. ::<<~ _':; " 
disturbance of 1969 .. 
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Since 1970. the government has.launched.a.rigorously interventionist NEP to intensify 
development programs by creating numerous institutions to promote Malay inter~sts, 
aimed at creating a strong Malay entrepreneurial class. This new development ideology 
~·.: .: the pow.~~ issue as having strong ethnic, urban and regional implications given that . 
: ... · ..... 
. ·. :· . .·t· . 
. . ··: .. 
.. :. 
;Jf ·' . '.ir Malay households were most concentrated in the less urbanised states of 
r:;··. 
}tt~ .. 
: ... 
~r::··. 
i~~.. . . 
K ·, '· ::;~ l'rengganu. Kedah and Perlis - states characterised by the general lack of 
access to urban services and opportunities. Consequently, the growth centre concept was 
adopted at the n::.~"nal level to help Malay urbanisation and involvement in indus:tt:ies. In 
..... 
··. ~t< 
the frontier development programs, notably FELDA, the growth centre concept was 
" !." ~t.-.-: 
. ~fr .: 
integrated for the same objective. With this background, the resource frontier strategy 
was born. ., ~f1 
But the resource frontier strategy needed a central institution to plan, coordinate and 
implement at the regional level Past experiences had indicated chat existing project-
oriented agencies were inappropriate to assume such a task. Consequently, a s~ries of 
regional development authorities were established and were managed. since 1976. by a 
new Ministry of Land and Regional Development. Chapter 4 will focus on how regional 
development authorities implement the resource frontier strategy. 
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The resource frontier strategy in Malaysia is implemented through its broad·-· 
regional development policies and institutions. Thus, there is a need to investigate how 
planners 1 in the regional development authorities translate federal policies into action. As 
it is not possible to examine the conduct of all regional planners throughout Malaysia, 
attention is focused on two planned regions - Pahang Tenggara and Kesedar (Figure 
4.1). Within the prescribed legislative framework, the regional planner's function is to 
ensure that targets incorporated in regional master plans are met. Targets are set in Kuala . 
Lumpur. They are updated by directives from the same location. The planner's task, · 
therefore, is to ascertain that these fiats are followed in implementing specific projects. 
This involves the regional planner in liaising with different federal and state government 
departments and private developers to ensure that the principles of the master plan are met 
in project development. Consequently, the regional planner is involved in mee.tings in 
Kuala Lumpur to provide feedback to federal colleagues, in meetings in state capitals for 
project discussions, and in writing periodic reports. This operational framework raises 
......... · . 
.... 
·. : . . · 
... 
the critical issue: how effectively do the regional planners implement the resource fro.ntier · · . · ·. « ·.; . 
. •,' 
strategy and the set targets? 
. . . . . 
Before determining the effec-tiveness of planners in the implementation process. we 
need to discuss briefly the background of the two regions selected for study. Once this is 
done, we can proceed to examine the role ·of planners and the degree of autonomy they 
possess in implementing regional policies. Within this narrowed focus w~ can ask the 
1 We entitle the General MMaiW of the regional development authority as 'regional planners' because 
of their direct responsibility in the daily operations of the corporation. To an extent, we agree with 
Johari Mat's (1983; 122} argument that their 'personality. dynamism 1[and} efficiency' has influence on 
the performance of the authorities. 
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Figure 4"1: Pahang Tenggara and Kesedar Regions and Their Planned Settlement Patterns 
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basic question: how dothetegio~ ipla:nn.ers.-in Pahang Tie~evelopmem Autb.Qlity 
and South Kelantan Development Authorizy {K\ES'.EDAA}ditiet fromieadtothetl 
In analysing the variations between the two region~ we begin by ~ning 
general features of Pahang Tengpra and K.esed.ar1 .f~llnwed .by an ~ew -0f the 
framework within which they 0per.ate (section l}. Subsequently., we srudy the conduct of 
the planners of the two regions based on field interviews and an analysis of their weekly 
schedule (section 2). We are then in a position to evaluate and account !oz< theit 
peffonnance in meeting the master plan targets established by the federal government 
(section 3). 
1. PLANNING STRIJCTU!m: AN rORGANISA~IONAL 
STRAIT JACKET 
The actions of the regional plannt~1$.dlroughQuf' Malaysia are circutnscribed by the 
federal Ministry of Land and Rttgi~nal 'Development. Hence, we have to examine the 
hierarchical organisation~ fmmework of planning to gauge the degree of autonomy 
enjoyed by regional development authorities. A general picture of Pahang Tenggara and 
Kesedar, however, should be provided before the task of regional planners is tackled. 
General Background of Pahang T<f.'nggara and Kesedar 
Of the seven regional developme... . chorities, Pahang Tenggara and Kesedar
2 
are 
the largest in terms of size. More importantly, both regions are located on the east coast 
where economic activities have been lagging behind thr.: more prosperous west coast. 
Under the New Economic Policy, they have a presumed role of counterbalancing the 
longstanding dominance of the west coast in modern activities. S~tuated at the 
southeastern part of Pahang, Pahang Tenggara covers one-third of the state area. 
Virtually all jungle, it had 56,000 people (mostly living on the coast) in 1972 when the 
authority was created by the Parliament Act No. 68. Conversely, Kesedar is situated to 
2 Throughout the thesis, · Pahang Tenggara' (also known as .Qm) is used to mean the region managed 
by the Pahang Tenggara Development Authority and' Kesedar' (also called Kelantan Selatan) for the 
region administered by the South Kelantan Development Authority. 
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the south of the more established north of Kelantan. Though occupying three-quaners of 
the state and larger than Pahang Tenggara by 20 per cent. Kesedar has less potentiaJ •li-;in 
the latter in agriculture because of its hilly terrain - more thaa half o: :;·.: :,•gion h .. n1..1: 
forest reserve and National Park ~aman Negara). Pahang Tenggara. however. is 
relatively flat - more than 70 per cent being !:tiitable for agriculture. Some of the swamps 
in J.ow lying areas, moreover, can be used fo;; annual crops if adequately drained or 
irrigated. Thoogh establisitc<l iater in ) 978 by the Parliament Act No. 203, Kesedar had a 
popuiation of more than 100,000 by that year - consisting largely of iand-seeking 
peasants fr<Dl North Kelantan. It was not an entirely virgin frontier: between the late 
1950s and 1978, twenty-five schemes had been developed by the Kelantan State 
Development Board for smallholders. It had also been bolstered by the timber industry, 
based on which two frontier towns (Kuala Krai and Gua Musang) had emerged before 
the war. Despite differences betw.!en Pahang Teng-71ra and Kesedar, their relative 
·emptiness' presented opportunities in the 1970s and attracted the attention of the national 
government and the planners. Consequently, both were assigned with the 'mission' of 
the resource frontier strategy. 
As frontier regions established by the central government, Pahang Tenggara and 
Kesedar have the same terms of reference 1:Jut they are guided by two different regional 
development plans. Recruiting polic) for settlers v:uies. For instance, the severity of 
landlessness in North Kelantan has restricted Kesed:rr participants from Kelantan only. 
In contrast, Pahang Tenggara absorbs settlers from all over Peninsular Malaysia, 
although residents of Pahang are given priority. Given their contra'!iting physical and 
socio-economic features, they differ also in methods of implem'!ntation. Nonetheless, 
they are subject to an identical degree of control from the central government which, 
under the Malaysian Constitution, is the sole authority for development budgetary 
contr01. Thus, we need to exain!ne how the hierarchy of national planning and decision-
making determines the operation of frontier regional planning. 
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Planning and Desicion-Making 
Within Malaysia's highly centralised developing planning framework, the input of 
regional development authorities to national policies is small as they are located far from 
the planning core (Figure 4.2). National developing planning is canied out or adjusted 
through successive five-year plans. Development targets of each regional development 
authority are set or readjusted in these plans. In preparing the plan, there are two tiers of 
agencies responsible for planning and coordination. At the federal level, planning is 
undertaken by central agencies located within the Prime Minister's Department - the 
Economic Planning Unit, the Socio-Economic Research Unit, the Implementation and 
Coordination Unit (ICU), the Public Services Department (PSD) and, the Malaysian 
Administrative Modernisation and Manpower Planning Unit (MAMPU)3• There are also 
contributions from the.Treasury, Bank Negara (Central Bank) and other planning units in 
various ministries. 
The Economic Planning Unit is the main coordination body and is assisted by two 
other agencies in data collection: (a) the Implementation and Coordination Unit (ICU) at 
the national and inter-departmental levels; and (b) the Inter-agency Planning Groups 
(IAPGs) responsible for coordination between central agencies. Having assembled 
proposals including those from the state governments and processed them, the Economic 
Planning Vnit is in the position to present preliminary development plans to the National 
Development Planning Committee (NDPC). The NDPC formulates, implements, · 
evaluates progress and revises, where necessary, the development proposals with the 
secretariat service provided by the Economic Planning Unit. These proposals are 
submitted to the National Economic Council (NEC) for further action. Chaired by the 
Prime Minister and comprising key cabinet members, the National Economic Council 
reviews the proposals and ensures that all development targets are in accord with national 
MAMPu coordinates manpower planning·with the Public Services Departmen~ -:Vhich provides staff 
and INT AN (National I11stitule of Public Administration) which undertakes mumng courses for staff 
at national and regional levels. Further, MAMPU's main task is to searc'a new management 
techniques and innovations to make the public service more efficient and effective. 
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goals and political objectives. Any financiaJ..proposals have also to be scrutinised by the 
Treasury which submits subsequently the documents to the National Financial Council 
for approval before being delivered to the Parliament After amendment and endorsement 
by the Parliament the formal procedure is for the Prime Minister to instruct the Minister 
of Land and Regional Development to undertake development projects that meet annual 
targets. 
The second-tier of planning rests with the state level - a mere supportive process 
for federal planning and decision-making. All state development proposals have to be 
first scrutinised by the Ministry of Land and Regional Development and the Economic 
Planning Unit. Before submission, the State Economic Planning Units (SEPU), directly 
assisted by its State Development Offices (SDO), formulate development strategies and 
coordinate projects and programs. The Menteri Besar (Chief Minister) is the chairman of 
the State Economic Planning Unit and the State Legislative Assembly. A politician, his 
main task is to ensure that the proposals correspond with the prevailing n~tional policies. 
In preparing regional programs, the State Economic Planning Unit also liaises with 
district offices, local authorities and regional development authorities within its own state 
(Hu sin, 1981 ). 
Once all required information from both federal and state levels has. been 
marshalled for the National Development Planning Committee, the latter is in the position 
to take into account the views of the Private Sector Consultative Committee (PSCC) on 
·-·.,. 
the prevailing investment climate and environment. Thus, the regional development 
authorities are only required to provide five-year development proposals related to their 
areas through the Ministry of Land and Regional Development and to the State Economic 
Planning Unit, including township development on the resource frontiers. 
Consequently, macro regional programs and decision-making are all determined at 
the federal level and are the prerogatives of the central government. The regional planners 
(or General Managers), as in Pahang Tenggara or Kesedar, have little input int? planning 
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and decision-making. At best, their conttibunons are restricted to views expressed in the 
respective regional authority's annual and quanerly reports which are sent to the Minister 
of Land and Regional Development (who is no~ally a politician). Moreover, the 
regional planners can also make their suggestions to the Minister with whom they meet 
monthly in the Ministry's headquarters in Kuala Lumpur. In tum, the Minister may make 
use of these materials in his contributions to deliberations in the National Development 
Planning Committee (NDPC) - a super-ministerial body made up of head figures of 
major economic development ministries. 
On receiving development targets assigne~ by the Parliament each year, the 
Minister of Land and Regional Development will direct the Regional Board of Directors 
(comprising federal and state representatives and professionals) to ensure that these 
annual targets are met within individual regions. Appointed by the Board (subject to 
ministerial approval), the planner's role is co implement the projects. Although members 
of their respective Boards, the planners have no right to vote in the Board meeting and 
they can be removed from office at the Minister's will without any reasons being 
specified. Consequently, planners in Pahang rTenggara and Kesedar (and elsewhere in 
Malaysia) have to be conscious of the Minister's political goals and objectives in 
performing their allotted task. 
Hence, regional planning in Malaysia Is ,strongly.centralised. National planning and 
political priorities are exercised through the heavy control of the federal .government. the 
Economic Planning Unit and the Minisuy of Land and aegional Development. They 
control the planning process and thus detennine how the resource frontier strategy is :put 
into action. Directives and targets are from the centre and there is Yinually no scope for 
those at the regional level to influence the overall objectives afid methods. Y ef, 1t is at the 
regional level where regional programs ar~ implemented. ,J-Iow" cruejal ,Jmd effectiv~ h~ 
the tole of the·regiopal plfilUlers b®n'! 
2. CONDUCT: ROOM TO MANOEUVRE 
Regional planners in Pahang Tenggara and Kesedar may have little real say in 
planning and decision-making, but they have an important role as facilitators of central 
government policy. Initially, their position is spelt out in general terms before an 
examination is made of specific projects in the regions under study. 
Implementation 
The regional planners of the regional authority receive their directives from the 
Minister through the Board of Directors. Specifically, planners in Pahang Tenggara 
(Dara, 1972c:6) and South Kelantan (Kesedar, 1978:6) are charged with promoting, 
stimulating, facilitating and undertaking economic and social development within their 
respective regions. In carrying out these tasks the regional planners have to act as: (a) 
initiators of feasibility studies; (b) agents promoting and coordinating industrial and 
commercial activities on behalf of the federal and state governments; and (c) lenders of 
federal money to assist persons, companies and public authorities in approved industrial 
and commercial activities. As shown in Figure 4.3, the planners have to liaise with the 
state authorities in Pahang and Kelantan that are based in Kuantan and Kota Baro 
respectively. They also receive feedback from administrative ;:ind operational divisions 
under their direct control. 
The key function of the regional planners in 1?ahang Tenggara and Kesedar t 
however, is t<> oversee the construction of infrastructu~ projects specified in the plans 
handed down through the Board of Directors (Figure 4.3) - the cairn being .to meet the 
planned targets set for theif respective domains. These projecrs range from. ·ci¥il 
engineering activities (roads, water supply, electricity and ctlmwunications) to 
archirectnral dev~lopments (houses, schools, shoplots, clinics, mosques and recreations 
facilities). Basically, there are du:ee types of projec~ in both regions of Pahang Tenggara 
'and Kese¢ar: publfG ventures initiated and paid for by the federal or state govemment; 
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Private ventures sponsored by individuals an. d corporations· and J'oi'nt· · : • -ventures mvolvmg 
either public-private pannerships or federal-state collaboration. 
Figure 4.3: Project Implementation by Regional Planners 
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With 'itlofe room ro IllilD6elfVI'C in their opef~nal ~etivifies, cite fegional planttets 
in Pahang Tenggara and Kes&lar<flave developed different..imph.ffl1entation structures. As 
sho:wn in Figure 4.4!) the :regional planner's acti¥itie~ in Pahang Tenggara are 
implemented through nine divisidhs .,,, four administrative, four developmental and ol'le 
coordinating cancj moniU>ring. Although l(esedar ha& also nine> divisions, five are 
Operational, oge administrative and three financial and planning. The functions of these 
different 'divisions in Pahang Tenggara and Kesedar are specified in Table 4.lA and 
Table 4. IB respectively. As can be observed fj'om these two tables, the development 
focus of Pah~g Tenggara is significantlycdifferent from that of Kesedar, despite tQ,e fact 
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Figure 4.4: Organisatiohal Chart of Pahang Tenggara and Kesedar 
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Table 4.IA 
Functions of Various Divisions of Pahang Tenggara Development 
Authority (DARA) 
DIVISION 
Adm1mstra tive 
AdmiPistration 
and Finance 
Land 
Administration 
Local Government 
Manpower and 
Training 
Development 
Planning and 
Education 
Technical 
Services 
Investment and. 
Ptomotions 
Housing 
Implementation 
FUNCTIONS 
Office adminis~tion, secretarial se1Vice, personnel 
management, library; finance, purchase and stocking 
accounts and budgeting. ' 
Prooessing of land applications (agricultural, township or 
mining), land acquisition, transac.tion, reserves, forest 
clearance. 
Planning and building control, town administration and 
maintenance, recreational facilities, health control, 
property management. 
Manpower recruitment and training, community and 
entrepreneurship development, agricultural extension 
service.· 
Town and regional planning including population projection, 
need of housing, commercial premises and transport; study 
of Orang Asli and traditional kampung~ 
Engineering design, contract management, temporary water 
and electricity suppliest vehicle maintenance and construction 
~upervision. 
Project identification and promotion, township construction; 
establishment of companies and monitoring their progres9; 
industrial developmento 
Implementation of building projects. loan and contract 
management for 'bousil'lg and commercial projects. 
Cnordination Directly managed by the ~e~eral Manager in M~ste1:Plan 
and Monitorin~ implementation and m0mtonng, program coordmanon, 
' . 
p 
0 0 
_bu<ig~t ~pc!Joan co11trola public rel~poos and reporting. 
~: Dmu, J985: 151-152., 
0 
i 
Table 4.18 
functions cif Various D'ivisions iof South Kelantan DevelGpment Author.ity 
(KESEDAR) 
DIVISION 
'Operational 
Utnd 
Rehabilitation 
Land Developrnent 
and Placement 
aif Sett~ers 
Local Government 
artd Deveiopment of/ 
Traditional Villages 
Pu'blic W Orks 
Unit 
Social 
Development 
Finance and 
Budgeting 
Pfannin,g and 
Evaluation 
Special Planning 
Unit (Kesedar} 
Administratiot1 
and Training 
FUNCTIONS 
Rehabilitates 25 land development schemes (7 ,280 
smallholders), since 1983, undertaken earlier by Kelantan 
State Land Development and Rehabilitatiou Board; 
provides infrastrucrure and raises productivity. 
Organises settlers to use a Ia Kelantan approach and 
undertakes also land clearing, planting, maintenance of 
'CTOps; constructs settlement and infrastructure for its o\Wl 
schemes. 
Rehabilitates 200 traditional villages threatened by floods, 
guerillas and wild animals; provides administrative 
services and identifies suitable areas for development. 
Providet; infrastructure and technical seIVices (road, bridge, 
.school, clinic, staff cffice and residence, water and electricity 
.supplies and maintenance). 
Creates a self .. reliant community; helps promote subsidiary 
jobs, solves settlers' problems and trains residents in various 
social aspects (teligion,ieduca.tion, sports and welfare~ 
leadership training)~ 
Geneml finance contrt)f~ accoundrtg ~nd budgeting, financial 
reporting. 
Plans and coordinates fur development of settlemems, 
traditional villages and agriculture; promotes investment and 
local entrepreneurship. 
~epares physical.plans for development area or site~ in 
collaboration with Federal town and Country Planrung 
Department. 
Directly unaer the General Mana.g~ to i?1prove nnd trai!l the· 
staffs skill i~management, adrmmstrat!on and secretanal 
service; personn~l management; allocanon of annual buQ.get; 
........ 
office administration and libm:¥. a . % l [.) • 0 t a l 
t s · 21 !1 a 
Field cl)$! from,, Kesedar Headquarters, Oua Musatig. 
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:hat both authorities ha~ie identical terms ...Qf reference clearly stated in the Acts of. 
I 
Parliament.creating thetif Hence. why are their organisational structmes different? 
! 
These differences reflect the specific needs of each region. Pahang Tenggara ·has 
been developed virtually from jungle and has now :evolv:e.d -co the stage where the regional 
planner's task is to attract industrial and commerda1 development by identifying projects 
w bt developed by the investing government agencies ·and private c·ompanies. 
Convmely, Kesedar has inherited a large .number of land schemes rlev'doped earlier by 
the Kelanran •state government Most .of ·.these schemes run by smallholders now need 
a-ehabiiit.ation to raise land productivity .and .income. Hence in :Pahang Tenggara. there :are 
divisionb for inve-stme1lt and :Promotions. and Hoa:snng lmplemen.ta.tion wherea~ in 
Kesedar ihet;e are Land 'Reliab.iiitatioo and T:raditit11rui.l Village Divi:sions. Further 
differer.~~s item from the fuct that although P.ahang Tenggaramakes direct investmem i:ri 
~crops, it noes rot recruit settlers. D~.ily tasks within its plarttations .are carried ~t by 
laboorers. K~edar, however, 1ras a land Development Division tet nm iu OW11 and 
schemes .and to .take in. settlers fo.r permanem: resettlement .. While Pahang Tenggara'$ 
Coonii.nation Division liaises with the Public Works Department to implemetti and 
tnainrain ~ecific physicai infra:snucrure works, ~bas a Public W()rks; Unit &e.t .up 
'Witltin its aurllority fOF the same put:P<>se. £ven the Local Government serves different 
fllltction~ in e"4Ch regiort. In f>aflang ieng!tara, iU}e Local uavemtnent is invol..-ed ift 
itown~hip administration, tn.aintenance amt property management. In contrast. Kesedar's 
Local (to\'ttnment is mote mncerneJ widl rehabiiitarlng the 200 'traditional villages~ 
thre2!e.ned frequently hy natural hazards. It also identifies areas ror toeal 4ev.eloptt1¢nt 
pr~. 
Otl\er ·cOlrtmStS Sletn ft<1I11 the 'Cliwr;gefll .way~ of fnnding .the iwo te;iomd 
•tU.borities~ Pahang T-enggara receives its roods 'directly from the Treasury ~ 
fina.mces 'for ·Ke~edar are foonelled through the Ktlantrut state gt>Vemmell't- These 
differ~esbel.W'c.tm the:organisational strUCuires usec:tl>y'tbe t"egiortat piartners in PSJ.ang 
TMggam .tsnd Kesc<iM ~ .atso refleote.d in Uieirdetailed activ.ities. 
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Weekf.Y 'Work Schedules 
; As a means of drawing out the differences between ·the two regional planners and 
their respective areas, attention is focused on their weekly work schedules. Although 
there is considerable variation in their weekly activities it is appropriate for our purpose to 
disi:uss a 'typical' week in the lives of the regional planners in Pahang Tenggara and. 
.K t'~sec.Uar. 
Basically~ as shown in !able 4.2, the J'egional planners in Pahang Tenggara and 
Kesedu' 01rganise their week! y schedule to meet the directives from rhe Secretary-General 
;of the Ministry ·of Land and Regional Development ot from other central agencie..'I based 
in Kuala Lumpur. Normally,, the regional planner in Pah.ang Tenggnra may spend the 
first day-0f the week giving advice to potential investors whereas the Kesednr rounterpart 
is engaged in checking a f.easibilhy report for submission to the Board of Directors. The 
second day of the week in Pa.hang Tenggara can be spent formulating .an '.actiofi 
program' for subsequent discussion with the Board of Diteetors whereas the regional 
planner in Kesedar bas a regular 'meeting with the state's Chief Minister in Kom Batu tn .. 
discuss joint federal-state ventures. While the regi<mal planner in Pahang Tenggara ib still . 
engaged in fonnuJating 4n 'action pro~Tam' on the third day of the week, his colleague 
in Kesedar has .tneetirtgs with ~ds of his Qperationai division.I to discuss progress oil 
Mtni.aated projects .. 
Typically, the f6Urth day of the week in Pa'hang Tenggara is spent by the region.al 
planner on checking fmancial and project _reports prepared within the main t>ffice. The 
regional planner in Kesedar, however, attends official openings and ceretrtonial 
celebrations before returning to the office. The regional planner in Pahang Tenggata 
devotes the fifth day of the week to visiting parti~ular townships and checking on 
construction while his i;bunterpan io Kesedar meets district visitots to discuss lotBl 
government affairs. 1lte last day -0f the week is spent by Pahang Tenggarn's general 
~r o.~ routine paperwDrk while his equivalent's time in Kesetlar is spent ~heckinj 
reports .an!t discussing specific issues•with the staff' concemed. 
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Table 4.2 
A 'Typical' Weekly Schedule for Regional Planner 
in Pahang Tenggara and Kesedar 
Pahang Tenggara 
Meet potential investors 
and give advice 
Kesedar 
Check feasibility report for discussion 
with the Board of Directors 
Day 2 Development of 'Action 
Program' for subsequent comment 
by Board. of Directors 
Travel to Kata Baro to meet Chief 
Minister to discuss joint-venture 
projects 
Day3 Asday2 Meeting with heads of Divisions io 
discuss progress of implementation 
Day 4 Check financial and project Official openings or ceremonial 
reporrs prepared by assistants in office celebration. Office paperwor~ 
Day5 Visit ton township to check: 
progress of construction 
Day 6 Some routine paperwork 
~ Fieldwork interviews. 
Meet visitors from district office to 
discuss local .government affairs 
Check .reports and examine specific 
issues with staff concerned ___ . 
This ttypical' weekly schedule of fhe regional planners ltt Pahang Tenggara and 
Kesedar have to accommodate events that have fortnightly, monthly and annual thychtns. 
ln Pahang Tenggara, for instance, meetings between the regional planner and divisional 
heads (some or all) are arranged on a f'ortnightly basis; their purpose is ro assign projects 
to divisions and discuss the ,progress of implementing nominated projects (e.g. shoplot 
construction to the Housing Implementation Division). Cl>nversely. in Kesedar monthly 
meetings are .arranged with divisional heads to ~xamine fresh instructions from the Board 
of Directors and progress on projects; these meetings xnay result in remedial action. Both 
planners have to arrange annual meetings which report implementation and rliscuss the 
budget for the next financial year. Apart from this isolated instance~ the regional planners: 
in Pahang Tenggara artd l<esedar have diverged i.n -scheduling their activities. These 
divergences -stern froxn the fact that Pahang Tenggara and Kesedar are very different 
Places as borne om by an ~atninatiorr of ca:se studies Jooated in their respective dOnJainS. 
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case Studies: Bandar Tun Razak and Paloh l 
In highlighting the differences in the activities of regional planners in Paha.ng 
Tenggara and Kesedar. we contrast their role in two settlements: Bandar Tun Razak in 
Pahang Tenggara and Paloh I in Kesedar (Figure 4.5). 
Bandar Tun Razak is the largest township within Pahang Tenggara, with 21.600 
residents of whom 17 ,200 are FELDA settlers. The FELDA settlers live in five 
settlements (Keratong 1 to Keratong .5) of the township which has a central zone 
managed by the Pahang Tenggara Development Authority. The physical design of the 
township is a good example of Pahang Tenggara's aim of 'rural urbanisation' through 
large settlements. Paloh 1. however, is relatively small. having only about 1,000 
reside~rs, none of whom are associated with FELDA. Bandar Tun Razak has the largest 
oil palm 'hinterland' in the region measuring some 12,000 hectares whereas Paloh 1 
serves merely an area of .1, 720 .hectares. Having been invested with substantial capital in 
infrastructure since the 1970s, Bandar Tun Razak has now piped water and 24 hour 
electricity supplies while settlers in Paloh I still had to depend on well water and lamps 
(u observed at the rime of survey in February 1988). As shown in Figure 4.6, the 
regiooal planner in Pahang Tenggara is using the Local Government Division to manage 
the Bandru' Tun R.azak project. 
Conversely as in Kesedar. the regional planner has given responsibility for Paloh I 
to the Land Developmettt and Placement of Settlers' Division. The decision to allocate the 
itask to the Loe-al Government Division in Pahang Tenggar.a reflects its prime task of 
ensuring the creation of an urban and industrial el1vironment to accommodate non· 
agricultural settlers within the township. In contrast, the Land Development and 
Placement of Settlers Division in Kesedar is not only engaged in land development but is 
responsible fot building settlers' Jrouses. Re.fleeting these differences, the regional 
planner in Pabang Tenggara has designated the project manager 'Admini~on Officer' 
but 'Scheme 'Mana:.get' is preferred 'by ·the Kesedar-based 'COlleague. 
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F'igure 4.5: Two Settlements: Bandar Tun Razak and Paloh I 
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Figure 4.6: Settlement Management in Pahang Tenggara and Kesedar 
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As manager of Bandar Tun Razak, the regional planner has delegated the 
Administration Officer to coordinate constructions within the designated township 
(technical services, tender documents and building inspection are provided by the 
regional planner's other divisions). The regional planner's Scheme Manager in Paloh I 
has a less onerous task as there is .still no town centre and little infrastructure for services 
{only a few grocery shops were in existence during fieldwork in February 1988). As 
Bandar Tun Razak is a FELDA area, the regional planner is responsible for the 
commercial and industrial centre (including the provision of public services, staff houses 
and shoplots) as well as to coordinate with the Public Works Department ~ver road 
construction and maintenance. In Paloh I, the regional planner is responsible for all these· ·,. 
activities. While FELDA also undertakes housing construction for its settlers and staff in 
102 
Bandar Tun Razak, the settlers in Paloh L undertake these activities themselves a la 
K,elantan under the supervision of the regional planner (under the a Ia Kelantan approach, 
groups of settlers tender for the housing contract and share profits). 
There is, however, considerable devolution of the powers possessed by regional 
planners to their field officers in Bandar Tun Razak and Paloh 1. In Bandar Tun Razak., 
for instance, the Administration Officer is in charge of township administration, 
community development, youth and women's organisations and the health inspectorate. 
Once the houses are completed in Paloh 1 the Scheme Manager's main task will be to 
manage the oil palm plantation with the help of ten field supervisors; the provision of 
general services, however, is provided by the regional planner's Public Works Division. 
Although both regional planners delegate power to field officers, the Administrative 
Officer in Bandar Tun Razak has to report to his respective divisional heads on a 
fortnightly basis and the Scheme Officer in Paloh 1 on a monthly basis. In tum, the 
respective divisional heads channel requests on physical and social needs to the regional 
planners. Although the reporting structures for Bandar Tun Razak and Paloh 1 are 
remarkably similar they do not mask the real distinctions between the two projects. They 
reflect, however, the more fundamental differences between Pahang Ten~gara and 
Kesedar and their regional planners. 
In part, these differences in the actions of the regional planners reflect the h~story of 
Pahar1g Tenggan1. and Kesedar. Since 1972, the former has built seventeen townsh'ips. 
Convers~ly, the latter has constructed only nine small settlements since its inception in 
1978. As Pahang Tenggara, therefore, is well-established the regional planner's task is 
more concentrated in the headqua..rters of th~ authority in Muadzam Shah though frequent 
visits are made to regional townships, Kuantan and Kuala Lumpur. In sharp contrast, 
Kesedar is a more recent phenomenon and much of the planner's attention is focused on 
embryonic projects (often areas in need of rehabilitation). Further, all land schemes in 
Pahang Tenggara are being undertaken by FELDA and private developers or under joint-
ventures whereas some land schemes are being carried out by the re$ional planning 
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authority of Kesedar. Both planners in Pah~g Tenggara and Kesedar are busy ~nendil1g 
meetings. The regional planner in Kesedar has to chair three subsidiary development 
corporations; the latter, given the strong federal-state connection, has also to participate in 
Kelantan's Kota Barn-based Forestry and Natural Resources Committee and State Action 
Committee (both chaired by the State's Chief Minister). Compared to Pahang Tenggara, 
the regional planner in Kes-edar has to delegate. more of his activities to an assistant to 
ensure that maximum attention is devoted to the desire of leading politicians at both the 
federal and local level to foster the economic and social development of Kelantan, 
Bearing these differences between Pahang Tenggara and Kelantan in mind w~ proceed to 
the more difficult task of assessing the performance of their respective planners. 
3, PERFORMANCE~ P.ROBLEMS OF ASSESSMENT 
Assessments of the performance of the regional planners in Pahang Tenggara .and 
Kesedar are difficult to make. As we have seen, their task is to manage funds derived 
from tt..e federal Treasury after aJ?proval by the Parliament or State Legislative Assembly 
(and, in the case of Kesedar funds are channelled through the state government). Other 
financial resources are derived from federal or state loans, private projects and money 
borrowed with the Minister of Land and Regional Development's approval. The planners 
are permitted, as shown in Figure 4. 7, to use these funds to create reserves, set up new 
corporations, repay loans, grant loans, make other investments and pay their staff. While 
they have similar obligations in accounting to their superiors they have more flexibility in 
choosing the method of i~vestment. Although their devotion to meeting the demands of 
their superiors can be gauged to some extent through art examination of official record~ 
there are no fonnal channels measuring the effects of their activities on people living 
within their respective domains. 
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Figure 4.1: Main Sourc::es·uf Incmne;lnd Expenditure 
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or State Loans 
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Salaries. Allowances, 
Prinsions of Employees 
Creating New 
Corporations 
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Loans Professional fel!s · 
fund Reserve Loan Repayment 
and Investment 
EXPENDITURE 
~: Dara, l972c; Kesedar.1978; Fieldwork. 
General Impact 
Other Investments. 
Purchase of Assets, 
Building 
Constructions etc 
Mellsuremenrs of the performance of'regiona1 planners in Pahang Tenggara alld 
Kesedar are confined to a narrow range of activities within the five year planning 
framework. Basically, the Minister orLand and Regional Development issues two main 
directives: the first concerns capital assets and the second demands specific infonnation 
to be submitted in quarterly, annual or occasional reports. As shown in Figure 4.8, the 
regional planners have to prepare four types of reports in response to these requests: the 
first is a routine repon giving accounts of the use of property, assets and activities; the 
second are special repons to meet the Minister's. ad hoc requests; the third comprises the 
quarterJy and annual reports on detailed development within the respective regions; and 
the fourth report concerns the annual budget estimate to be submitted in September of 
each year. AU reports ar,e delivered to the state .government and. if directed !>}' the 
Minister, to other public authorities ot iodividu~s. 
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F"q:ore ·4.8: Repb.rting by Regional Plannets:to the Minister 
D irectivss Directives Routine r.eports 
demandin'g concernihg related to 
specific use of property. 
inl0111ation 10 capital assets and 
be reportell assets activities 
~:Dara, 1972c; Ke.sedat, 1978; Fieldwor~ 
Specific 
rep arts 
State government 
and other public 
authorities as 
-directed by the 
Minister 
Anhual Annual a11d 
budget qnarterlv 
-estimate reports 
Besides these paper assessments t>f .dteir performance the planners in Pa.hang 
Tenggara and Kesedar have tO attend ministerial meetings. They are required to attend 
monthly meeting at the Mini~try's. 'headquarters in Kuala Lumpur with regional planners 
from throughout Malaysia. The Minister and senior bureaucrats in the Ministry are 
.. 
present. Occasionally, ·ad hoc meetings are :ca;lled by the Secreta.ry"General of tbe 
Ministry to discuss specific issues, such as budget consttaitits for the ensuing year .and 
variations in .tent for shophouses to encourage <Commercial development in .p~icular 
regions. 
During the MiniS~fs regular meetings any rl'ajor"Propo&itio.q$ arcnnimtted.and 
circulated afterward Fonow .. pp actions in t>ahal\g Tenggara a11d Kesedat, fQr instance, 
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will be pursued by theitrespecti've planners ... Frequently, quarterly and annual repons0~ 
used by the planners to report progress on specific requests. They may -also repon 
progress in person at a subsequent monthly meeting. Clearly, this system -provides the 
Minister with an effective way of monitoring the perfonnance of the regional planners in 
Pahang Tenggara and Kesedar. The fonnal channels for assessing the performance of the 
regional planners .in Pahang Tenggara and Kesedar are rather general and abstract. A 
more concrete means of determining their performance is to examine township 
development and project investments. 
Township Development 
The regional planners in Pahang Tenggara and Kesedar are charged with 
implementing township development .as pan of their respective development plans - a. 
reflection, in tum. of the federal government's emphasis on urbanising the rural poor 
(especially the Malays) as part of the New Economic Policy brought down in 1971. Both 
regional planners have targets set for them for township development and we can use 
these to provide a specific perfonnance yardstick. 
The targets for township development in f>ahang Tenggara were incorporated in the 
master plan drafted in 1972 as part of the New Economic Policy's aim of providing 
opportunities by shifting residents from agricultural into managerial, commercial~ 
industrial and financial activities i11 frontier regions. There was no master plan as such, 
however. to guide the regional planrter in Kesedar; the targets on township development 
ha.ve, therefore, to be derived from the Indicative Regional Plan rel,eased in 1984. Both 
plans, however, were infused with the standard regional planning doctrine. The thrust ()f 
tlte PahlU!g Tenggara Master Plan ·was, to transform the agricultural and resource-based 
region into a spatially modetnised zone where non··ttgricultural jobs were to be created 
through 'multiplier'.effects' and concentrated in the .new £ownships (Dara, l972a:2-3). 
Similar sentiments pervaded I{esedar's Indicative Regional Plan (see 'Kesedar, 1984) as a 
combined growth centre and :central place strategy was ·seen as <the ke)' to township 
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development - the attn beirtg ·to aggregare PQpuiatit>n fO proYide the threshold for hi~ 
levels of serv.ices. 
The P.ahang Tenggara Master Plan prOpoSed to build 86.000 residel'ltiai units in 
rhlrcy-six new townships by 1990 to .accommodate about 450,000 people <>f whom a 
Wge proportion would be employed in secondary and tertiary activiri~ - .a mne .. fold 
increase from the 56,000 people resident there in 1970 (Table 4.3); the designat.ed centre, 
Muadzam Shah was to have a populatiu.n of 40.000 in i'99Q. In eonrrast, Kesedar's 
Jnqicative Regional Plan proposed to develop sev.en major townships (Gua MRSang. Je.ti, 
Manek Krai, Kemubu, Dabong, Benam and Ciku) from their 5.-000 pGpuiation in 1970 
to 54,000 in 1990. These targets will not be reached in rime based on present pr.ogress 
(more details will be given in Chapter 7). 
Table 4.3 
Projected Population tor Pahang Tenggara and Kesedar 
Pahang Tenggara Kesedar 
YHr TownshiR Urban Rural Total 
l i 
1970 5.5,800 .5,li9 90,300 95,419 
1980 291,500 l8,lS4 121.699 145,953 
1990 448,780 53,620 236,3'11 289,-991 I d. "i. 
~: t>ara. l 972a:34 snci 49~ Kesedar. 1984:8. 
More infonnation is available on townships .in Pahang ·renggara than Kesedar. Qf 
the planned thiny-six townships in the fOrmet, seventeen have been completed; derails on 
housing construction are available for ·twelve of the townships. This shows that the 
regional planl\Cr in Pahang Tenggara has overseen !he construct~n of l, 118 ht)uses. As 
shown in Table 4.4~ the rate of occttpancy, however, varies markedly bot.ween 
settlements. All hooses in Bera, Cini and Bandar Tun Razak have been .qccupied; 
Muadzam Shah also has a near-perfect record. There are, however, marked vacancies ia 
the other settlements - the worst case being Kota Shahbandar wher~ Only 39 of the 195 
~ 
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dwellings are occupied. Not ~u.rprising-1-y~ .th-e MiniSter :of Lnnd and Regional 
Development has called a halt ·to further town.ship de-velopnrent in Pahang Ten,ggara iJt 
1985. 
Tab1e 4~4 
Occupancy Rate for Houses Built by Pahang Tenggara Regional Aulhority 
Township' 
i 1 6ccupfed 
No .. 
Felda Scheme 
Bera 
Cini 
Perwira Jaya 
Bandar Tun Razak 
Non·Felda Scheme 
Chenderawasih 
lbam 
Kota Bahagia 
Kota Perdana 
Kota Shahbandar 
Melati 
Muadzam Shah 
Paloh Hinai 
Total 
~: Data, 1986:28. 
50 
5G 
81 
61 
113 
79 
90 
135 
39 
59 
575 
132 
l,464 
% 
100.0 
lOO.O 
53.6 
100~0 
36.6 
73.8 
49.7 
65.9 
20.0 
58.4 
99.8 
100.-0 
69.l 
., 
Vacant 
No. 
.. 
70 
196 
28 
91 
70 
156 
42 
1 
654 
-· ?'" 
.. 
46.4 
63.4 
26.2 
50.3 
34.1 
80.0 
41.6 
0.0 
30.9 
CompieteCl · 
No.. % 
50 100.() 
SQ 100.0 
151 100.0 
61 100.0 
309 100.0 
107 100.0 
181 100.0 
205 100.0 
195 100.0 
101 100.0 
576 100.0 
132 1'00.0 
2,118 100.0 
It is difficult to a~ess. the perf onnance of the regional planners in Pahang Tenggara 
on these figures. T~wnships with no vacancies (other than the regional centre Muad~rn 
Shah) are dominated by FELDA settlers who, on joining the scheme, are guatantee,d a 
house. Those with low occupancy rate are settlements dominated by labourers employed 
by private developers. As the developers have provided longhouse (kongsi) 
accommodation free of charge to save commutirtg time and house illegal immigrants from 
Indonesia (especially .during the 1978-84-economic boom), there is no pressure on the. 
accommodation by the regianal planner in Pabang Tenggara, especially .as illegal 
immigrants are ineligible. Thus, though getting residents in tewnships has been one of 
the regional planner's primary tasks, the rate of oocupancy is beyono bis control il1 
Pahang Tenggara. 
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Unlike the regional planner in Pahang 'Tensgara, the ,Kesedar planner has More 
flexibility governed by an indicative plan rather 'Ihan fl master plan. Nevenheless_ she 
iargets. panicularly for its regional centre of Gua Musang, seemed unattainable within tett 
years. Inde~ the regional planners in Pahang Tenggara .and Keseda.t seem to be 'Victims 
of unrealistic wgets established by decision-makers in their haste to foster rural 
urbanisadc>n which is seen as a means of raising the 'Stn.tUS of the rurai poor. 
Symptomatic of the problem is the fact that the regionBI planner in Pahang Tenggara bas 
been able to spend only 35 per cent of the $9,600,000 budget allocated to township 
development in 1986 (Dara, 1986). Yet. Pahaug Tenggara was a 'favoured region· 
compared wHh Kesedar which received up oo 1987 only 20 per cent of the $500 million 
promised in 1978 for all development projects (Hamzah, 1987:57) - a reflection that 
Kelantan has not always been conttolled by the governing party - UMNO - which has 
resulted in unfavourable allocations (see Nik Mahmood, 1984). In addition to township 
development, we use another yardstick to measure the regional planners' performance -
project investments. 
Project Investments 
As noted, '.legional planners are implementors and coordinators of the New 
Economic Policy on the frontiers. In suppon of that policy, there is a need to mobilise 
and acquire more financial means either by public agencies or private investors. 
Consequently, .there has been great pressure on land resources initially earmarked as 
reserved areas by the Pahang Tenggara Master Plan. This pressure h~s become even 
. 
greater when commodity prices are high and tnore profits can be made. Between 1971 
and 1984, in fact, the agricultural development within Pahang Tenggara exceeded the 
targets set by the Master. Plan by almost 50 per cent (Table 4.5). FELDA exceeded its 
target by about 80 per cent as, in the 1970s, .more ·rural poor were attracted by higher 
income brought ~bout by oil palm. Jts total area ~ov~d 45 per cent of the wbole 
agricultural land of Pahang Tenggara. 
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Tbe public agencies and the small..private estates ~ounted fur the high~ 
proponion in exceeding lTieir original alloted targets. This. wa$ si.otably .due ro their 
relatively small altocaied .areas in the Mas{5rr Plan. Indeed~ me public; agencies have 
undergone substantial expan&ion under the NEP as :a 'cata.ly.st• m help cr-eate Malay 
entreprew;urs and managers at the .natiMal level. ·Consequently, the~ are also many 
public i.nvestmenr pr*cts in bolh Pahang Tenggara and Kesedar. Few of these public 
enterprises. ho~>ever, did well. Tables 4.6A .and 4.6B show the financial status of some 
.sclecte.rl public enterprises. These comprised businesses in cattle fanning, mining, cash 
cropping, consttu~ion of building materirus, togging, sawmill and hotel catering. Until 
the end of 1986, almost an were in deficit. 
Table 4.5 
Agriculf.ural Development in Pahang T~nggar.a,. 19'11 .. 84 
Proposed Uy Actuatly % % 
Agency Master Plan Developed Over or Below of (hectare) {hectare~ Tarset Total 
Puhlk 
FEl..DA 77,740.9 138,7.53.3 78.S 44.3 
Joint-Venture 
Estates 31,242.1 21,574.S -30.9 7.0 
Public Estates 12 .. 181.1 26,729.2 119.4 8 .. 6 
Mard.ia 890.3 1,011.7 13.6 0.3 
Private 
large Estates 69,525.7 88,003.1 26.5 .28.4 
Small Estares 5,626.2 15.034.2 167.2 4.8 
Small Holdings 13,840.3 18.869.7 36.3 6.1 
Total 
. 211,046.6 309,975.7 46_.9 100.~ ... 
Nole: a ~peritnemal farms of MalaySian AgricultJ,11'3l Resemth ,and Development Institute. 
~: ~. l985:16. 
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Tabl~ 4..6A 
Pahang Tenggara Project Investments 
-
Projects 
'lJ"Wn Corporatfons · 
Pahangbif Sdn Bbd8 
Darabif Sdn Bhd 
Binadara Sdn .Bhd 
Dam Ornamental 
Minerals Sdn Bhd 
Beef impon, cattle farming 
Beef impon, cattle fanning 
House construction, quarrying 
Mining and Processing 
of serpentine:: 
Sawira Sdn Bhd Oil palm plantation, 
oil extraction 
Dara Koko Buahan Sdn Bhd Dive'rsifi.ed crop plantation 
Pasaranika Dara Sein Bhd Miscellaneous trading 
Dara Fabricators Pre-fabricated low-cost 
Sdn Bhd housing componentS 
Dara Wood Sdn Bhd Pre-fabricated 
housing components 
Bata Dara Sdn Bhd Brick manUfacturing 
Joint-Ventures 
Tehda.ra Sdn Bhd 
Dara Lam Soon Sdn Bhd 
IhamSdn Bhd 
Oil palm, tea plantation 
Oil palm, oil extraction 
Logging. 
Perkayuan Tenggara. Sein Bhd Logging, sawmill 
Logging, sawmill 
PrOftt(+ )/Debit( .. ) 
(Till End :o.f 1986 
in ThOUSMd $) 
5,Sl.3 (v) 
4.767 (·) 
3~~2 (·) 
1,389 (-) 
98 (·) 
l,67S (·) 
2,880 {-) 
Sold in 1986 
1.601 {·) 
20,193 (+) 
S,64lc( .. ) 
77 ( .. ) 
9,130 ( .. ) Lesong Forest 
Products Sdn Bhd 
----..;.;..;:;.=.:.;o,:;;.::_ ______ ...,_._.... __ _..._..,.__..,......~ ........ ~.-............................. ..._ ____ ~ 
Noic: 8 .Sendirian Bctbad (private company limited). 
b Till lhe end of 1984.' 
c Till lhe:end of 198.5. 
~ Dara. 19a6:6-IQ,~,.t®oniUJ (Annual l?cpOtt.. Fina,ncfaI ActQUlltS). 
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Table 4 .. 6B 
K-esedar ·Project Investments 
- PrOfit (+)/ 
Debit(-) $a 
.... 
"Kesedar ~awmill 
Sdn Bhd 
Kes-edar ln.n Sdn Bhd 
Kesedar Galian 
Sdn Bhd 
Activities 
Maini)~ sawroiu 
. Hotel and catering 
Brick manufacturing 
Notr.: fl for the first six rnooths of 1987 only. 
~ Kesedar.1987:55~56. 
79.780 (-) 
7.0SO (~} 
* 
Whether the main reason of deficit was a question of management or due to the 
disadvantaged location of those businesses remains to be examined. My visit to the 
'Kesedar Inn' in December l 987 was useful for understanding the situation in some 
way. The hotel is well located off the main street which runs towards the old established 
centre of Gua Musartg. It caters for a clientele consisting mainly of government officials 
who visit the town on special occasions. There were few regular customers. This rneans 
that it is difficult to maintain a good standard of service. Obviously, the hotel was of 
higher standard than the other modest inns doWJt·town. But 'Kesedar Inn' charged 40 per 
cent more for the room rate -and this would have probably discouraged non-government 
offidals - workers and small contractors - who caxne fr.om different pans of the country. 
Thus, we can suggest that more extra land has been used for agricultural 
production to cover the financial burden of public enterprises. Under the NEP~ there has 
been an urgent task to create managerial posts and raise the equity share for Malays with 
government funding. C<>nsequently, whether such enterprises make profits at th.e initial 
stage is a secoodary matter. This :investment policy, however, has been beyond the 
Control of the regional planners in Pahang Tenggara and Kesedar. The regional planners 
can take satisfaction in their overall performance because the Minister has the ,power to 
dismiss them. The key omission, however, is the absence of any mecharusrn for 
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assessing how the settlers in Pahang Tertggara and Kesedar respond to the centrally 
imposed regional planning. 
Resume 
This chapter has outlined the structure of regional planning in Malaysia and 
highlighted tl1at the planners in Pahang Tenggara and Kesedar have little input into 
planning and decision-making. Nevertheless, the planners in Pahang Tenggara and 
Kesedat have played .a .key role in managing the implementation of a variety of 
infrastructure and investment projects. Assessments of their respective perlormance 
proved difficult because the only yardstick for gauging their effectiveness are reports 
submitied by the planners to higher authorities. Basically, they try to achieve targets set 
but they have little control over the investment programs made for their respective 
regions. These programs are subject to the will of politicians who are again influenced by 
developers and -other interest groups. They all work outside the formal planning structure 
but have substantial impact on the regional development outcome. Thus, we cannot 
assess the perfonnance of regional planners. There has been, however, no assessment of 
the effect of regional policies on the settlers in Pahang Tenggara and Kesedar. This 
evaluation is undertaken in Chapters 5 and 6. 
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CHAPTER 5 
SETTLER'S EXPERIENCE: THE ECONOMIC ASPECTS 
Settlers are at the forefront of the Malaysian government's regional development 
policy for resource frontier .regions. As noted, they have been encouraged to move from 
different parts of Malaysia into planned settlements. Any assessment of the success of the 
government's policy hinges upon whether the living standards of the settlers have 
improved or are sustainable. There is considerable controversy over this matter among a 
variety of observers. Macro studies by Bahrin and Parera (1977), MacAndrews (1978), 
Peacock (1979), for instance, have acknowledged FELDA settlers' overall improvement 
in income. Their conclusion has been bolstered by detailed field studies by Blair and M. 
. . 
Noor (197&), Chan and Lim (1981) and Omar Din (1981). Conversely, Baharuddin 
(1979) and Robertson (1984) have contended that progress in settlers' living standards is 
not sustainable. Inevitably, they suggest that settlers will decline into poverty. These 
studies, however, have not been conclusive and further case studies, particularly 
comparative studies are required. Admittedly, Chan and Lim (1981) have considered 
three settlements but their utility is limited because the conditions of living standards was 
focused on income. Although income is a key factor in any assessment of living 
standards, other characteristics must be surveyed. More particularly, the different aspects 
of assessment must be seen from the settler's viewpoint. Moreover, there is a need to 
examine the process of change (before and after the move) and the settlers' relationship 
with Malaysia's broad regional development objectives. 
There is a pressing ne~,for an in-depth study comparing two areas established at 
different dates so that contrasting responses from settlers can be obtained. A comparative 
study of two schemes is important because it shows how two areas planted with the same 
crop (oil palm) under identical type of mapagement but at different stages can lead to 
diverse results. Tb.us, by ex.plaining that settlers' i~come corresponds with yield levels of 
us 
oil palm trees (according to age) and availahle secondary job opponunities in each area. a 
more comprehensive picture of income change is provided. This eliminates biases arising 
from studying one single scheme. 
One this basis, Bandar Tun Razak, an older scheme in Pahang Tenggara and Ciku, 
a younger scheme in the South Kelantan region were chosen. Moreover, they were 
deliberately selected from two east coast states because they serve the objective of 
examinicg the long-term economic and social sustainability of the FELDA program and 
the consequences of Malaysia's resource frontier strategy since 1970. As already stated, 
the strategy aims at narrowing the disparity between the west and east coasts by 
concentrating infrastructure and productive investment at some townships and rural 
centres in newly-cleared zones. 
The comparative study also enables us to raise a series of basic questions on the 
living standards of settlers. Not only do they include a question on change in income 
before and after the move but others on land holdings and employment. As employment 
data can be misleading a further basic question is raised: how have patterns of assets and 
expenditure been altered by change in income? Based on the settlers' profiles we are in a 
position to discuss the controversy over living standards and the issue of sustainability. 
In conducting this survey attention is concentrated on two FELDA schemes: 
Bandar Tun Razak in Pahang Tenggara and Ciku iii Kesedar (see Figure 4.1). One 
hundred settler households were interviewed in each area between D~cember 1987 and 
February 1988 (see Appendix 0.1 for details). Aggregate data from these surveys are 
complemented by reference to two in-depth household case studies - the Kamal family in 
Bandar Tun Razak and Jusof family in Ciku. Before entering the questior of income 
change, we need to ascertain whether the paramount motive of settlers was to improve 
their income (section 1). Subsequently, a comparative analysis of the results of _t~.~---~ 
'-· 
surveys is used to consider changes in incomes (section 2), expenditure pattern (section 
3), assets (section 4), occupational structure (section 5) and land holdin~ size (s~ction 6). 
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Finally, we enter the controversy over ~hanges in settlers' living standards and 
sustainability (section 7). 
1. MOTIVES FOR RESETTLEMENT 
An assessment of why settlers moved into the resource frontier is elusive. Shon of 
a 'lie detector' test there is no way of finding out the· truth. All that we can do is to 
question settlers about their motives. Income is the paramount 'pull factor' assigned by 
planners, politicians and academics. But is this true? 
A survey of settler's tnotives raised this issue. An open-ended question was asked 
as to why they t.~:::.me to move to the resettled area. The a~swers were more complex than 
assumed by planners, politicians and academics as five sets of reasons were given: 
higher income, employment stability, access to land, improved prospects for children and 
other various replies. As shown in Figure 5.1, income was the leading but not the 
dominating motive. 'More money' and 'escaping poverty' were the reasons given by 
almost half of the Bandar Tun Razak and Ciku settlers for participation in FELOA. 
Although these results underline the Malaysian .government's emphasis on improving 
rural incomes, the pull factor was more complex. 
Another key motive was the wish for a 'more stable life'. The Malay tenn 
kehidupan tetap (literally pennanent livelihood) was often expressed flfid used by settlers 
to imply security and stability involving, in particul'U", life-long guaranteed employment 
and an acceptable living envirottment. Though the expression was less precise, it can best 
be examined, in economic terms, in· terms of employment - including both primary artd 
secondary occupations. Inde~. job security and .opponunity are essential parameters 
closely associated with settlers' stan9ards of living. 
Income and stability were, for example, the twin reasons for the Kamal family 
c 
leaving for Bandar Tun Razak. Kamal bin Ahmad was then 29 years old, living with his 
parents in Kampung Pianggu, Rompin District of Pahang. He was married six years 
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Figure 5.1 Motives of M~gration 
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: • Bandar Tun Razak II Ciku : 
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earlier and had already three children. 'tapping old rubber trees in his parents' 4-hectare 
holding could not offer him a comfortable living, and bis parents were growing old anct 
increasingly needed his suppon. Consequently, he joined the FELDA scheme in 197lt 
Income and stability were also paramount reasons for 1usof bin Kassim leaving 
Kampung Tumpat, Kelantan for Ciku. Then 31 years old, he :w~ a fisherman, tenting a 
Small boat from a fellow fisherman in his village. His low income was further affected hr 
the Nonheast Monsoon which force(i him to fish near the coast, resulting in poor 
catches. That made his life unstable and incotne insecnre. In search of a better livelihood 
inclnciing the future of his'f our childreQ, he went to the Ciku scheme in 1981. 
' 
' l 
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Oearly. the Kamal and Jusof families were motivated by the same aspirations. Yet. 
one in five Bandar Tun Razak :settlers and one in seven in Ciku considered land as a 
reason for moving. Sll.rPrisingly, the desire for land was not stressed as much as might 
be expected, despite the record of land shortage in rural West Malaysia. Thus, the 
improvement, or otherwise, in access to land before and after moving needs 
investigation. Settlers also showed considerable concern with their children's futUre as a 
motive for migration. In this respect; they wished they could offer their children better 
educational opportunities so that they would lead a more successful life in the future 
outside the scheme as government servants and professionals (a theme to be taken up in 
Chapter 6 which examines social factors). 
The residual category in Figure 5.1 classified under 'others' comprised a range of 
answers, S':.1Ch as independence. starting a new life, business opportunities, better social 
facilities, opportunity to own a house, frustration with the previous occupation, poor 
relationship with parents, response to government policy or the New Economic Policy. 
While some of these motives were more a consequence of personal sentiments. they also 
included a pragmatic demand for a better livelihood either for settlers themselves or their 
children. Many of these will be taken up again in Chapter 6. 
Thus, when we examine the motives and expectations of the settlers, it is obvious 
that seeking higher income was the most important but not the only criterion that 
motivated settlers to move. Settlers, indeed, had a wider and more complex rar.ge of 
motives than government policy makers and planners had in mind. There is, therefore, a 
need for more in·depth analysis of factors associated with the change in income levels 
(employment and land) as well as a more ctiticallook at income itself, encompassing new 
expenditure patterns and holdings of assets. These will be the concern of this chapter 
and, it is hoped, will add new insight into the 'economic performance of settlers on the 
Malaysian frontiers. 
·, 
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-2. CHANGE IN INCOME 
lnevital:>ly, a change of income is the outcome of shifting from ()ne place to 
another. Net ooly did most settle~ want to achieve-this objective but so did Malaysia•s 
politicians and .planners. But to what extent has this aim been realised? Io response to this 
question, attention is focused on examining the change in household iacome of Bandar 
Tun Razak and Ciku before and after they moved. 
Before examining any achievement of this nature, we first bring up the computation 
methods. To compute the household income, we include both primary and secondary 
sources made by all resident household members. Non-resident household member~ are 
,:·excluded even though some of th~m may from time to time contribute to the overall 
household incox..1e by means of remittances. Settlers' primary income is derived from 
their tasks performed within the FELDA plantations and was taken from FELOA's 
official records for 1987. This income was the net income after deduction -0f loan 
inst3lmems and other contributions 1 whereas their secondary income was obtained 
1hrough a wide range of occupations including fanning, contract implementing, trading, 
wage earning and small-scale cash cropping. 
Net income was used because the assessment of change in sertlers' living standards 
was not based on incOltle alone but also on the change in their expenditure pattems, asset 
holdings and occupational structures. Using this m~chod, the life patterns of senlel'! 
would be more accurately reflected by the actual amount of disposable cash. Further, the 
use of gross income will be incompatible for .a comparative study as S5 per cent of Ciku 
settlers2 were still not incorporated into the block system whereas all Bandar Tun Razak 
2 
Taking a typical month in 1987 for instance, as long as a settler's net rflonthly incnme in Bandar Twi 
Razak reached $350.00 (a guaranteed amount for minimal living r.xpenses), he had !o pay $100.49 for 
the loan. S40.00 for replanting fund, $8.88 for land tax and $3.00 as membership fee t0 'K'{(R 
(Schetne Developmertt :Authority). 
these non-block members received an income much<lower than block members (less.than half in the 
case of Ciku). Their remuneration was based 011 the number of workdays and the output of palm 
fiui~ They were not required to start loan repayment as yet. 
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settlerS were block members (to be further~xplained in Section.;). Such Jarge income 
gap between block and non-block members is ·transitory within the FELDA arrangemem. 
Thus, it is best not to use lhe gross income for ·our comparison purposes while the 
eventual capital gains by ~ttlers have to be .acknowledged (also discussed later in 
Chaptcr6). 
By focusing on income, the rnost significant issue of concern, therefore, is: how i I 
I 
have the income levels changed; and why have incomes of Bandar Tun Razak differed I 
from those in Ciku'? In tackling these questions, we concentrate on settled change of / 
income levels before and after they migrated and, by briefly examining the background of / 
I the two areas, we can also explain why their income levels were different. Income Before Moving 
I 
· Calculations of income before moving are derived from our survey which ! 
I 
questioned settlers in Bandar Tun Razak and Ciku about the main and secondary ! 
activities of inembers of the household undertaken in their place of origin. This figure 
includes income from both wives and those children living with the male household 
head. These data of individual household incomes from both Bandar Tun Razak and 
Ciku are then grouped into five categories (Table 5.1). The data show that the mean 
income levels of most settlers of Bandar Tun Razak and Ciku before moving were quite 
similar. Bandar Tun Razak settlers earned slightly more than their counrerpans in Ciku. 
Yet, more than 70 per cent of settlers in both areas earned less than $400 per month. 
Revi:aling their poor background, settlers' mean income before they mr.;vcd was 
relatively low by the Malaysian standards - the rural ,mean household income was $590 
1.21 
in 197~ (see Government of Malaysia, l-981:56). On average, Bandar Tun Razak 
settlers ~eived 51 per cent of the mean while their counterpans in Ciku only 47 per 
cent. Thus, in general terms, both Bandar Tun Razak and Ciku ·settlers came from 
Malaysia's rural poor and sought to escape poverty. The plight of those settlers below the 
.mean income level is highlighted by examining Kamal and Jusofs housebold before they 
moved. 
Table 5.1 
Distribution of Household Monthly Income Before and After Moving 
in Bandar Tun Razak and Ciku 
Bandar Tun Razak Ciku 
Household 
Monthly Percentage of Percentage of 
·Income ($) Households Households 
Before After1 Before After1 
<100 4 7 
100..399 70 73 52 
400-69!> 23 43 16 27 
700-999 3 44 3 19 
>1000 13 1 2 
Total Households 100 100 100 100 
Mean($) 302 803 276 488 
Median($) 250 733 21.5 375 
Standard Deviation 180.16 276.93 182.83 239.59 
Coefficient 
of Variation 
-
59.66 34.49 66.24 49.10 
Note: 1 Average bouseboJd moQthly income taken from 1987. 
~ Fieldwork. 
The Year 1979 js sel~ted because the highest proportion of Bandar Tua Razak se~tlers moved to the 
seheme during lhat year while no 'tlata flave been obtained for 1983 - the median year taken for 
assessment. 
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Kamal's income in Kampung Pianggu.:in Rompin District, Pahang was only $120 
per month which put him in the second lowest category. This income was derived 
primarily from tapping rubber on his parent's 4-hectare holding. As the rubber trees were 
too old to produce a good yiel~. he also worked occasionally as a labourer to supplement 
his irioomc. Jusof's income in Kampung Tumpat, Kelantan was higher than Kamal as he 
earned $200 but he was still in the second lowest category. 
In contrast to Kamal and Jusof, there were a few households in both Bandai-Tun 
Razak and Ciku whose monthly -income recorded more than $700. This income diversity 
is indicated by the high figures in the coefficient of variation (60 and more). The three 
households in the topmost category in Bandar Tun Raza.k comprised an e~-Singapore 
construction worker, a skilied sawmill operator and a married couple working in an 
office. Conversely in Ciku, three of the four highest earners were ex~anny corps 
members while the fourth was an experienced builder. 
There were other differences, too, between settlers from the two areas. Overall, 
Ciku settlers were slightly poorer because nearly all of them came from the northern part 
of Kelantan where land fragmentation and lack of employment opponunities had been 
one of the most serious in the country (Alias, 1983; Ali, 1983; Gove~ment of Malaysia, 
l 986a). Conversely, Bandar Tun Razak settlers were recruited from most states in West 
Malaysia including Sela.ngor - the dchest state. Further, by examining primary income 
levels, it was follnd that settlers of both areas made iderttical average incomes of about 
$245 per household (Table 5.2). This indicates that the income differential between 
Bandar Tun Razak and Ciku, albeit small, had originated in disparity in secondary job 
Opportunities and their levels of remuneration. Indeed, through these secondary sources, 
a Bandar Tun Razak settler on average earned about 10 per cent more than a Ciku settler. 
Hence, as we can seet the ratio of primary to secondary income -w·as much larger in the 
case of Ciku settlers. After studying the income strocrure in the settlers' place of origin of 
both area~ we have now a g~neral \lnderstanding of Jheir income backgrounds. On this 
basis, we can proceed ·ti) study· the extent nf ~hange in income levels after the move. 
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Table 5.l 
Change in Ratio or Primary to Secondary Income ($) Per Average 
Household 
"Settlement .Before 
Bandar Tun 
Razak 
Primary S~condary Ratio 
Ciku 
248 
242 
SQ!m: Fieldwork. 
Income After moving 
54 
33 
4.6:1 
'7.3:1 
Primarv 
625 
410 
= 
After 
Secondary Ratio 
178 3.5:1 
78 5.2:1 
Settlers came from a background of general poverty and diversity of income but 
iheir participation in FELDA resettlement has led to two impressive changes. The first 
was the significant improvement i.rt cash incomes. Table 5.1 shows that settlers received 
higher average monthly incomes after joining the FELDA schemes. The improvement 
was more marked in Bandar Tun Razak (270 per cent) than Ci.ku settlers (180 per cent). 
Theincrease was indeed large and represented a rapid improvement for both groups of 
settlets. Secondly, Table 5.1 also shows that the change in coefficient of variation frnm 
place of origin to the frontier areas had narrowed down their income disparity in the 
process. Clearly, this hlUi been ·brought about by grouping settlers to perform identical 
tasks in the oil palm plantations, a consequence of change from occupational diversity to 
virtual homogeneity~ 
As one can -observe in the same table, there was a great differential in income levels 
between Bandar Tun Razak and Ciku settlers after moving - all settlers in the former 
made more than $400 per month whereas there were still 52 per cent in the latter who 
received le5s than that amount. While more than half of Bandar Tun Razak settlers 
acquired more than $700 a month, .a quarter of Ciku settlers even asserted. that they 
eatned more in their place of origin. Yet; each settler had received an allocation 'OI 4 
hectar~s of oil palm. This income differential between Bandar Tun Razak and Ciku 
stemmed from two main factors: Bandar Tun Razak was established before Ciku and its ... 
124 
.· 
'' 
0 
. ' l' 
._:,.·,1, 
. - ' . ' . 
~ : 0 .. ~ 
• ... Q .. ~ ~· 
oil palms were more mature (i.e they had reached the second srage of the oil palm cycle) 
and their different environments. While Bandar Tun Razak's Pahang Tenggarn region is 
endowed with deeper, more fenile soils and less steep terrain, the Ciku area is found 
amidst hilly limestone valleys in South Kelan.tan which fonn pilrt of the :Peninsular Main 
Range. Ciku's topography and soils, being less favourable, influences to an extent the 
yield of its settlers' plantations. 
Our field survey indicates that settlers in Bandar Tun Ra1.ak moved in between 
1977 and 1983, with the greatest number being recorded in 1979. On the other hand, 
Ciku settlers arrived between 1980 and 1986. The difference in date of arrival is reflected 
in settlers' levels of income. The settlers' primary income levels were mainly dependent 
on the yield levels of oil palm and its market price. Developed at different times, the palm 
yields (\f Bandar Tun Razak and Ciku vary accordingly (Figure 5.2). Planted in 1974-
1977, the palm trees in Bandar Tun Razak. had reached maturity in 1980-1983 where all 
settlers belonged to the 'block system'. By contrast, Ciku plantations were groW'il later in 
1980-1982. Consequently, only 45 per cent of its settlers became incorporated in the 
'block system' enabling them to earn a mean monthly income of $594 in 1987. The other 
55 per cent of non-members made only $260 per month (paid on subsistence wage). 
Thus, the income disparity between block and non-block members was very marked. 
The jncome levels between Bandar Tun Razak and Ciku are expected to be closer by the 
end Qf 1988 when all Ciku settlers will become 'block system' members. Moreover, as 
the oil palm yield in Bandar Tun Razak was nearing the peak level at the time of survey 
(December 1987) whereas Ciku bad yet to reach it, Ciku settlers are expected to catch up 
soon with their counterparts in income and eventually pass them (Figure 5.2). 
The difference in the stage of development is also reflected in the income levels of 
I<amal and Jusof families. In Bandar Tun.Razak, Kamal, a block member, had moved 
into the second topmost bracket and was paid·$680 per month by:FELDA. When he 
arrived in the Pahang Tenggara frontier in 1978, his income was not much higher than 
his earlier one. Conditions began to improve in !982 when set~lers i.n his scheme were 
'125 
... 
•,. 
... 
• 
·; 
.. 
. ., 
'o . 
!''·',. ,; 
. ·~ .. ;· .. 
. 
.• 
20 
15 
Annual Bunch 
Yield in 
Tonne/ Hectare 
10 
s 
s 
Figure 5.2: Life Cycle of Oil Palm Yield 
Settlers' Stage in 1987 
Year 
15 20 25 10 
Note: The average yield per unit area in Bandar Tun Ra?.ak and Ciku was higher than that shown 
on the graph. Nevertheless, the trend of variation rernains relevant - 25 years being 
considered Ute optimal productive period. 
~: Ng, Swee Kee, 1972:112; See also Mansoor and Barlow, 1988:21 for general refel'ellce. 
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mcorporated into the 'block system' which bolstered income. \In 1984,.tbe palm oil price 
fetehed up to $2,000 per tonne which enabled settlers to mak,e up to $1,000-1,SOO per 
JI}Oflth. Unlike Kamal, Jusof was still not a 'block system' member. Consequently. he 
received only $320, a figure however higher than most other non-block members 
beeause he worked extni. hours and the yield from his block was also relatively high. 
Besides incomes from oil palm plantations, settlers' also acquired (:ash from 
secondary activities. Table 5.2 shows that secondary activities experienced an increased 
importance from the settlers' place of origin to the resettled region, as indicated by the 
change in ratio of primary to secondary jobs. The extent was greater in Bandar Tun 
Razak than Ciku. This change in ratio corresponds well with our case study of the Kamal 
and Jusof families. In his place of origin, Kamars secondary activities were rare. 
Occasionally, he would take up any offer during the leaf-falling season when yields from 
rubber trees were extremely low. He earned about $250 per year. His counterpart Jusof, 
during the Monsoon from October to March, would help other fishermen with larger 
. - -, 
boats to s~ 9urfish. The income derived in this way came to nearly $200 per month. 
After the move. the nature of secondary income of Kamal and Jusof underwent a 
drastic change. Kamal was elected block leader by other members of his working team. 
For his duty, he was paid a mo~thly allowance of $80. To further increase household 
income, he sometimes helped other settlers to do harvesting which earned him $30 per 
month. Thus, his monthly average in 1987 totalled $760. In contrast, Jusof had a much 
simpler subsidiary occupation= a part-time cleaner in a nearby plantation which paid him 
$50 a month. His total monthly average was $370, which was half of Kanw's in 1987. 
The wives of Kamal and Jusof had played no role in contributing .household income. 
They both remained as housewives ever since they wete lnarried in their place of origin. 
Their ~ase was typical of the great majority of women and children in both, Bandar Tun 
Rat.ale and Ciku. though they share equal re~ponsibility in any ·household unit. We 
exarniJle here how this has evolved 
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Change in Women and Children's lneome Sources 
From their place of origin, women and children followed men to the FELDA oil 
palm schemes. They were taken as suppon components because the relatively heavy 
tasks required for harvesting are assumed to be men's job. In these ·cir~mstances. how 
has their income-earning ability changed? 
Our survey finds that the shift had been to the general disadvantage of women. 
Before moving, 11 and 15 per cent of the women now in Bandar Tun Razak and Ciku 
earned a cash income. It was equivalent to some 10 per cent of men's primary income in 
Bandar Tun Razak and 7 per cent in Ciku. After the move, these proportions declined to 
2 per cent in both areas. There were. however, a few exceptional cases when female 
household heads assumed man's role in the field after divorce or their husbands had 
died. The number of femaie households thus involved in the sample was small. with four 
in Bandar Tun Razalc and three in Ciku. 
Children's contribution to household income was almost zero in the plarn of origin 
due to their age. Although on occasions, some young children did help their parents to 
labour in the rice fields after school, their input could not be considered in the household 
income. After migrating. they had remained basically as dependent as before while their 
. 
total income aggregate was found to be less than 2 per cent of men's primary income in 
both Bandar Tun Razalc and Ciku (excluding a few who worked away from home). 
The survey on income change has inOicated that rnost households have achieved a 
higher income level after they moved. The average improvement was quite significant. It 
was more marked for settlers of Bandar Tun Razak than their Ciku counterparts because 
the former enjoyed the advantages of an older and better established location ,having oil 
palm with higher yields. Ciku settlers are, however, expected to improve their relative 
income levels in the near future when their oil palm grows older. The progress was even 
rnore impressive if we take into account block me111bers who w.ere able to pay off frorn 
their gross income some $1~0 monthly for land 1oart, replanting fund and Jand tax. The 
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income disparity between settlers in each ai:ea had narrowed down after moving ·as they 
now performed basically identical tasks.· Moreover, it has also been found that the 
proportion of settlers' secondary income to primary income had progressed over time. 
But the shift was biased towards men. While children's contribution to household 
income remained insignificant, almost all women saw their contribution declined from 
their place of origin to the resettled areas. Improvement in income usually leads to new 
expenditure patterns which reflect the real income progress. Thus, we now investigate 
how settlers use their income ro meet their daily expenses .. 
3. REAL INCOME AND NEW EXPENDITURE PATTERNS 
As noted in the previous section, there has been a marked improvement in income. 
This increase was due mainly to payments from FELDA (especially if they were 'block 
system' members as at Bandar Tun Razak) but also from enhanced secondary income 
sources. Although they may have more cash in hand than before, we still need to ask 
whether this was a real improvement. To verify this, we first look into inflation patterns 
and secondly, at the new forms of expenditure required in their new homes and jobs. 
Then, we are able to gauge more closely if higher incomes have been translated into new 
and improved consumption patterns. 
The consumer price index for Malaysia has risen steadily since 1979 - the year 
when the highest number of settlers moved into Bandar Tun Razak ( 1983 is chosen as 
the median year for Ciku). Thus, their higher incomes have had to be used to pay higher 
prices for goods. Although the national consumer price index is not an especially i;ood 
measure for inflation rates experienced by settlers, it does provide some indication of 
how real incomes might have changed. The deflated income data are give11 in Table 5.3, 
which demonstrates that real incomes have still increased. Real income had almost 
doubled in Bandar Tun Razak and had increased by two-thirds in Ciku. Such progress 
was still very satisfactory. Againy Ciku incomes remained lower. Its later start and lower 
base incomes mean that the improvement experienced had actually been at a higher rate 
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than Bandar Tun Razak. Thus, in quantitative terms, real incomes have risen sharply. 
But what about new expenses and· the new necessities that settlers required which ate into 
their family's pay packets? For this, we have to take a close look at the expenditure 
patterns. 
Income ($) 
Mean Household 
Income 
Real Mean 
Household Incomea 
Mean Annual Rate of 
Real Income Increase 
Table 5.3 
Progress in Real Monthly Income 
Before 
After 
After 
After 
Bandar Tun Razak 
302 
803 
594 
8.8% 
ciku 
276 
488 
463 
13.8% 
~: a Deflated using the consumer price index released in Government of Malaysia, 1982/83 
and 1983/84; 1988:12. 
Characteristics of Expenditure Patterns 
Settlers' household expenses were recorded on a monthly basis in classified items 
shown in Table 5.4. The table does not include settlers' monthly instalments required for 
purchases of consumer durables - a common practice found among settlers especially · 
those from Bandar Tun Razak. It has also excluded occasional eating-out during settlers' 
visits to nearby towns and other contingency expenses which are irregular in nature. It 
> 
provides, though, a general indication of how settlers spent their money on a monthly 
basis. 
The expenses listed in Table 5 .4 can be divided into basically two parts: basic 
necessities and what may be considered non-basic necessities (entertainment, ceremonies 
and remittances) plus savings. Many settlers stated that since moving, their expenses had 
increased: they had now more children and had to pay more for their children's 
education; they had to run a motorcycle or spend more to get between home and the work 
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Tab1e 5.4 
Average Monthly Expenditure Per Settler Household by Items ($) 
Bandar Tun Razak" Ciku 
Item Amount % Amount "11'1 
Basic Necess1t1es 
Rice 39.5 7.4 30.4 8.2 
Other Food 221.8 41.S 16.5.0 44.4 
Clothing & Footwear 28.7 5-4 20.1 5.4 
Children's Education 40~1 7.5 55.2 14.'8 
Medicine 6.8 1.3 3.0 0.8 
Private Transport. 49.9 9.3 30.3 8.2 
(Motorcycle) 
Lighting 1.33 ,2.5 S.3 2.2 
Water 8.5 1.6 ,~a a "" 
Sub-Total 408.6 76.S ,31243 '84~0 
Non-Basic Necessities 
Cigarenes 26.0 4.8 14.t} 3.S 
Private Transpon 38.5 1.2 9.3 2.S 
(car, truck and van) 
Public Transportb 19.i 3.1 16.3 4A 
Entertainment 26.3 4.9 13.4 3.6 
Ceremony 5.,9 l.t 2.6 fi.1 
Remittance 9.5 1.8 1.9 1~0 
Sub-total 125~.9 23.5 59.5 16.0 e ,. 
Average Monthly 
Expenditure 534.5 ' 100.6 37.1.8 100.0 
,Eer Household c 2 
Average Savings c 
m 
_l)_er Household 268.5 116.2 c $ :: .0 b 
Note: Ba'Sed on a rough estimate of the households',average monthly expe~s duriAg 1987 
ex duding purchase loans and other contingency expenses. 
a Wettwater. 
b A high proponion of expenses on public transport was for visits to life place of origin 
during Harl Raya festival (ending of the fasting month) and to nearby townships for 
entertainment and shopping purposes. Thus, it is considered a non-basic necessity. 
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place; and local foodiprices were often -higher. In particular, many former near~ 
subsistence fanners now had to buy their entire food intake. All these increases in 
expenses are included in the data, though it was not possible to compare them with actual 
expenses before moving because of the great difficulty in .compiling past expenditure 
patterns. Indeed, education, use of motorcycles and other non-food neces.s!ties accounr 
for about 30 per cent of both Bandar Tun R,azak and Ciku settlers ..... a heavy ourden for 
the households. When food items are added, a further 50 per cent of expenditure is. 
accounted for. Thus, there was little left for 'luxuries' though the average monthly excess 
(income minus listed expenses) of $269 in Bandar Tun Razak and $i 16 in Ciku was 
used usually as a hedge against falling prices, unforeseen expenses, or used for the 
purchase of consumer durables. Still~ when the general pattern of expenses is examined 
much of the enhanced income has been dissipated on daily necessities, many of which 
. 
constitute new orsubstantially increased expenses compared to the place of origin. 
Expenditure patterns differ between Bandar Tun Razak and Ciku. An avera~e..--· ·· 
,. 
household in the forrner spent some 45 per cent more than his counterpan. These 
differences reflect that the Bandar Tun Razak resident not only received a higher income, 
but his children were also olde~·aild needed more money. Clearly, as settlers from both 
areas used about half of their ~:xpenses on rice and other food, their income was still 
mainly used to meet basic subsistence needs. Some marked changes, however, had 
occurred in the food c~mposition of FELDA settlers 'Since 1978. According te> the 
research findings by Blair, Dissanayake and M. Noor (1980: 78-81)-0n FELDA settlers 
(conducted in July 1978), the expenditure ratio of rice to other food was found to be 1: 
3.1. In contrast, the present survey shows that the ratio had altered to 1: 5.6 for Bandar 
Tun Razak and 1: 5.4 for Ciku4• This change in.consumption patterns discloses a marked 
dietary change. Now, settlers consumed relatively less rice and moved towards a wider 
4 
The change must oot be over-emphasised. The ratio derived from the·presenrsurve~ has'tx:en·~eatly 
enlarged by the uneven change of consumer price for rice and fish (tile .most 1mportam items). 
Between 1978 and 1987, the price of rice increased by 14 per cent compared with 64 per cent for fish 
~: Govenunentof Malaysia, 1982/83 and 1'983/84; 1988:12.) 
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v.arieiy of food items than some ten years ago. This shift can be interpreted as a logical 
response to higher income and, possibly. a sign of itnproved diets and itunition. 
An1ong other non-basic items, settlers in both areas allocated a higher proportion of 
their income to pri~ate means of transpon. Although this was costly it was a basic 
requirement for daily commuting to work as FELDA had not established a public 
transport system. Educational ex:penses stood out. indicating the concern of settlers with 
their children's future occupations. This was pronounced in Ciku. There were two main 
reasons behind Ciku settlers' high allocation to their children's education. First, there 
was, as yet. no secondary school in the settlement. Consequently, settlers either left their 
older children with relatives in the place of origin, sent them to boarding schools in Gua 
Musang and Kuala Krai or despatched them to school on the bus. Secondly, from poor 
Kelantan villages, Ciku settlers appreciated that good education for children not only 
would bring family honour but eventually economic reward. 
Among non-basic expenses, settlers' own four-wheeled private vehicles accounted 
for a small percentage. The large differential between Bandar Tun Razllk and Ciku was 
because the fonner had twice as many vehicles and they were also more actively used. 
Bandar Tun Razak settlers' higher income also allowed them to spend twice as much on 
entertainment as their counterparts. Indeed, in response to their lower income, Ciku 
settlers had adopted a different strategy in budgeting their expenses, exemplified most 
markedly in their consumption ofcigarettes: there were more smokers in Ciku than in 
Bandar Tun Razak, ye4 -0n average, the fC>trner spent only half of that expended by their 
counterparts. 
The disparity between individual household expenses was found to be great. In 
Banctar Tun Razak, six households with monthly expenses of more than $1,000 were 
those having highly rewarding secondary jobs: tl-YO contractors transporting fruit bunches 
froni field to factory, one grocery shopkeeper, .one purchase officer for FELDA's 
c00perati'1e, one house ·builder and one t!Ulvert construction worker. Conversely, there 
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were a few single-person households in Ciku .whose household expenses accounted for 
less .than $WO. Housing improvement had been substantial in Bandar Tun Razak but. 
beeaUSC of the lack of savings this was quite minimal in Ciku (T~ble 5.4). In this regard, 
more than 90 per cent of settlers in Bandar Tun Razak had undenaken some kind of 
house repair or extension to accommodate more household members while relatively few 
had done so in Ciku. 
Our case study of the Kamal and J usof families shows how they planned their 
expenses according to income. With a wife and nine dependent .children, Kamal in 
Bandar Tun Razak spent proportionally more money on rice (50 per cent of other food} 
so that he could ensure some savings. For the same reason, he did not wa'lt a car as 
some other friends did. He had, however, other options in mind which was to renovate 
his house. In 1984, with the help of his brother~ he used $5,000 for building materials 
and successfully expanded his house. Now all family members lived in it more 
comfortably than before. His counterpart Jusof at Ciku was more concerned with his 
children's future, especially education. He had two elder sons studying in Kuala Krai - a 
14 year-nld in a boarding Islamic high school and a 12 }'ear-old in a primary school. This 
cost him $75 a month. In order to make ends meet, he spent little on clothes and would 
try not to eat out when visiting nearby towns. He had no savings and had from time to 
time to borrow from relatives. 
The expenditure panern reflects that despite significant progress in real income. 
settlers of both Bandar Tun Razak and Ciku spent most of their income on basic needs. 
To most settlers, their expenses had increased after moving because of larger family size. 
a motorcycle needed to the work site, Telatively higher costs for incoming goods and 
other new expenses. Aiready all of these extra expenses had, to an ext~nt, reduced their 
real income. Though savings were available, especially in Bandar Tun Razak, these were 
only possible when the palm oil price was high. These savings, however, had to be used 
either as a hedge against falling prices, the purchase of consumer goods, or house 
ex.pansion to accommodate their expanding family tesponsibilities. More partioo1arly, 
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many non-block system members in :Qku had tt> borrow map.ey from relativ.es from time 
rotime or, OCC8Sionally sell jewellery. Other expenses on luxuries had little significance. 
nus. the Jevel of progress in living standards can be considered as minor by the national 
standards. Another issue that is often used for assessing incC1me improvement is the 
change in asset holdings. By examining change in this respect, we can \lerify the ~tent 
of mcotne progress. 
4. CHANGE IN POSSESSION OF CONSUMER DURABLES 
The change in household asset holdings, like the evolution of settlers' expenditure 
patterns. is also reflective of the variations in income levels. In recognition of.the general 
improvement in settlers' real income, the two key issues which we need to investigate 
are: have improvements in income been translated into more assets; and, have new 
patterns of consumption of consumer durables emerged? To answer these cwo questions, 
we: compare settlers' assets in therr place of origin with the resettled area. This analysis of 
the net shift in assetS fonns the basis of funher gauging the material progress of those 
living in Bandar Tun Raz.ale and Ciku and explaining the differences betWeen the two. 
Assets Before Moving 
GeneraUy, settlers did not possess rnany assets in their place of origin, reflecting 
their low living standards. Furthermore, a large proportion of household assets were 
actually owned by their parents with whom they lived. This feature underlines again that 
the settlers came from poor households. Apart from bicycles (essential for personal 
transpon) and radios (for news and household entenainment), there was little available 
for expenditure on consumer durables. Electrical appliances and motor vehicles were 
quite rare. 
The change in household assets for settlers of Bandar Tun Razak and Ciku before 
and after the move is provided in Table 5.5. A'S stated earlier, settiers from Bandar Tun 
Ra7.ak enjoyed higher income levels tltan those from Ciku before they moved. Their 
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ownership of necessities - radios and motorcycles - was higher but, surprisingly, Ciku 
settlers possessed more luxury items, such as television sets and refrigerators. This 
differtnee reflects the timing of the shift. Moving later, Ciku settlers took advantage of 
the spectacular increase in the availability of low-priced Japanese-made consumer 
durables during the early 1980s. By the time of this 'boom', Bandar Tun Razalc settlers 
bad. to a large extent. already moved. 
Table 5.5 
Household Assets of Settlers in Bandar Tun Razak and Ciku 
Before and After Moving 
Item 
Bandar Tun Razak 
Percentage of 
Households 
Before After 
Radio 
Television 
Video 
Bicycle 
Motorcycle 
Car/Truck/Van 
Gas Cooker 
Sewing Machine 
Washing Machine 
~frigerator 
Source: rreldwork. 
\ssets After Moving 
78 95 
16 
74 
40 
1 
5 
22 
1 
1 
93 
7 
63 
96 
19 
77 
63 
18 
49 
Ciku 
Percentage of 
Households 
Before Arter 
54 55 
25 
74 
25 
4 
s 
17 
22 
I 
~o 
79 
9 
60 
24 
1 
-) - t 
The general improvement in hopsehold income levels bas enabled ~lers t& acquite 
tnore assets. Table 5.5 clearly ·shows this was"pronounced in Bandar J'un R.azak. the 
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progress was most mar~ed in items such as~ehicles, gas eookers and sewing machines. 
In fact, the improvement in asset holdings .was· attributable not only to higher income but 
the relatively lower real price of.these consumer goods since the early 1980s. As a result 
of these factorS, settlers ~uired higher purchasing power. 
Differentials in income levels between settlers of Bandar Tun Razak and Ciku were 
definitely the main cause of their unbalanced asset holdings. The difference also reflected 
the lack of electricity. While more than 90 per cent of Bandar Tun Razak settlers owned 
television sets, only one in four in Ciku had them. Wit}:iout electricity, Ciku settlers had 
to use dry battery cells to operate their television sets - their cost was too high for general 
use. Other assets requiring electricity - video, washing machine and refrigerator were 
.. : .. ,...;::r!!v non-existent. 
For both areas, however, the ownership of motorcycles was high. Replacing the 
ubiquitou!'. bicycles, motorcycles had become one of settlers' basic needs in view of the 
relatively long commuting distance to work (over 6 kilometres for Bandar Tun Razak 
settlers as against over 4 kilometres for Ciku residents). Correspondingly, Bandar Tun 
Razak also saw more four-wheeled vehicles than Ciku because the former had more 
settlers who used them for commercial activities. Thus, patterns of vehicle ownership not 
only reflected the increased need for better transport on resettlement but also the enhanced 
capacity of settlers to move from rudimentary push bicycles to motor transport. Further, 
there was a substantial change in cooking facilities. Firewood, the chief source of 
cooking fuel in the settlers' place of origin, was largely replaced by gas cookers. As we 
can see, new patterns of consumption of consumer durables have emerged on the frontier 
and a new life style of consumption is also taking root. It was commonly found that as 
long as the settlers' purchasing power allowed, they would attempt to own them and 
many did so by buying on credit. How these assets were acquired is illustrated in Section 
4 of Chapter 6 which focuses on regional access to high-level goods and services. 
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At the individual level, 1he change ia- asset holdings can be demonstrated in the 
boUSeholds of the Kamal and Jusof families. In his place of origin, Kamal possessed 
only a radio and a bicycle. At that time, his wife had to cook with firewood collected 
from 1he rubber holding where he worked. After nine years in Bandar Tun Razak. a 
radical change had occurred as I observed in early January 1988. I was looking carefully 
at his house when Kamal smilingly parked his motorcycle after being called back by his 
wife to attend the interview. The newly renovated house was larger than most other 
houses in the area. When he welcomed me to the sofa in the sitting room, the television 
set right in front caught my attention immediately - it did not look new but was 
apparently in good condition. His wife soon went into the kitchen to set the gas cooker 
alight for some hot water. In a few minutes, tea was served in splendid cups taken from a 
set installed in a cupboard. On the cupboard was a radio covered with a piece of cloth t0 
keep it away from dust. Kamal's children djd not want tea like us but preferred cold 
drinks from the refrigerator. After finishing the interview, I asked for the toilet which I 
found had flush facilities. Near to the toilet stood a washing machine- thanks to-which 
Kamal's wife could save much labour in washing clothes of her nine children. Just 
before 1 said 'banyak terima kasih' (many thanks) to the hosts, I had a final glimpse into . 
the house comers and was attracted by a dark object - a sewing machine. For the 
consumer goods I saw in Kamal's house, the change was indeed very substantial. 
In comparison, Jusof was less fonunate than Kamal. Previously as a fishennan, he 
rode a bicycle around the village, as did his wife to the market place with a second 
bicycle. But that was all they had as consumer goods. Cooking was by firew~ 
• 
Purchased from a grocery shop nearby. It had been six years since they migrated. Yet, 
when I saw his resettled house in Ciku, I realised that little had changed - hardly any 
improvement on the house and two bicycles were leaning against ir. Inside the house, 
there was little furniture. Decorations of the house were obviously far inferior in ~uality 
to Kamal's. They had, hcwever, a motorcycle 11eeded for commuting to ·work. for 
Cooking, they Still USed firewood. 
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from the above data and observatiOtlS., we can contlude that the variations in . 
settlers' assets 1Jidi.cate proponional progress in li\ling standards in each area. With 
Bandar Tun Razak ·settlers generally .bener off. The progress -could .be gre:uer s..'ill 
because assets declared by -some settlers before the move were believed to have been 
over-stated - by claiming their parents' assets. as their own. The rise in motorcycle 
ownership was the most spectacular feature but it was highly work .. relared. Thus., it can 
be ~serte-0 that settlers were inclined increasingly rouse mechanised vehicles for their 
main and supplementary jobs, symptomatic of both higher incame and higher expenses. 
Thus, a new pattern of eonsumption of consumer goods bas .emerged in the light of 
improved income levels and pu~hasing power. Their transition fu>m semi-subsistence 
agriculture to a more monetised existence, integrated more into the national and 
internarional economies, has been marked - a feature also suggested by a change in 
occupations. 
5. CHANGE IN OCCUPATIONAL STRUCTURE 
Earlier sections of this chapter establis~ .by refereRCC to the indices of real 
incomes, expenditure patterns and assets, .a 'Strong case for higher incomes with 
resetrlement. Attention is shifte.<i to the .second reason for moving - the search for s.table 
employment. To do so, we .compare occupational sttuctures before .and after moving. in 
Particular. we note not (}nly the change m primary incomes but also new patterns of 
secondary work .and opponunities for the househoki as a .whole. 
Occupations in the Place of Origin 
Settlers' pttvious occupations were ·fundamentally ·associated with Malaysia's 
traditional agricultural sector (Lim. 1977; Courtenay, J'988). These .low productivity 
activities involved subsistence food cropping and other low incorne occupations 
characteristic of rural areas and mi~l towns. 
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The occupational structure of settlers-before they migrated is given in Table 5.6. 
Here, the m('lst outstanding general feature is the highly diversified nature of 
employment. The types of occupation covered farming, non-skilled ro skilled labouring, 
go\1P.mment service and petty trades - the most common occupations in rural West 
Malaysia. A relatively high proportion of settlers depended on land for their primacy 
source of livelihood. In this respect, there were more rice farmers, rubber tappers and 
other farm workers among those who settled in Bandar Tun Razak (64 per cent) than 
among those who mov·!d to Ciku (35 per cent). Indeed, due to the uneconomic size of 
rice farms, a large proportion of Ciku settlers adopted a different strategy. Non-farm 
activities constituted their chief occupations with rice growing and rubber tapping 
providing a secondary income and subsistence food (see Table 5. 7). Among those 
classified as fann workers, most from Bandar Tun Razak were previously employed on 
estates whereas, in Ciku, almost half were self-employed tobacco planters. 
Besides occupations attached directly to land, about one-third of Bandar Tun Rat.ak 
and one half of Ciku settlers were construction workers, fishermen, drivers and skilled 
or semi-skilled workers. There were many construction workers and carpenters among 
Ciku settlers due to the 'housing boom' in the early 1980s, a rime when they joined the 
FELDA scheme. Given the concentration of recruitment in North Kelantan including the 
coastal villages, Ciku had more ex-fishermen than Bandar Tun Razak. In addition. 
skilled or semi-skilled workers made up quite a high proportion in both areas comprising 
skilled handicraft workers, b.filik painters, car or motorcycle mechanics. sawmill 
operators and log graders. While there was no ex-military and police personnel in Bandar 
. 
Tun Razak, there were five from Ciku recruited either after their retirement or 
resignation. They joined for two main reasons. First, they were given priority in 
Kelantan to participate and no formal age limit was imposed ·on them. Second, -seeking 
Other job alternatives after resignation and retirement appeared more difficult than their 
colleagues from other richet states. Obviously, if.settlers' '1'revious occupations were 
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Table 5.6 
Settlers• Main Occupational Structure Before Moving 
-
Occupation 
farm-Related 
Rice Farmer 
.·· Rubber Tapper 
Other Fann Worker 
Non-Farm Related 
Construction Worker 
/Carpenter 
Fishing 
Driver (Vehicle/frishaw) 
Small Trader 
Office/Field Clerk 
Military /Police 
Skilloo 
/Semi-Skilled Worker 
Total 
Total Households 
~ F'i.eldwodc. 
Bandar Tun Razak Ciku 
Percentage of 
Households 
23 
25 
16 
6 
4 
3 
3 
4 
16 
100 
100 
Pet:centage of 
Households 
12 
10 
13 
22 
10 
9 
3 
2 
s 
14 
100 
100 
characterised by great divers1ty, and more Bandar Tun Razak settlers were involved wjth 
land than their Ciku counterparts, it must be the nature of the new occupational structure 
that has contributed to their rise in income levels. 
Primary Occupations After Moving 
Settlers performed almost identical tasks -after moving to the two schemes but their 
income levels differed. The differentials were largely a result of developmentai stages 
which determine settlers' status whether they were or not 'block members'. A 'block 
Illeillber' enjoyed not only higher income but greater freedom to work. aasically, dlece 
are two developmental stages. Stage 1 stm:tS when settlers move into·the FELOA eil Pah,n 
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scheme to do field maintenance {leaf pruning; weeding, fenilising etc) arid also do small-
scale harvesting within their individual 4-heetare plots. During this stage of three to four 
years. settlers are paid.daily subsistence wages until the yield reaches maturity where the 
'block system' will be introduced. 
The second stage begins with the 'block system' when the yield becomes steady. 
The system is organised by the Scheme Manager to group twenty to twenty-five settlers 
into a block, with a working size of 80 to 100 hectares. A supervisor is assigned to each 
specific block by the Manager to direct members to do the harvesting, fertilising, field 
maintenance and other routine checks within their individual plots. The supervisor is 
assisted by a 'block leader' elected by" members who pay him a monthly allowance for 
1he service. AU settlers within specific blocks have common responsibility and are 
required to carry out work as planned. Consequently, an individual settler gets his 
momhly income by sharing the yield produced within the block, after deduction of 
operating and maintenance costs. As the yield differs from block to block and varies also 
with the age of the oil palm trees, it is clear that settlers receive a wide range of income. 
Not only does the settlers' principal income from the 4~hectare oil palm area vary from 
stage to stage but their overall househoW income is further influenced by the availability 
of secondary occupations. Hence, we now examine how secondary jobs at settlers' place 
of origin changed after moving to the frontier areas. 
Settlers' Secondary Jobs Before and After 
Secondary jobs play ao important role in seufe.rs' economic life and their 
" ._.availability is directly associated with many factors. External factors depend essentially 
'• . 
on job opponunities outside the -settlement so that settlers or their wives and children can 
obtain work there wiJlin easy reach. An ongr .. ;;1g public project near the settlement, for 
instance, can create employnt~nt opportunities for some settlers at least for a fixed period. 
Conversely, internal factors are a result ofthe"1evelopmental stage within the settlement. 
Higher income naturally leads to higher consumpdon and creates demand for more 
grocery shop~ petty u.-adipg,, motoreyele workshops. ancJ other service'S. 
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Table 5.7 provides a comparison of ~ndary job opponunities for settlers of both 
!Teas in their p1ace of origin and present settlements. Primarily small farmers, the great 
majority of settlers found themselves with time left for secondary jobs both before and 
after migrating. The table shows that, before the move, many settlers were deperident on 
subsistence farming as a secondary occupation. Since shifting, ~.ey have leaned more 
rowards cash earning, in panicular by involving themseJves in small businesses, 
labouring and contract jobs available in the new frontiers. Following the move, settlers of 
both areas have acquired a wider range of secondary employment opponunities. Indeed, 
Bandar Tun Razak settlers doubled their income from this source but their Ciku 
cour.terpans made only slight progress. The difference between the two sets of settlers 
stemmed from the fact that Pahang Tenggara was developed earlier and on a much larger 
scale than the Kesedar region. Consequently, a more diversified local economy has 
evolved. Also, more settlers from Bandar Tun Razak: have found secondary jobs in fruit 
loading, harvest and maintenance because there were private estates nearby and more 
settlers busy with secondary occupations. Consequently, the need for wage labourers 
was created. By contrast, most Ciku settlers engaged in cash crop farming merely grew 
small quantities of vegetables, sugar cane, and bananas chiefly for their own 
consumption. Little was sold for cash. <Bandar Tun Razak: settlers' higher income also 
enabled ~hem to have more small business enterprises and opportunities to renovate their 
houses. Generally, a Bandar Tun Razak settler with a secondary job earned a mean 
monthly income of 60 per cent higher than his Ciku counterpart. 
Fish and Cattle Raising 
Supplementary to secondary jobs mentioned above, FELDA also ~ncouraged the 
settlers to participate in other off-farm activities. The activities highly recommen<ied by 
FELD A were fish and cattle raising. At the time of survey, a small number of fish ponds 
had been dug by enterprising settlers in both Bandar Tun Razak and Ciku. These ponds 
were usually located in low-lying areas ,considere4 unsuitable for houselots. As fish 
fearing has just been staned there, it is pi::emature to make any observations. Cattle 
" r r ~,
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Table 5.7 
Settlers' Secondary Jobs Before and After Moving 
- Bandar Tun Razak Ciku 
Type of Job Percentage of Percentage of 
Households Households 
Before a After Before a After 
Farm-Related 
Rice Growing 4.0 18.0 
Rubber Tapping 2.0 5.0 
Field Loading/ Har-
vest/ Maintenance 4.0 23.0 1.0 5.0 
Cash Crop Farming 6.0 5.0 8.0 13.0 
Livestock/ Fish Rearing 3.0 2.0 4.0 2.0 
Othe1 Fann Work 3.0 6.0 5.0 
Non-Farm Work 
Contractor 3.0 4.0 
Grocery Shop/ Other 
Small Businesses 1.0 12.0 6.0 
Sea Fishing 1.0 1.0 
Car/Motorbike Mechanic . 3.0 3.0 1.0 
Construction/Carpenter 3.0 9.0 3.0 1.0 
Other Services/ 
Labouring Work 2.0 5.0 S.o 
Total 32.0 68.0 40.0 45.0 
Average Monthly 
Income ($) Per 
Household Involved 91.3 234.8 43.9 142.8 
., 
Note: a As these figures depend upon the memory recall of settlers, they may not be reliable. 
Sm&: Fieldwork. 
raising, however, has produced some encouraging re;,ults. Under FELDA's 'Cattle 
Integration Project' (Projek Jntemsi Ternakan Lembu), settlers had been able to use their 
savings to invest in raising cattl~. They were closely involved in the operations of the 
project and took regular turns in minding the cattle. In 1987, the project in Bandar Tun 
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Razak (Keratong 5) had 356 head of cattle,-wonh about $160,000. In contrasf., the scale 
was much 13maller in Ciku where the project, staned only in 1987, 'embraced merely 
fewer members and cattle. 
The general transformation of the economic life of settlers is reflected in Table 5.7. 
Before mo'ling, about 70 and 90 per cent of Bandar Tun Razak and Ciku settlers 
respectively had land-based secondary jobs. After migration, the number of settlers from 
· · both areas engaged in land-based secondary jobs di-opped to about 50 per cent - a 
reflection of increasing importance of non-fann jobs which allowed settlers to earn more 
cash. Contrary to Omar Din's (1981:47) suggestion, settlers' average subsidiary income 
increased as their main income source rose; they worked more, not less. Thus, our field 
survey shows that settlers' secondary incomes depend upon the availability of regional 
jobs and the developmental stages that determine settlers' income levels. As observed in 
Bandar Tun Razak, settlers higher income levels raise their consumption, creating greater 
n 
demand in areas where there is not usually a pool of labour available or a well-developed 
retailing infrastructure. Hence, increased incomes seem to have a strong 'multiplier effect 
.. on the settler economy. 
The change in residence has led Kamal and Jusof to a more stable life and 
employment. When Kamal was tapping rubber previously in Rompin, he worked 
occasionally as a labourer and took any offer that came along. Now in the frontier 
settlement, he has been elected block leader which exempts him from the harvestng and 
fi~ld maintenance tasks which were, instead, assumed by other members of the working 
team. In this position, Kamal's main responsibility has been to ensure good working 
relationship among members and to liaise with the FELDA management regarding 
implementation of field tasks. He has to attend a monthly meeting convened by the 
General Manager who gives him direct instructions. With the FELDA supervisor, he has 
had to solve all problems within the block such as family quarrels and neglect of field 
maintenance - both requiring his power of persuasion. He now works about fifteen days 
a month and some eight hours a day. When free of obligations, he sometimes helps 
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others wirh their harvesting. Likewise+ JuSGf is glad to end his fishing career whieh he 
considers highly unstable because of the Noitheast Monsoon and irregular catches. Now 
in Ciku, he does maintenance and harvesting work. Subsidiary jobs are rarer there but he 
bas one as a cleaner. This has relieved him, however, of some financial burden to 
support his sons' education. As noted earlier, men have been more active in earning 
household income than women. N evenheless, we need to know the type of occupations 
in which women have panicipated. 
Women1s Occupations Before and After Moving 
Before the move, both Kamal and Jusofs wives were engaged in home duties. 
This has remained unchanged since they arrived at the ·FELDA scheme. How typical is 
this of other women? We seek to answer: this question by examining other examples '()f 
employmellt for women. As stated, settlers' wives generally contributed little to the 
household income before and after they migrated. In the place of origin, their.jobs were 
predominantly rubber tapping, rice farming and petty trading. If they were rubber 
tappers, they made the same income as their husbands, though generally they were paid 
less than men in most other rural occupations. After resettlement, howev.er, ther.e were 
fewer opponunities because the heavy harvesting tasks and maintaining a 4,.hectare plot 
of oil palm were not perceived as jobs for women. They were handled by .a single male 
worker without need for extra help. Consequently, contributions by women to household 
inc~'me have declined. Their involvement in both Bandar Tun Razak -and Ciku has been 
minimal. Indeed, few women helped their husbands in the field. As a source of 
supp!ementary income, tailoring provi<.L:d them with the ·best opportunity by working at 
home. Other sources of income, ·however, wefe limited. Thus, moving to .the frontiers 
has disadvantaged rnost w.omen in tenns C1f income-earning capacity. 
Therefore, improvement in the income of settlers 'has been marked by.~H,lmnge in 
occupational structure, with enhanced secondary job .oJ'portonities. Nor only Ms their 
higher income brought about other supplemeptary off .. farm jobs but the nature of rheir 
.kib~ __ has chaqged commensurate with the shift from near-subsistence to cash-eamin,g 
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activities. Before moving, the settler.&' Primary occupations bad been diverse, m:. sdy 
low-paid and often insecure. In contrast, their new FELDA job was relatively stable. 
Women, however, had become less involved in income earning than before. Also, the 
overall improvement-Of household income has to be partly attributed to the change in land 
size. A salient feature w.as the settlers' attachment to small parcels ()f land before 
migrating~· an issue that is now considered. 
6. LAND 
Land is the key resource for the Malay peasantry and access to hnd is needed to 
grow crops for subsistence or sale. Security of tenure to adequate agricultural land is the 
basic deremrinant of household well-being. Thus, while land shonage was not accorded 
hlgh priority in settlers' motives for moving, land lies behind most of their stated 
reasons: better incomes, greater stability and a better future for their children. In this 
section, we will e~amine the land holding of settlers before moving and then see how this 
changed on the frontier. 
Land Holding Before Moving 
Most of the settlers were under 35 years of age and their parents were still alive 
when they joined the resettlement schemes. When interviewed, many settlers who lived 
With their parents claimed to own land, which, in reality, was registered under their 
.~· 
parents' names. In legal terms, their pai:~rits owned almost all the land, with plot size 
/ 
ranging from O. l to 1 O hectares (Table"S.S). 
The size of land owned by settlers and their parents .was indeed small, measuring 
tnOStJ.y less than I hectare, especially for Ciku settlers. Yet, n'1ote than 90 per cent of Hus 
land belonged to settlers' parents. Although largely attached to the land, the average 
holding was negli~ible, with 0.1 and Q.03 hectare .respectively in Bandar Tun Rft2.ak and 
Ciku. Furthermore, 28 and 1 & per cent Qf se.nlers ef Bandar 'fun Razak and Ciku 
re.spectively did not J)ossess atty land at an. Given this level of Iandlessness .and coupled 
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with most land being owned by their parerns, it is safe to conclude that the settlers were 
basically drawn from ainong Malaysia's rural landless population. They worlred mainly 
as renan1 tanners or wage earners in generally disadvantaged zones of the country. On 
. . ... 
their parents' holdings they grew matnly rice, rubber and fruit trees (especially durian). 
Livesrodc which were kept in small numbers by settlers before they moved con~sted of 
two categories: .cows and buffalos as draught animals while chickens and ducks ~ 
nearly all for home consumption. 
Table 5.8 
Distribution of ~tflers• L9nd Size B-efore Moving to Bandar Tun Razak 
and Ciku 
Bandar Tun Razak Ciku 
Total Owned By Owned By Total Owned Owned Range Settler Settler's By By (ha) Parents Settler Settler's 
Parents % {%) {%} % (%) (%) 1i 2a 18 
0.1-0.9 18 (3) (i5} j9 (9) (50) 
l.0-1.9 24 (4) (20) 10 (IO) 
2.0-2.9 12 (2) (IO) 10 (10) 
3.0-4.9 16 (16) 1 {l) 
5.0·10.0 2 (2) 2 .. (2} 
{3.3) ,. (96.7) Total(%} 100 (6.T,1 (93.3) 100 
TotatArea 
{ha) 144.3 9.6 134.7 77.2 2.6 14.<> 
Average Size 
0.77 0.03 0.73 ar Household 1.44 0.10 1.35 
') J ~: Fieldwork. 
New FELDA Holdings 
On moving ro a FaJ)A scheme, .settlers received a houselat-ofOJ. hectare fer their 
house and home gatden, in addition u1 tlteit 4-hectare oil palm holding: A common 
Complaint ma,cte by s~ers was .that their hous~lot was tao small for.ffuit trees. The oil 
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palm holding represented a substantjal impJOvement in the size of land held bu:. :·ewers' . 
satisfaction with this has been affected by recent repercussions over the land title dl;;;f'Ute 
in Jobor
5
• Apparently for the settlers, there remained a risk that FELDA land would be 
used as a collective means of production rather than as private propeny. This h1. fact has 
already been manifested in the introduction of the 'share system'6 by which settlers 
recruitr-:.d since 1985 would no longer hold any individual titles. On 30 Ocrober 1988, 
under immense pressure from settlers, the Deputy Prime Minisrer, Ghafar Baba. declared 
to abolish the •share system' and res um~ all individual own.ership of land to settlers so as 
to motivate them to work on land that they see as their own (FEER, 24 November 1988). 
This decision had retained the hope of settlers to hold land as their primary asset for daily 
production. 
. 
For Kamal and Jusof, their experience of change in land holding had been 
dramatic. As a rubber tapper on his father's 4-hectare holding, Kamal previously 
possessed no land of his own. Moreover, at his father's death. he would only inherit pan 
of it as he had many other brothers and sisters. Now in the FELDA scheme, he was 
entitled to own all 4-hectares by himself after he repaid the loan. Jusof had an en~irely 
different life from Kamal before coming ro Ciku, he derived his livelihood from the sea 
instead of land. The potential of land ownership was not only a new experience for him 
but represented also stability of livelihood with solid ground below his feet. 
Our field investigation indicates that1 though highly dependent on land for their 
livelihood in the place of ·origin, settlers' mean land site was 0.1 hectare or less. 
s 
In September 1987, a group of FELDA settlers in Kulai District, Johar demonstrated to demand free 
Jaoct title since they bad all repaid their loans as was expected under terms of ~le FE~DA agr~en1t !hey also rlemanded that they be freely allowed to tnanage their own holdings without fELvA s 
Illlelference. 
~ Th I• • 
.. . _ ~$hafe system' aims at overcoming the 'equity' problems of the 'block system •.n two maJOr ways. 
·· ·Fl!St, it applies the principle of 'more work more pay'. By this principle, i~ r~q~1res each 8t'.ttler to 
Work on the basis of 4 hectares in a work team. Under .this arrangement, an md1V1d11al settler is ~ore 
fully employed. The second objective is to protect seUlers from dras.tic price fluctuations. With a 
gllaranleed wage, sewers can at least be assureci that their income would be 12blero cover the~xpe,gses 
for basic needs. 
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Landlessness and possession of tiny plots -ef land were an important reason for their 
poverty._ After the move, seulers' land holding has expanded to 4 hectares of highly 
productive oil palm which has bolstered their income. They had, however, a common 
complaint over the new houselot dimension which was too small for traditionally grown 
fruic trees. Despite considerable improvement in income, assets and land size as 
discussed above, settlers' improved real income has be~r; constantly undermined by 
marked flucmation of palm oil price. This is the recurrent nightmare, suggesting an 
underlying fragility to their improved standards of living. 
7. FRAGILITY OF SETTLERS' IMPROVED STANDARDS OF LIVING 
We have seen how settlers have become better off: higher incomes, more assets 
and land and security of employment. There is a need, however, to consider whether 
these improvements can be sustained. Do they represent a real, secure and sustainable 
progress or merely a fortuitous set of circumstances in the early stages of resettlement? In 
contemplating this question, we have to turn from the household survey data to consider 
broader implications: mainly the financial relationship between settlers and FELDA; and 
the world palm oil price. 
FELDA•s Operations and Fixed Costs 
FELDA is a semi-state corporation which consists of three divisions, namely ~e 
land development schemes~ business corporations and joint-venture companies. Io 1986, 
the whole network employed 21,670 people (FELDA, 1986;7). Within the whole 
FELDA business chain, the range of services is widespread (Figure 5.3). It encompasses 
functions such as trading, marketing, transport, processing mills, refinery, palrn kernel 
Proeessing, .!'·':".::.,ni1y services, agricult~ra} and maintenance services and construction of 
Premises and sites. Within this complex network, settlers are managed by the land 
developm~nt division co.mprising managemer1t and training staff at different levels. The 
land development scheme is part of an integrated physical distribution system linkingtaw 
m.aterial production by settlers in <the plantation and transportation of fresh fruit 'bunches 
l·SO 
Figure S.3: Range·of FELDA 's Services in Peninsular Malaysia 
• Rancangan (Scheme) 
Do Kilang (p~,'Jcessing MiU) 
* lnstolasi (Bulking Installation) 
f FELDA Development Institute (INPUT) 
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• Pejabat Pemban9unan (Regional Office) 
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by settlers' cooperatives to the processing mill. From the mill. the crude palm oil is 
fanher carried by FELDA's fleet of truck-tankers to local seapons for direct expon and 
local reprocessing (less than 15 per cent). The fixed costs of operations directly affecting 
settlers comprise fertilisers, transport of fruit bunches from field to factory, field 
surveillance, some specific maintenance and general insurance. They have tended to 
increase in real terms over time and are passed on to the settlers since pay-outs are only 
made after these charges are deducted. All these costs can be taken as a constant variable. 
independent of the price levels of palm oil. This variable is pitched at a relatively high 
Jevel because of the extensivene~s ofFELDA's network and bureaucracy. It is the settlers 
who bear price fluctuations and suppon the FELDA snucture - they are bound to this 
financial arrangement and can do little to cushion themselves from price variations or 
mounting FELDA costs. As the fluctuation of palm oil price can be very marked, the 
variability is reflected in differences in the income of settlers. Thos, the settlers! 
improved living standards is fragile when the commodity price declines. 
FELDA's substantial maintenance costs have been a perpetual source of complaint 
by settlers in recent years. As noted, in 1987, their frustration resulted in an open 
demonstration in Johor. Nevenheless, any detachment from FELDA at this stage would 
leave many settlers lost because they have been dependent on it for guidance since 1956. 
Further, despite their un~table source of primary income, they have enjoyed a secure 
financial position under FELD A's protection. It has guaranteed settlers a minimum 
subsistence income .0 f $350 through extra-loan arrangements free of interest.This 
guarantee was provided in 1986 when prices declined sharply. In compensati0'1 for this 
&ssistance, the settlers have had to prolong their Joan repayment period beyond the 
11
ortnal fifteen year period. Yet, this enhanced loan arrangement merely acts to postpone 
the impact of financial pressure. Settlers may· be-better off economically but their relation 
With FELDA is one that 'ertsures-their continued dependence to that organisation and 
VUinerability to outside fotces. 
.• 
Price Fluctu~tion 
The improved standards of living of the :settlers can only be maintained when the 
palzn oil price is high. Palm oil prices, however, have proved ·extremely volatile. Figure 
5.4 shows the price fluctuations of palm oil between 1970 and 1986. The price 
fll:lctuarions were often extreme and these reflected the pay~packets of the settlers clearly. 
Indeed, for an individual settler, the unstable income is illustrated in Figure 5.S 
which shows that a senler's mean monthly income fell sharply from $1,295 in 1984 to 
$368 in 1986. In 1986, about half of this Bandar Tun Razak settler's gross income as 
reported in his tax return was used for loan repayment, replanting fund, management and 
maintenance costs. Consequently, this settler received only half of it as net income. This 
instability of price levels is clearly a recurrent dilemma as the pivotal conn·o] is 
detennined by external demand rather than by the producers themselves. As a result, it is 
impossible to predict the growth of the settlers' annual income. 
Price Index (1960= 100) 
400 
300 
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Figure 5.4.: Price Fluctuations of Palm Oll,1970·86 
1975 1980 
~; Mansoor.and B.artow, 1988: Figure 1.1 
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Unstable Income of A Bandar Tun Razak Settler 
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_.: Based on payslips of a seulcr of Bandar Tun Razak (Kerarong 1). Real income is 
computed using consumer index between 1982 and 1987 (see Economic~ 1986/87, 
MinistrY of Finance and 'Consumer Price Jndcx for Malaysia, 1988'. Department of 
Statistics, Kuala Lu111pur. 
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Thus, ibe settlers have a dual relationship witti the 'paiernalistic' FELDA 
organisation. They.have been 'delivered' by FELDA oot of mere subsistence fanners or 
~ly paid wage.earners. Without any need for initial capital. they have become capable 
of achieving higher cash incGtne within a Teiatively shon period. Their subsistence is 
fu.'tber guaranteed in case of any marked decline in commodity prices.. On the other hand, 
a substantial part of their gross income is used for maintaining the .costly FELDA set-up 
and bureaucracy on which they have become dependent. On top Of this vmiable of high 
fixed cost is the drastic fluctuation of commodity prices, making the improved living 
standards of settlers fragile at titneS. Economic stability remains elusive. 
Resume 
This Chapter has examined whether settlers were better off after rhey moved to two 
FELDA schemes - Bandar Tun Razak and Ciku. The results show that most settlers 
enjoyed higher income levels after migrating- a result that corresponded well wirh their 
main motive for moving. This was more significant for Bandar Tun Razak setders than 
their Ciku counterparts largely because the former area was established for a longer 
period. In the shift, settlers had abandoned subsistence farming and become more 
involved in the cash economy, including off.farm secondary jobs. The availability of 
sectmdary jobs was related to settlers' consumption capacity and opponunities provided 
by existing projects in the area - a result of multiplier effects. Bandar Tun Razak was 
tnore privileged in this aspect. The shift had also benefired men rather than women. The 
latter saw their income-earning ability evaporate -.the heavy tasks on. the oil palm esnues 
were deemed unsuitable for women. 
The substantial real improvement in income has b=:en accompanied by more assets, 
empl~ent stability and land holding. The achievement has been even gteater when we 
consider block members who have staned to repay leans for the 4-hectate plot and the 
houselot which they will eventually own. They ·have been the privileged .among 
Malaysia's rural households. Nevertheless. this bas not been -as marked as may .appear 
because it was off set to somedegree by bearing additional living-costs. Mote man half of 
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their income was absorbed on basic needs1suggesting that the real improvement was 
,smaller than the income statistical figures have indicated. Although household assets 
increased in both areas, the most noticeable change was the possession of a work·related 
motorcycle. 
Hence, the findings agree with the argument { y Bahrin and Parera (1977). 
MacAndrews(l978)~Peacock (1979), Blairand M. Noor(l978). Chan and Lim (1981) 
and Omar Din ( 1981) - there has been an overall improvement in settlers' living 
standards. But this view has not been conclusive because of the problems of increased 
costs and uncena.inty due to fluctuations in commodity prices. Thus, the suspicion of 
Baharuddin (1979) and Robenson (l 984) over the sustainability has been confirmed. 
Indeed, the settlers' improverl living standards can only be sustained by high commodity 
prices and higher material standards of living cannot be assured and are fragile at times. 
Consequently, the sustainability of the settlement for the second generation of settlers is 
called into question - a matter taken up in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 6 
SETTLERS' EXPERIENCE: THE SOCIAL ASPECTS 
We have shown that the settlers have achieved higher material standards of living 
after resenling in Bandar Tun Razak and Ciku. This improvement has been accompanied 
by new consumption-oriented expenditure patterns, more household assets, an 
increasingly monetised economy and a larger land holding size. The progress, however, 
is constantly undermined by marked fluctuations of commodity price and, therefore, 
results in a fragile economic base. This economic perspective does not provide a 
complere view of settlers' experiences on the frontier. Thus, we need to funher assess 
the social aspects of the settlers' living standards by examining their response and 
reactions. This involves not only the long-term interest of settlers but also that of the 
politicians and planners. The acid test is whether the improvements are sufficient to 
persuade the second generation to stay on the frontier. 
Before we can discuss this issue, we need :o answer a series of basic questi0i1s. 
Initially~ we have to know if there has been any improvement in the social let of settlers 
from their place of origin to the resettled areas. As the judgement of settlers forms the 
basis of our approach, we have to question: how do settlers perceive the evolution in 
their social life and environment? Given, however, the varied nature of social change, we 
need to isolate different aspects that are recognisable to the settlers. These aspects 
include: how has the quality of housing changed; how has local access to public goods 
· (schools, health and religious facilities) been transformed; how have educational 
opponunities altered; and finally, how has regional access to higher-level goods and 
services developed on the frontier? After examining these issues, we can address the 
OVerriding issue: will the second generation stay? 
· .. . :.i:). 
- ~ ~-· 
In considering these questions, we draw upon field data and the surveys conducted 
on one hundred settler households each in Bandar Tun R~ and Ciku and undertake a 
comparative study. Initially, we seek a basic understanding of how social facilities have 
changed by analysing the settlers' perception of change between the place of origin and 
the frontier (section 1). Once this broad perspective has been established, we focus on 
detaikd change in individual i_ssues by looking first at housing (section 2). This is 
followed by an investigation of alterations in local access to public goods (section 3), the 
development of regional access to higher-level goods and services (section 4) and lastly, 
the change in educational opportunities (section 5). With this background, we can 
consider whether the second generation will stay on in the frontier (section 6). Again, as 
a means to escape .he 'dry bones' of field surveys, we interlace the text with household 
case studies. On this occasion, we leave the Kamal and Jusof families and draw upon the 
whole spectrum of households (rich and poor) to illustrate each section. 
1. PERCEPTION OF SOCIAL CHANGE 
In this section, attention is focused on changes in social facilities and services 
before and after the settlers moved to gauge the effect of state efforts and self-
improvement. Much, of course, depends upon the mental outlook of settlers. This 
outlook is strongly influenced by their past experience and degree of exposure to the 
outside world. The latter aspect provides them with varied criteria for judgement. 
Because of the exposure, the settlers' judgement of change does not solely rely on the 
quality variation of an observed object. Instead, their perceptions become more complex. 
Thus, in assessing their perception of change, attention is concentrated on the issues that 
settlers consider to be the most important. In response, we have grouped five issues 
which the settlers were most concerned about in their daily life: income, housing, local 
access to public goods and services, education, and regional access to higher-level goods 
and services. 
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An examination of the individual issues in Table 6.1 has shown m<h-ked variations. 
The general consensus in both Bandar Tun Razak and Ciku was that housing conditions 
were better. There was, however, a marked divergence in access to social facilities and 
marketing in both settlements. In education, there was no sharp difference between 
Bandar Tun Razak and Ciku. Their perception came together again in access to regional 
facilities. The reasons for their similarities and divergences remain to be explored by 
explaining each issue in tum. 
Table 6.1 
Perception of Change 
Much slightly About Littie Much 
Perception Better Better The Worse Worse 
Same 
(Total 100%) % % % % % 
Housing A 3.0 68.0 17.0 12.0 
B 3.0 73.0 8.0 16.0 .. 
Local Acee~ 
Social A 4.0 72.0 16.0 8.0 
Facilities B 3.0 79.0 14.0 4.0 
Marketing A 34.0 37.0 29.0 
B 1.() 23.0 29.0 47.0 
... '.ucation A 11.0 67.0 19.0 3.0 
B 43.0 12.0 45.0 
kegional Access 
Public A 8.0 53.0 17.0 22.0 
Transport B 2.0 47.0 19.0 32.0 .. 
Note: A= Bandar Tun Ra7.ak, B= Ciku. 
Smm: Fieldwork. 
2. HOUSING 
The traditional rural wooden housing in Malaysia has served generally more as 
shelter than as a symbol of wealth. This conception, however, has changed since the 
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second World War as houses have been ·bwilr increasingly based on Westem .... ~..1-1 iu~S. 
This trend has been in ~tially reinforced in urban area~ by the emphasis .0 f local and 
foreign mrined. architect£ on concrete designs equipped with modem faciliths. These 
designs sprei:?d to the rural areas following income improvements. Consequ~:; •ly, many 
rural houses d1~-play not only better~ less cramped and healthier liv log conditions but at 
also r~Ui·iifestations of differences,in wealth. As noted in Table 6.1, about 70 p.:;:r ~. '~•·'- uf 
settlers in both Bandar Tun Razak and Ciku claimed to be more satisfied with the housing 
after their move. To ascertain the reasons for this satisfaction, we need to ask: how has 
the settlers' housing quality altered; and how has their house ownership status changed? 
In answering these questions, we examine the alterations of house types and household 
amenity, and ownership status of the settlers before and after the move. 
Change in House Types 
On arrival, a FELDA settler is allocated a standard one~room traditional kampung 
house built on pillars with wooden walls and a roofing with galvanised zinc or asbestos. 
Most settlers were familiar with this type of house before they moved to the frontier. 
Indeed, the traditional atap roof, made of coconut leaves, was still quite popular, 
particularly in Ciku {Table 6.2). Houses b1r:h with 'brick wall and tiled TOof were more 
costly and were rare among settlers orig;nating in Bandar Tun Razak. None were 
reported in Ciku. On average, Ciku <Settlers lived in much older houses, rnost of which 
were in a poor state compared with those lived in by their Bandar Twt Razak 
counterparts. 
After the shift, <there has been a marked difference in the change in house types 
between settlers of Bandar Tun f{azak and Ciku. The transformation for Bandar Tun 
Razak settlers was motecdramati.c - most of them seemed to have moved out of a wooden 
country house and shifted into a more substantial dwelling. In sharp contrast, Ciku 
seemed to have inherited a typical rural habitat from North Kelantan. Indeed, with higher 
income, settlers of Bafidar Tun Razak had generally made substantial improvements 
between 1982 and 1985. }'hey had spent an average of $3, 170 per household on 
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renovations compared with $195 in Cikur-Ouring 1984 in particulat, eight enlers in 
Bandar Tun R.azak used up ro $10,000 ·to enlacge their houses but in Cil"U, the hr~ 
a.mount s~:mt on -renovation came from a settler who used $3,SOO in 1987. yet,. this Cilal 
settlet would not have been wle to do so without the help of his two working children. 
Table 6 • .2 
House Types of Settlers· Before Moving 
House Type 
Wooden Wall+ 'Atap' Roof 
Wooden Wall+ 
Zinc/Asbestos Roof 
Brick Wall+ 
Zinc/ Asbestos Roof 
Brick Wall+ Tiled Roof 
Total 
Average Age 
of House (Years) 
Note: a made of coconut leaves. 
b including bamboo roof. 
c including nled roof. 
Bandar Tun R3zak · 
25.0 
67 .. () 
2.0 
6.0d 
100.0 
. (ll.f} 
d including one having :wall built 'With rocks. 
Fieldwork. 
cjku 
~ 
20.0° 
79.0c 
I.O 
.. 
100.0 
(25.8)' 
From my observations in &.ndar Tun Ra:tak, th~ great majority of settlers adopted 
an almost identical approach in house renovation. They usually maintained the front pan 
Of the original house which was constructed on pillars and extended the rear part 
(attached to ground) to the ~ze ithe:y wanted. In 'lhis extended portion, sancl bricks were 
nsually used for buildfag a wall ~p to about a metre high, above which wood pla,nks 
were added to the height of a normal holl!e wall. The roof was mostly covered by 
asbestos sheets. A small number Df 1successful' settlers even pulled down !he whole 
.. 
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original house and rebuilt on the spot a one-.storey brick bouse similar t£> that <=OttlmOnly 
foi!nd in an urban area. 
In Ciku, mos! ht1use improvenrenrs, if undertaken, were cniitor. The tnl>sl 
significartl alterations were made by a few settlers running grocery and coffee shops. To 
suit the need of the business, the whole original facade constructed on pillars was 
removed so that the floor could be established at ground level. The floor, however, was 
not cemented because of the lack of sprue cash. 
The contrast in housing improvement between Bandar Tun Razak and Ciku can be 
portrayed by a case study of two settler households. Appokountan Subramaniam was 
formerly a rubber tapper living in a wooden estate house. Having been successful as a 
contractor in transporting palm fruit bunches to a processing miU for a plantation owned 
by the Pahang State Development Board (1,embaga Ksmajuan Negeri Pahang}, he spent 
more than $10,000 in 1984 to renovate his house. It now looks like an urban middle-
class dwelling with a car porch, a concrete wall, a spacious kitchen and four bed-rooms. 
A Cik.u countetpart, Che Min bin Ismail, had lived previously in an atap dwelling in a 
kampung near Kota Baru. Seven years after shifting to Ciku, he has not done much to 
the original house. In 1984, he paid $30 for some planks and zinc plates left over by a 
friend and used them to upgrade the kitchen. That was all he could afford to do. 
Another factor linked to the settlers' perception of change in house quality is the 
supply of household amenities. The two most imponant elements are .lighting and water 
supplies. In fact. electricity and piped water were not common in the settlers' place of 
origin. As shown in Table 6.3, a.bout 60 per cent of settlers of Bandar Tun Razak and 
Ciku used kerosene or 'pressure' lamps before they shifted. After the move, .an settlers in 
Bandar Tun Razak enjoyed 24-hour electricity supplies previrled by the National 
Electricity Board whereas settlers pf Ciku did not yet have electricity supplies. Sinu1arly, 
llandar Tun Razak settlers were privileged with water supplies. Indeed, even befor~ the 
move, 42 per cent-0f settlers of Bandar Tun Razak hlld piped wat~ supplies compared to 
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only 8 per ceni from Ciku. As many ·as 8.7 per tent of Ciku settlers consumed well water 
itt their place of origin as against about half for their counterparts in Bandat Tun Razak. 
After the move. all senlels in Bandar Tun Razak enjoyed piped W'..'ter1 but some ihree-
quarters of Ciku settlers still used well water while th<~ rest cousumed river water. 
Table 6.3 
Sour~e of Lighting Before and After Moving 
Bandar Tun Razak 
1 f Clku 
Source of 
Lighting Before After Before After 
% % % % 
Kerosene or 63.0 61.0 100.0 
Pressure Lamp 
Electricity 37.0 100.0 39.0 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
~: Fieldwork. 
Again, a contrasting image can be seen with the experiences of Appokountan and 
Che Min. Before moving, Appokountan had to collect water from a stand .. pipe and lit a 
'pressure' lamp when night fell. Cwrently within his house, there is a basin for him to 
wash his face after work. More conveniently, he can turn on the video a~ytime to watch 
tapes loaned from Segamat. Conversely, Che Min has yet to enjoy the advantage of 
elecnicity. His house lighting is by two dim kerosene lamps. For daily bathing, the 
whole family uses the well at the rear of the house. 
Besides the ~hange in house quality, the settlers' perception of change also 
involved ownership. According to the FELDA contract, all settlers are potential ,house 
owners once they have repaid the entire loan. If all settlers are assured ,of possession of a 
house by FELDA over a fixed perio4 we need to examine the situation of house 
ownership befor-e they moved. 
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House Ownership of Settt~ B~fore Moving 
More than half of the se.ttlers were in their late rwenties or early thinies when they 
joined the scheme. By rural tradition, youngsters normally live with parents even after 
rnatriage. In general, older settlers would own a house either by inheritance or when they 
lived away from their place of birth. As shown in Table 6.4, about half of the settlers of 
Bandar Tun Razak and two-thirds of Ciku settlers lived in their parents, houses before 
they moved. Because there were more settlers from Bandar Tun Razak who lived away 
from their place of birth when they joined the scheme, their previous residence was either 
rented or provided by relatives and employers. For example. Appokountan lived in an 
estate house provided hy his employer. Che Min, however, was a proprietor before 
migrating as be owned a house. After the move, there is no difference between them. 
They will both eventually own the 0.1 hectare site !>rt which their house was builL 
·Thus, the over.all data indicate that there has been a marked improvement in the 
housing of settlers - they have been able to-own the roof over their heads (at least after 
loan repayment). Moving :away from their parents' house. many of them have avoided 
living in extended (and increasing) households. The basic FELD A house is of adequate, 
Table 6.4 
Housing :owhership Status Before Mov.ing 
Bandar Tun Razak "2 ' • " Ciku o a i' 
Status 
Ownect By Setuer fr? a fill! it Ce 33_0 2. ?iii" fl 'i:Gf' -; ? 28..tf ii 9 " SQ Q 'it! p 0 
Owned By Settler's Pare.ntS 
Rented By Settler 
Provided By Relative& 
Provided By Etnp1oyer 
Total 
46.0 
1-0.f> 
1 . .0 
4.0 
100.0 
" 0 0 a o a a Q 0t& 8 CzP' . a 
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if .not opulenti quality. On this basis, tnany ;Settlersf particularly those from Bandar TWI 
Razak. have been abl-e to:e:xtend, renovate and even Teplace their dwellings of generally 
higher sw.ndard Nevenheless., for others. especially in Ciku, their new housing was little 
beuer or bigger and few could afford to make substantial improvement. yet, Ciku 
sealers' satisfaction remained high. This importanf index of the quality of settlers' living 
standards has reflected beneficial change on the frontier. The number of settlers who 
were more satisfied with the change in housing was greater in Ciku than in Bandar Tun 
Ratak. Settlers from the latter area travelled tttOte and had greater exposure to good 
housing standards outside their settlement. As a result, they tended to be less content than 
. 
their Ciku counterparts when asked to comment on change in housing quality before and 
after the move. Housing. however important it is, is only pan of settlers' livelihood. 
Public goods and services are needed to sustain the -community life. 
J. LOCAL ACCESS TO SOClAL AND MARKETING SERVICES 
Local public goods and services comprise social and tnarketing facilities. Being 
most directly related to the need for moral support and the settlers' survival, these 
facilities are of considerable concern. Although more than three-quarters of settlers in 
Bandar Tun Razak and Ciku have been happy with social services, there have been 
mixed feelings about changes in local marketing. Given this divergence, attention is 
focused initially on social facilities ranging from schooling. religious and health care 
facilities to social organisation before discussing the marketing system. As an index -of 
measurement, distance is used to reflect the alteratiol'ls brought about by the shift. 
Schooling, Religious and Health Facilities 
Access to public goods is assessed by both distance of 011vel sod quality of the 
service. Shortening travel distance does not imply progress in .access .ul)Jess 
infrastructural -standatds have reached a ~evel in which services can be effectively 
delivered. During the last tw.e11ty years, the infraStructure h1lS been ex~.n?.~d ~provide 
1~ 
. 
. 
... 
. , 
·. 
• • u 
basic services for almost all pans of rur.al West -Malaysia. Conseqnendy, we ean 
concentrate on changes in travelling distances brought about by the shifl 
Using distance as the criterion to evaluate change, our survey shows that access to 
local public goc:><i8 and services has generally improved following the shift (Table 6.5), 
particularly for Bandar Tun Razak settlers. Without a secondary school, Ciku 's children 
had to commute to Gua Musang for the service. Consequently, the travel distance bas 
increased by almost five times. The overall improvement is a reflection of FELDA •s 
physical planning arrangementS that have substantially contributed to the reduction of 
travel distance in the resettled areas. Different from the linear settlement pattern found in 
the place of origin, the FELDA design provides public goods and services in a central 
location which, as a whole, are closer to settlers. 
Table 6.5 
Distance of Facilities From Home Before and After Moving 
Facility Bandar Tun Raznk Ciku 
(km) Before After Before After 
Primary School 3.0 <1.0 2.7 <2.0 
Secondary School 10.8 <3.0 7.0 34.0 
Praying House/ 1.8 <1.0 1.7 <1.5 
Mosque 
Nearest Health 6.2 ..:;2.S 4.8 <l.5 
Centre/Hospital 
~: Fieldwork. 
Social services were unevenly distributed in the place of origin, greatly to the 
disadvantage of scattered settlements. Despite the government's major efforts to build 
mosques and to popularise education since 1957, particularly in the rural Malay areas, 
schools and mosques were non-existent in isolated hamlets - the rice growint; r.'; :d rubber 
smallholding populations were below the threshold. Consequently, these nr;;'.l i-Olk had 
to join the nearest village or towns for the services. For all thr~e services - schooling, 
r.~ligion and health tare - the average t.cavei distance was .sherter for cCiku settlers 
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compared with their B~ ·Jar Tun Razak counterpans. The main reason was that Ciku 
s,ettlerS originated from the more densely populated Nonh Kelantm whereas their Bandar 
Tun Razak settlers came from all rural comers of Wesr Malaysia. 
Thus, in the place of origin, those living further away had more difficulty in 
reaching the services. Hanin bin Abdul Ghani of Bandar Tun Razak came originally from 
a solitary farm in Pahang. He remembers the years when he used to carry his two older 
daughters on a bicycle to a school at Kampung Janau, 6 kilometres away. His Ciku 
counterpart Samsudin bin Mohammad had to ride a bicycle to school 8 kilometres from 
home w!Jen he was a child. Other settlers have mixed experiences in attending Friday 
prayers. This could be hazardous when it rained for some, such as Abdul Razak bin 
Aziz. Before shifting to Bandar Tun Razak, he lived 6 kilometres from Kampung 
Cenderung Balai (Perak) where the nearest mosque was located. Mounting an old nnd 
unreliable motorcycle, he had to negotiate the bumpy and tonuous lane between the rice 
field and the mosque - a risky experience on stormy days. Zakaria bin Yaakob of Cikut 
however, was luckier because a mosque was found closer to his home. It took him only 
five minutes to walk there. 
The picture changed dramatically after the move, except for Ciku settlers who badly 
needed a local secondary school. The mosque was now within walking distance for all 
settlers. In Bandar Tun Razak, there were five mosques, five primary schools and one 
secondary school. In Ciku, there was one mosque and one primary school. The religious 
service was. however, restricted to Muslims who formed 98 per cent of settlers in 
Bandar Tun Raza.le and I 00 per cent in Ciku. For the 2 per cent .or 400 non-Muslims in 
Bandar Tun Razak, they had no .access to religious premises of their own choice. Before 
they moved. by -contrast, they .could visit Chinese temples or Hindu shrines near to their 
home. 
Like religious and schooling services, the medical services bef.ofe mov.ing wert 
alsodispersed. Attending a health centre or a 'hospital was cumbersome. J.>eh Ah Ha of 
.. 
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·. 
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Bandar Tun Ra~ak prefe®d to coasult a familiar private -clinic when he became ill But 
he bad to travel 48 kilometres fmm .a priivate robber estate to ·Benrollg, .a prosperous town 
in Western Pahangt for the service. The experience of Abdullah b-i:n Mohammad Shah 
was totally different. As a soldier from Kelantan before coming to Ciku. he just needed 
to walk into the -clinic at the :army camp for medical care. Af,er the shift, the medical 
seMc.e has been upgraded fur ·most of Bandar Tun Razak settlers but little .as yet for their 
Ciku counterparts. Indeed, the health care service differed quite significantly between 
Bandar Tun Raiak and Ciku, though free treatment was. offered in both places. In BandM 
Tun Razak. there was a health care centre equipped adequ.a1ely with trained staff and 
supplies but Ciku settlers only had a 'mobile' clinic service once a week from Palob I, 
some 10 .kilometres to the north. Moreover, each of the five Bandar Tun Ra.zak 
settlements possessed a midwife whereas Ciku settlers had t() seek help Lorn 'traditional' . 
midwives if they <:hose io deliver locally. The .ex-soldier, Abdullah bin Moh.smmad 
Shah, however, has been disadvanraged by tile tthift When m. he has to ask a -tar· 
owning settler to take ·him to the Gua Musan:g Hospital. 
For more serious illness, local health .care services were. inadequate. Settlers in 
Bandar Tun Razak then had to attend the general hospitals in Seg.amat, Kuantan and .their 
Ciku counterpans in Gua Musang and Kuala Krai, if not other larger towns where 
service was better. In addition 10 the three types of semces discussed above, rbere is 
another service essential to settlers. This is the FELDA administration itself which hai a 
stmngly paternalistic commitment rowan:is the senlers. 
Local Social Organisations and Administration 
In the place of origin, settlers pursued a great variety of occupations and had an 
economic life litrte interfered with by other social -organisations. Their life style w.as 
dominated by a relativ.ely uncomplicated social stmet\lre. The most :notable social.activity 
Pfactised within the village community was the traditional gotong rayon, {mutual 
assistance). This coll~.e spirit has be~n used to cs:rty out leoalprojects. Other official 
Soeial organisatiuns were relatively loose and political inv6h>ement was a periodical 
•• 
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event, activated normally by the approac~o{A generat election. After the et:ecr.o.rnl 
caropaign, social life was. again restored to ilS t\Ottnal mood and pace. E-etmomic fife and 
social etistenre were two m:;tinct elements which hardly overlapped. 
After the ·move. a new phenomenon has been induced through FEL.DA's 
introduction of the Scheme Development Authority (Jawaw.nkuasn Kemajuan Rachaqgan 
or JKKR). The JKKR has merged senlers' economic production and social code of 
behaviour into one. Created in 1967 as an institution to allow settlers to have their views 
reflected at all levels of the hierarchy, the JKKR's initial objective was primarily ro 
ensure that settlers' productivity would not be affected by their own problems. Since 
March 1986, its rote has been extended to allow settlers to participate in management and 
assessment of socio-economic development within individual schemes. 
How the JKKR acts as a guardian of settlers' socio-economic life needs, however, 
to be explained. Specifically, rhe JKKR's operational committee is chaired by the 
Scheme Manager and 'block leaders' are automatically committee members. Other 
committee members are recruited locally to include the Pen~hulu (village bead), school 
headmaster, Imfiln (religious leader). chief of police and head of local health care centre. 
The committee has four working bureaus, namely (1) the Field Bureau (Biro Ladang) for 
field maintenance, harvesting and fruit transportation; (2) the Economic Bureau (film 
Ekonomi) to supervise the operations of the cooperative (where daily supplies are sold by 
credit to settlers), handicraft and to encour.age settlers to invest in commercial and 
industrial activities; (3) the Education and Training Bureau (Biro Pelajaran dan Latihan) 
to promote education from pre-school to tertiary level in the scheme; and ( 4) the Social 
and Corrununity Bureau (Biro Sosial dan Kemasyarakatan) whose wide range of services 
extend from donation for the deceased, religious affairs, settlers' general welfare to 
spores and women's home sciertce activities. 
The JKKR is, however, not independent. It is directly t:ontrollecl by a regional 
office (Gapungan JKKR ·PembanguTian) whose r-0le is to 'SUpet>1ise and guide ·settlers' 
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'ideas' and help solve settlers· problems at the ~heme. level. Obviou~ly. the hie:nuchy is 
linked from the regional level to the federal level as it is the Settlcr·s Consultation Council 
<bwatankyasa. Perunding Peneroka} at -the Headquarters in Kuala Lumpur that 
forJlllllates the policy for the regional office .to follow and henceforth guide the settlers. 
~ the Council holds a meeting every three mombs to brief rhe region.al officers on 
current policy mm.ers and discuss rhe progress of the socio-economic developmenc as 
reported by the regional offices. The role of the JKKR is illustrated by reference to 
Samuri bin Tusimin of Bandar Tun Razak and Meriam binti Saat of Ciku. 
Samuri bin Tusimin was not active in any sociai work in his former little village. 
Now a 'block leader'. he is responsible to the Scheme Manager. He is proud to follow 
his field supervisor to Muadzam S.hah's regional office 10 attend an annual meerin.g. 
There, he is glad to meet those 'big men· from Kuala Lumpur. He listens attentively to 
what they say and asks his supetvisor things he cannot understand. He is confident of 
doing a good job as he knows his team mates very well. In Ciku, Meriam binti Saat's 
case represents FELDA's readaptation of the traditional 'g9tong rovong'. Her husband 
died in an accidenl in 1985. She would have quit if without the timely assistance from 
lKKR"s 'Women's Association' fPersatuan Wanita) which gave her moral and material 
suppon. Under a special arrangement, she now does only maintenance work in the field 
while hruvesting is done by other male ream workers. This relieves her of the heavy tasks 
and allows her to have more rime for her small children. Besides public services provided 
by the government, the public goods from the private sector also manifest differences 
between Bandar Tun Razak and Ciku. The most spectacular is the local marketing 
network. 
Local Marketii~g 
In both Bandar Tun Razak and ·Ciku, bu~iness was conducted by foeal settlers who 
were given priority to do so. As noted~ local market ~upply was unpopular~ particularly 
among Ciku settlers because of the 1itnited vamty and .. relativ.tly low quality. This 
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discontent, however, was relieved by 'mobile;; traders who came once a week to offer 
goods of better quality and greater variety. 
There were a few reasons behind the settlers' complaints about the supply of local 
goods. For example, the ex-fishermen or those who came from areas near to big towns 
such as Kuantan, Alor Setar and Kota Baru where fresh and relativ.!ly cheap foodstuffs 
were available would find that the resettled areas could not offer the same service. In 
many settlers' place of origin, grocery shops were a common feature, though the stock 
and variety might be restricted in some remote villages. After migrating, the state of 
supply has not improved much, though conditions were better in Bandar Tun Razak than 
in Ciku. Indeed, Ciku settlers' relatively low purchasing power and its isolation 
discouraged high-quality food supplies from reaching them. Fish is the most important 
food item besides rice. Yet, good-quality fish landed in Kelantan itself were mostly sold 
to Singapore and other important national towns to fetch higher prices. 
Local supplies of fish and other food declined in quality as the sale penetrated 
funher inland from the coast. with the poorest quality reaching Ciku settlers as one of the 
last destinations. They were more expensive as it involved additional dealers acting as 
middle-men. Conversely, the relatively large population of Bandar Tun Razak: with 
higher purchasing power and its proximity to Segamat and Kuala Rompin attracted 
bigger dealers who obtained direct supplies from the main supplier. Daily supplies varied 
quite markedly between Bandar Tun Razak and Ciku. There were a row of shoplots in 
each of the five FELDA settlements in Bandar Tun Razak, supplemented by a central 
market place in the heart of the township. The various food supplies ·were basically 
adequate to meet the demand of the settlers. In contrast, the Ciku settlers had to rely on a 
few, scattered poorly provisioned grocery 'Shops. Highly specialised in palm oil 
Production, Bandar Tun Razakand Ciku had to import almost all their food from outside, 
except some fowls, goats and cows and ~ small amount of vegetables and fruits grown 
for domestic consumption. 
171 
:-: ... , ... 
The gocxls from local shops, and in the.case of Bandar Tun Razak a central market, 
were 1 ::.;iricted to mainly focxl items ai.i some other basic services. So· far, no settlers or 
businessmen from nearby towns had set up business serving higher-quality goods 
' 
because of the high risk involved. Goods such as garments, general household utensils, 
and 10wer-quality durables (watches, radios, electrical appliances) were supplied by the 
weekly market (Pasar Minggu), held adjacent to the central market. A visit to the Sunday 
market in Bandar Tun Razak was indeed an unforgettable experience. Starting at around 
2 pm, the central market lots specially designed for such purpose are soon filled up by 
'mobile' vendors travelling in their vans. Settlers gradually arrive in groups or in 
famiiies, looking for what they required. Towards evening, the crowd is augmented by 
the roaring motorcycles and cars. Late-comer~ have to park their vehicles up the slope 
funher away from the scene. The market activity finally ceases at 9 pm when vendors 
begin to pack up and call it a day. Indeed, it is a grouping of a few local and other petty 
trallers from various places - Segamat, Kuantan, Temerloh. Telok Iman and Kota Baro 
who offer goods of slightly higher quality and greater variety than those available locally. 
The intermediate service provided by incoming traders fills the vacuum between local 
inferior supplies and higher quality goods available i;'l the regional centres. Thus, settlers 
need to travel to nearby towns for important consumer items. Among the local traders 
who join in the Sunday market 'fever', Zainal Abidin is one of the most active. By mid-
day, he has already transferred a large stock from his father' grocery shop to the stand. 
as he knows this is a big day for business. We had a chat when I walked by one Sunday 
afternoon, and he said: 
'We sell the same things as in the weekdays. But we sell most on 
Sundays because people are there to buy all sorts of things they 
see. On good occasions, we can make in one Sunday as much as 
in three or four weekdays.' · 
ln Ciku, the weerJy market is held on Tuesday (Ciku 1) and Saturday (Ciku 2) 
from 2 to 6 pm. The market scene between the two areas manifests a shaIJJ contrast. The 
aa·nosphere here is calm and fewer goods are displayed. Most food items can be found in 
local shops but are of much better quality. Other settlers' favourites - cheaper quality of 
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gannents and cooking u~nsils- are also on aisplay. Traders are almost all from the nonh 
_ Machang, Kuala Krai and Kota Baru. A woman trader selling Kelantan artifacts. 
however, is a local settler's wife. When asked how her business went, she replied: 
'We have extra time after working in the field. So I want to do 
something. I sell artifacts because I can obtain the supply from a 
friend in Kota Baru by credit. We use a van to go around this 
region and we manage to earn five to six ringgit a day.' 
In sum, there has been improvement in thf; access to social services such as 
religious and health services in the shift for both Bandar Tun Razak and Ciku. ln 
schooling, however, while progress has been made in Bandar Tun Razak, it has been 
worse off in Ciku. Further, through its social arm - the JKKR - FELDA has made 
effective efforts in offering the settlers a 'secured' transition to an improved social life. 
Leaving the loose and 'spontaneous' traditional community spirit behind them, the 
settler~ have now seen their social life consclidated and merged into the operational 
framework of FELDA. They have become part of its economic structure, linked directly 
to serve the purpose of a large-scale cash crop production. The access to local marketing 
services, however, has not satisfied many settlers, especially those from Ciku. Although 
being supplemented by the weekly maricet, the goodl.' and services were restricted to an 
inte1mediate level because of me organisation of the regional marketing network. Hence, 
market goods and other social services of higher level have to be sought in established 
regional centres. This suggests a:iother issue for investigation. 
4. H.EGIONAL ACCESS TO HIGHER-LEVEL GOODS AND SERVICES 
The local supply of goods and services in Bandar Tun Razak and Cikn has 
remained at a low level because of the relatively meagre purchasing power of the settlers. 
Indeed, goods and services offered within the schemes have been restricted to meeting 
basic necessities. Higher-level goods and services have to be obtained from other urban 
centres. Thus, this question of regional access and interaction is important because h 
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relates to both the social ,and economic-life of settlers and the broader regional 
development strategy. Before we examine how the access lO the regional centres has 
developed, we need to raise a series of peninent questions: how often do the settlers 
tt'l1Ve1 co Ehe regional centres; why do they go; and, how do they get there? In tackling 
these questions, we study t.he settlers' frequency of travel in a range of towns, followed 
by their motives and means of t&-ansport. 
Frequency of Travel 
Visits away from the scheme~ are a strong reflection of the types of goods and 
services required by settlers but which are lacking in the local community. The 
availability of these goods and services have regional implications. They highlight not 
only settlers' income levels but where savings have been spent. For this purpose, this 
survey focuses on towns that settlers selected to visit (but excludes the annual trip home 
undertaken by Muslims during the Harl Raya Puasa at the end of the fasting month). This 
home trip covers the whole of West Malaysia which is beyond the regional focus of our 
study. 
Primarily, the frequency of visits to the prescribed list of towns in Table 6.6 
depends on the distance1 means of transport and types of goods and services available, 
Frequency is calculated on the basis of average number of trips per settler per ye·ar 
(Figure 6.1). The survey indicates that Bandar T_un Razak settlers travelled much more 
often than their Ciku counterparts, reflecting not only their higher incomes but also the 
greater proximity of more towns. Their most favourite town was Segamat, 60 kilometres 
to the south and situated outside the Pahang Tenggara region. On average, they,made 
21.3 trips per year -three times higher than to Muadzam Shah, the designated regional 
centre of the Pahang Tenggara Master Plan (Dara, 1972a). Bahau, another town lying 
outside the Pahang Tenggara region-ranked third after Muadzam Shah. Conversely, Gua 
Musang (regional centre for Kesedar) Jeceived the largest number of Ciku settlers, with 
an average frequency of 14.2 trips_ per year. Frequency to other towns fell sharply after 
Gua Musang. Al.though Kuala Krai can be reached easily from Ciku by a highway, the 
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frequency of travel to that destination a~ounted for only one-tenth of that to- Gua 
Musang. In contrast, the completion of the 'Kuantan-Segamat Highway' in 1984 had a 
dramatic effect upon settlers of Bandar Tun Razak; it enabled them to travel to Segarnat 
more frequently at a lower cost. 
Table 6.6 
Population of Se:ected Urban Centres Visited by Settlers 
Bandar T. Razak 
Kuala Lumpur 
Seremban 
Kuan tan 
Segamat 
KualaPilah 
Bahau 
Temerloh 
Muadzam Shah 
Kuala Rompin a 
Population 
919,610 
132,911 
131,547 
34,008 
11,954 
10,260 
8,176 
7,754 
1,162 
Note: a Old town excluded. 
S~: Government of Malaysia, 1986c; 
Oara, 1986:35. 
Motives of Travel 
Ciku 
KotaBaru 
Kuala Krai 
PasirMas 
Tanah Merah 
Mac hang 
GuaMusang 
Pasir Puteh 
Poeuiation 
167,872 
12,607 
13,402 
9,016 
5,012 
4,973 
3,432 
There were multiple factors attracting settlers to urban centres. Even in a single trip, 
... 
there could be more than one motive. To provide a clear picture of settlers' mobility1 only 
th! primary m<'~ve of each .trip was recorded. These motives are grouped into four 
categories: shopping, entertainment, visiting relatives or friends and others. 
Entertainment is an equivalent to 'berjalan-jalan' (literally to go f~r a walk),, a Malay term 
frequently used by settlers to indicate a trip without specific purpose. Yet, the trip is 
important as it includes seeing a movie, eating out in a restaurant, watchjng the parade of 
a special occasion, or just having som~ refreshment in a cof'fee shop as a means of 
relaxation away from routine work or bore~om. Under 'otjlers' was encompass,ed a wide 
,, 
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Figure 6.1: Frequency of Travel by Settlers to Nearby Towns 
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range of motives such as medical consultatioo; religious observance, banking, paying the 
water bill, course training, contract negotiation, meeting or attending government offices. 
For ea.ch category of motives, the average number of trips made by a settler within a year 
is given in Figure 6.2. Only trips recorded more than once a year are shown. 
Obviously, Segamat and Bahau supplied the bulk of the higher-level goods and 
services sought by settlers from Bandar Tun Razak. Indeed, Segamat was the pole of 
attraetion to both retailers and consumers for shopping, recording 18.9 trips per ye 11" per 
settler. This accounted for 87 per cent of all shopping trips. Not only did Segamat serve 
as a commercial centre where settlers could put their savings in banks or buy motorcars 
in an affluent yrar (as j;; 1984) but also it was a social interacting place from the 'frontier' 
to 'civilised urban zone'. Despite .a relatively large populativ1of21,000 people, Bandar 
Tun Razak was little more than a planned agglomerated groups of kampung where social 
life remained basically rural, thus making no significant difference from the settlers' place 
of origin. Following far behind Segamat came Bahau which received only 2.1 trips from 
Bandar Tun Razak settlers for shopping (10 per cent)-. Muadzam Shah was not viewed as 
ideal for shopping as only 5 per cent of settlers visited the centre for the purpose. This 
centre, however, served more for entertainment and other specific purposes such as 
banking, administration ,tasks and meetings in the FELD A's regional office. 
In Ciku, almost all visits were focused ·on Gua Musang, the designated centre of 
-the Kesedar region. Like settlers or Bandar Tun Razak, shopping was the most important 
motive of travel. Settlers made 'an average of 6.1 trips per year to Gua Musang where 84 
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Entertainment 0 Others (banking, administmtion, meeting, contract negotiation, religious affair) 
per- cen r of ail exremat shopping from Oku was concentrated. Other higher~ level serv~ 
_medical consultation, religions obsetv3nce and government administration. mnked m 
second place. Except during the Hari Raya break, Bandar Tun Razak -settle.rs ~dom 
visited relatives in the rest of the year because of 1heir widespread origins. aku senieB 
made more trips to see their relatives.., -especially those who had children attending 
primary and secondary schools in Gua Musang. Another feature differentiating settlers of 
Bandar Tun Razak from Ciku .: ~"'.nts was their exposure to the outside environment. 
. 
The former travelled not only mr1 1ften but .also further away. They went to Kuala 
Lumpur and Seremban and Ku;i for specific motives such as -course training, 
purchases for FELDA's cooperative or religious affairs. Ciku settlers. however. seldom 
went north. If they did, they used the ·occasion to buy daiiy needs and visit >"elatives or 
friends. Making a trip specially for entertainment was exti-emely rare. 
The mobility of settlers between the frontier settlementS and the urban centres can 
be exemplified by a few case studies. In Bandar Tun Razak, Kadir bin Said runs a 
grocery shop. He drives down three times a week to Segamat to acquire provisions from 
wholesalers to refill his stock. Poh Ah Ha, however, ·rarely goes to Segamar. His trip ro 
Bahau three times a month serves a dual purpose - shopping and visiting a few friends of 
his dialect group. On each nip, he will make sure to purchase enough pork 'for .a week'~ 
consumption as it is unavailable in Bandar Tun Razak. In Ciku, Che Wil bin Che Muda 
.goes once a month to Gua Musang for household needs that are lacking in the local tiny 
grocery shops. Apparently, he en~ ..,ys the trip which allows him to forget for a while tb~ 
endless routine tasks in the oil palm plantation. Y<et, there is aoother mission for hirn in 
" Gua Musang - to see his two children staying in a hoarding school in town and hand 
them some money. If Bandar Tun Razak settlers were in a much better firancial position 
to travel than their Ciku counterparts, we need to funher eJeamine the means of transport 
that they used - a factor having strong implications for regional access. 
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Means of Transport 
It was apparent that settler$ perceived an improvement in public transport after 
moving. A ~~~.?lt ~~O p ,::r 1.·ent of settlers cf Bandar 'run Razak were satisfied with the 
service ; . .:iuc half for their Ciku counterparts (Table 6.1). In fact, bus 
servic.es ,.,, rt: regnln:: ilri'd quite efficient in both Bandar Tun Razak and Ciku. Coupled 
with the relatively cheap fare, buses bec~me the most imponant means of public transport 
to settlers in communicating with the outside world (Figure 6.3). In addition to buses. 
settlers also, on occasions, used private cars and taxis. In Bandar Tun Razak, if 
travelling alone, settlers rarely used their own cars1 but took buses to minimise expenses 
provided business was involved. This was even more so for Ciku car owners (about 10 
of them} who used their cars strictly for essential trips including business. During low 
income months, cars were more a prerequisite for e~-1·ing supplementary income than an 
object of pleasure. 
Motorcycles were widely used by settlers of Bandar Tun Razak over 3horter 
distances, particularly when visiting Muadzam Shah and Segamat. In co.nttast, Ciku 
settlers rarely used them and restricted their use to visiting Gua Musang. Because of 
budgetary constraintst most of the Ciku settlers did not pay motorcycle registration fees 
and had, as a result, restricted its use to daily journey to work. Thust Poh Ah Ha of 
.Bandar Tun Razak rides his motorcycle to Bahau because the bus service was terminated 
some time ago for lack of passeng~rs. To Segamat, he prefers to take a bus as it is less 
tiresome. Without registering his motorcycle, Che Wil of Ciku is worried about the 
police check set up frequently a!ong the highway to Gua Musang. Consequently. he has 
to catch a bus. 
The mobility of·settlers has shown that access to regional centres for·higher 1eve!S 
of goods and services has been relatively easy. The intensity of t:ravel from Bandar Tun 
Razak and Ciku depends upon distance, means ",; transpon and types of goods and 
Includimg a few trucks anti vans in Bafldar Tun Razak. 
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· Figure 6.3; Means of Transport by Settlers to Nearby Towns 
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services. Their movements have not been restricted by the regional boun?aries drawn by 
politicians and planners with predetennined <>bjectives. Instead, this mobility has been 
dictated by a logical response to meet their needs and circumstances; the latter reflecting 
the frequency of travel and means of transpon. The better-off Bandar Tun Razak settlers 
were more involved in meeting their business obligations and household needs than their 
Ciku counterparts. Having established the varying degrees of accessibility, attention can 
be shifted to the evolution of educational opportunities before and after the shift - a fact0r 
closely associated with retaining the second generation on the frontierS. 
5. CHANGE IN EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITIES 
As noted in Chapt~r 5, one of the imponant motives behind the move ex.pressed by 
settlers to shift was the hope that their children would have better educational 
opportunities on the frontier. The reaction of settlers, however, has been mixed (Table 
6.1). Three-quarters of Bandar Tun Razak settlers were satisfied with the quality of 
education but less than half of their Ciku counterparts shared this view. The difference in 
perception reflects the varied backgrounds of the settlers. Our field survey indicates 
Bandar Tun Razak settlers came from nine states of West Malaysia, with Pahang making 
up the highest proportion. Conversely, Ciku settlers were all drawn from Kelantan by the 
ruling of the state policy (Figure 6.4). Nevertheless, there was a common feature 
marking settlers from botb areas. They were recruited from the lower social strata in the 
rural areas (over 85 per cent) 'and very .small towns and were engaged in subsistence or 
low income occupations. As a means of escaping poverty, ~ettle1s were convinced that 
education provided the best opportunity fot their ehildren to achieve a higher social 
status. Before examining the changes in edu~ation brought about by the shfft, we need to 
find out first the levels in their place of origin. 
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Figure 6.4: Place of Origin of Settlers 
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Bandar Tun Razak Ciku 
Source: Fieldwork. 
Educational Opportunities Before Moving 
The survey of settlers' education levels indicates that they had generally received a 
low level of formal ·training. The highest level achieved was Form 5 (Tingkat 5) of 
secondary education. Of the five levels categorised (Table 6. 7), it is found that .settlers of 
Bandar Tun Razak and Cik,u had a very close pattern. Although Band~ Tun Razak 
settlers seemed to have·received more formal education than their Ciku counterpartst leS$ 
than 20 per cent of settlers from both areas had been to a secondary school. There is 
another characteristic wonh noting - younger settlers in both areas had received more 
formal education than the older groups. By the same token, settlers of both areas were 
generally better educated than the earlier FELDA settlers of the 1960s and 1970s - a 
reflection of the gradual expansion of educational system initiated througho'tlt West 
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Malaysia's rural areas sinee the 1950s. This-impact was, indeed. quit~ substantial~ Thus\ 
by examining the new educational opportunities in the re.settled areas, we can verify 
whether the situation has improved over time. 
Educational Opportunities After Moving 
Some settlers, in Ciku particularly, had not brought their school-going chi~clren 
with them. An imponant reason behind this option was attributable to their belief that 
standards in the established schools in their place of origin were generally higher. 
Secondly, in Cilm, there was still no secondary school. Moreover. among the 
newcomers, a considerable proportion chose to bring the other family members at a later 
stage. Con:1equently, they had left some of the children behind with relatives or in 
boarding schools in other urban areas. 
Table 6.7 
Settlers' Formal Educational Level 
Educational· Bandar Tun Razak Ciku 
Level 
% % 
None 
__.r- ~· '" 4.0 5.0 
Primary u.o 15.0 
(Standard 1-3) 
Primary 65.0 69.0 
(Standard 4~6) 
Secondary 15.0 8.0 
(Form 1~3) 
Secoodary 4 .. 0 4,0 
{Form4-5) 
Total 100 ~ 0 100.0 
~ Fieldwotk. 
Educational facilities were better equipped in Bandar Tun Razak than in Ciku. At 
primary school level, there were five schools in Bandar Tun Razak. Conversely, in Ciku, 
there was a temporary primary school a few kilometres way, using premises built in the 
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late 1970s for FELDA staff. At the time of survey, a permanent one was being built and 
was expected to be operational by April 1988. Almost all setr !ers' childreil of Bandar Tun 
Razak-:ttended local schools whereas a higher percentage of Ciku children did not attend 
che temporary school at Ciku. Instead, they followed their elder bmthers or sisters who 
attended secondary school in Gua Musang. 
Almost all the settlers' children in Bandar Tun Razak attended local schools. It did 
not take more than fiftt:en minutes for children to walk to their primary schools. 
Motorcycles and occasionally cars were used by parents to carry their children to school. 
The Ciku children, however, were less fortunate. They either cycled or had to be carried 
by FELDA trucks and paid a monthly fee of $4 each. At secondary school level, again 
the children of Bandar Tun Razak were better off. Here, a double-storey school stood 
within a spacious compound in Keratong 4, adjoining a main access road (see Figure 
6.5). For Ciku settlers, the designated lot has been '.r:-..:ated in Ciku 3 (about 5 kilometres 
away along the Gua Musang-Kuala Krai Highway). This school will only be ready by 
1989. Up to February 1988, about a third of settlers sent their children to Gua Musang 
High School (34 kilometres away), with boarding facilities. Boarding priority was, 
however; given to Form 3 and Form 5 students due to sit for Lhe public examinations. 
The rest had to commute · . .:.;ly by school buses provided by FELDA and a private 
company (Syarikat Kemaiuan Melayu Kelantanl. Although vinually never attended by 
parents previously, kindergartens were common place - six in Bandar Tun Razak and 
two in Ciku, operate.ti by the FELDA Scheme Development Authority (JKKR). Each 
child paid a. monthly fee of $7.50- 8.00 for the service. Both settlers of Bandar Tun 
Razak and Ciku had their children attending boarding schools other than in Bandar Tun 
Razak and Gua Musang. In recent years, FELDA's scholarship fund and study loans had 
enabled a small number of settl~rs' children to acquire training in Kuantan, Segamat, 
Kuala Rompin, Kuala Lumpur and Kott> Baru. To provide vocational training to settlers 
2 Fares charged varied according to settlers' status. While those grouped under the 'block system' paid 
S20.00 monlhly for ea:::h child, the rest working for subsistence wage paid only S7.SO. Conversely, 
the private company chilrged a flat rate of S28.00 per child per monlh 
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and their children, FELDA has set up a Training Centre in Bandar Tun Razak. Courses 
conducted, however~ were very basic, with sewing and typing being the most imponant. 
Nothing of the same nature has yet existed in Ciku. 
From the changes evolved; children in Bandar Tun Razak and Ciku had obviously 
better opportunities to receive higher education than their parents who often complained. 
about financial difficulties and the poor school facilities of their schooling days. This was 
the cnse of Haji Ahmad bin Serman of Bandar Tun Razak. When he was a boy, few from 
his kampung were able to attend high school in the nearest town. Like many .others, his 
father was too poor to support him for further studies after he completed primary school 
edu,cation. Now, as a father himself, he has decided not to repeat the 'misfortune', He 
now supports two older daughters to study in a boarding high school at.Kuala Rotnpin 
while having two other younger children attend a local :primary school. His Ciku 
counterpart, Mohammad Zain bin Che Hassan, has the same conviction. With only a few 
years of schooling and formerly a guard in a rubber estate, he wants his children to do 
something more 'prosperous' in their future careers. His oldest son is seventeen and is a 
student at an Arabic school in Pasir Mas. His other three school-aged children nre 
stndying either in Gua Musang or in the iocal school. 
Indeed, education has been an important social facility and priority of the settlers.. 
Many settlers judge their children's erl~1~1Hion achievement as their own success. They 
have seen substantial progress in the shift from theii" own gP.neration .to that of their 
childrl!n. In fact, except for a small number of drop-outs, all primary school-.aged 
children in both Bandar Tun Razak and Ciku attended school. Furthermore, more than 
half of secondary school-aged children in the two areas attended school. If educational 
opportunities have improved over time, and the second generation has been expected to 
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~eek .a bener livelihood -rhan thar of their parents, how will the opponunities on the 
fronrie: be able to retain them? This question is now investigated. 
6. THE. SECOND :GE!\1ERA TION 
After thiny years of converting the frontiers imo cash crop plamarions, FELDA has 
transformed the subsistence farmers and low income-earners into modem .cash crop 
farmers. The firsr generation settlers have acquired higher material standards of Jiving, 
accompanied by paid subsidiary jobs, improved local social facilities and a relatively easy 
access to higher-level goods and services in r~gional centres. According to our survey, 
these improvements have convinced virtually all settlers ro remain on the frontier. Very 
few wanted to leave. But there is :a future problem. FELDA's benefits are restricted to the 
first generation. What new employment opponunities are there in the fronrier to retain the 
second generation? Before we analyse this issue more comprehensively, we have to look 
first at the issue of land inheritance. 
The Dilemma of Inheritance 
OriginaUy, a main objective of the FELDA resettlement programs was to solve the 
land shonage problem in the rural areas. Given that land was a scarce resource, most 
settlers of oil palm were allocated 4 hectares of land to maximise the number of 
households resettled. No land reserve for the second generation. however, was 
considered. Consequently, two problems will be created when the children grow up. The 
first problem involves land inheritance because under Islamic law sub-division will be 
uneconomic. The seriousness of land fragmentation problem can be predicted from an 
analysis of the family structure in Bandar Tun Razak and Ciku. 
Table 6.8 shows that settlers of Bandar Tun Razak and Ciku both had an average 
family size of 6.5. As the average age of wives was 33.6 in Bandar Tun Razak and 31 in 
Ciku, the potential for additional childbirth was high. Thus, the chance of increasing the 
average number of children per family from 4.5 to 6 until the end of the fertility period is 
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likely. This projection is not exaggerated in the light of current population policy which 
encourages larger family size to meet the government's seventy million target by the year 
. . 
2100 (Malaysia, 1985:14 and 1987b:93). With the family expanding in size, the future 
occupation -0f the children will need to be located elsewhere as only one male chHd~can 
succeed the father when he retires. Even the father's working hours are relatively ~hon. 
particularly when he ha<s no subsidiary job. 
Table 6.8 
Family Structure of Settlers of Bandar Tun Razak and Ciku 
- Bandar Tun Razak Cik'u 
Category 
Average Husband's Age 37.8 36.4 
(years) 
Average Wife's Age 33.6 31.0 
( ear.s) 
Children's Age No. % No. % 
·(years) 
l- 4 107 23.6 129 28.8 
5-9 150 33. l .142 31.8 
I0-14 107 23.6 113 25.3 
15-19 64 14.1 42 9.4 
>20 25 5.6 21 4.7 
Total 453 100.0 447 100.0 
Average Family Size 6.5 6.5 
.. I 
Source: Fieldwork. 
Settlers' Present Workload 
From our field survey of the settlers' working hours in their primary tasks, we 
found that a Bandar Tun Razak settler on average worked 15.6 days per month for 6.3 
hours per day. By comparison, a Ciku settler laboured 23.3 days and 4.4 hours daily. 
· On a weekly basis, a Bandar Tun Razak settler worked about 22 and a Ciku settler 23 
hours, which is quite short by the Malaysian standards. Ciku settlers spent more days in 
the field because 55 per cent of chem were non 'block system' members who were 
required to work six days per week for their wage (Friday was a free day). Conversely, 
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the settlers ·of Bandar Tun Razak - all block members - had more flexibility in work 
schedules ,.except a:t harvest time. In face, with some experience, the overall task of 
harvesting :and maintenance could be handled by a single able-bodied settler without 
requiring help from other family members and, he enjoys 'leisure' time. 
'fhus, if the first problem is linked tC land -inheritance and occupation, the second 
problem }nvolves generating other non-agricultural activities co absorb the second 
generation_. Without adequate non-agricultural jobs emerging in the resettled areas or the 
opponunities to gain urban employment, the second generation youth will likely become 
'st•rplus' rural labour and experience the poverty which their fathers 1.-merged from 
before moving to the frontier. So far. however~ the increased off-farm opportunities 
available locally has been hardly inadequate to absorb even the first generation (Table 
5.7}. Funhermore, the types of subsidiary jobs have been restricted to oil palm plantation 
activities, petty trade. construction and other local services needed to maintain a basic 
livelihood in the resettlement community. 
Charaderistics o.f FELDAfs Cash Crop-Bused Set-up 
Within the FELD A schemes, land for growing subsidiary crops and rearing fish is 
severely limited. Only lower-grade terrain unsuitable for oil palm and houselots has been 
alloted for these purposes. Cattle raising by settlers cannot be relied too much upon as 
grass avail.able is also limited for any large-scale expansion. In FELD A's set-up, virtually 
all forward and backward linkages within the oil palm plantation are outward-oriented. 
The senlers only assume a small share of the whole distribtition and service business. 
The principal operations, including the processing of fruit bunches, marketing of crude 
palm oil and transporting services are assumed by FELDA. Other inputs such as parts fer 
the processing mills. fertilizers, insecticides and implements for field maintenance are 
imported from imponant national centres. The output, crude palm oil, is also carried 
outward for either direct export or domestic reprocessing. Funher the basic needs of the 
settlers - rice, vegetables, clothes - are all imported. 
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In tenns of consumption demand, we have seen that about half of the settlers' 
income had to be spent on food. The remainder of the income was used for other basic 
demands and children's education. Savings were largely spent on consumer durables 
acquired from regional centres. Virtually no items for household consumption were 
produced locally, except some vegetables, fruits and rooE crops grown for s~lf· 
consumption. Given the relatively efficient distributive system established in the regional 
centres, local engagement in providing high·level goods .and services had been edged 
out. Even traditional services such as midwifery and doctors (homoh) were running out 
of business once the government health care service reached the settlers. As a. result. 
settlers had to concentrate on local transport, retail trade. construction and some other 
personal service such as beverage and repair shops. Consequently, the number of jobs 
that settlers' children could acquire locally was even smaller, as indicated in Table 6.9. 
These data reveal that most offspring over 18 years of age were employed away 
from home. Few were employed locally - about one-quarter in Bandar Tun Razak and 
one-third in Cik!J. Of the rest, a small proportion wete still schooling in other towrtswhile 
most were either jobless or helping their parents. The problem of obtaining employment 
is reflected in the experience of Zainal Abidin. Abidin is now 22 years old. He finished 
Fonn Five at Tenneloh in 1982 and completed another two-year business course at 
Segamat in 1987. There is, however, no proper position for his qualifications in Bandar 
Tun Razak. He tried to get a job in an urban centre. But in the public service, the 
government has just frozen the intake of new personnel in a bid to control public 
expenditure. Further, there are few opportunities in the private sector as the severe 
recession that started in 1985 has yet to bottom out. Without relatives or friends to help 
him, Abidin has to remain in Bandar Tun Razak to help his father in the field and the little 
grocery shop. 
Thus, the generation of local employment has to come from additional non-farm 
opportunities. This needs incoming investment or the entrepreneurship of local settlers to 
boost the economic base. The problem of incoming investment will be taken up in 
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Cnapter 8 where the failure of rural urbanisation will b-e explained. Att·ention is now 
foetJsed on local ·e:nrrep,t~neur~hip. 
E.mp'loymen.t Situation uf The- Se·cond ·Generation 
. . . . . ~ ..... 
. Is 
...... .. o11HHi II 'ii1I • Bandar Tun Razak Ciku 
Type of Employed Employed :Employed Employed 
Job Locallt Elsewhere . Locally Elsewhere ... ' 
Farm-Related 
Field Harvest 1 l 
Non-Farm Work 
facrory Worker .., 1 ~ 
-
Truck Driver 1 
Sales la 1U l 
Clerk/ Typist 2 l 
Construction Worker 2 
Technician/Mechanio l 1 
Miliuuy/Police 3 I 
Total 5 6 4 6 
Households Surveyed 100 ioo' 
I I 
,. 
. I 1111 'tJ 1 c 
Nocc: a FE.LOA Cooperative .(Pcrbadanan Nii.ma FELD A} 
~; Fieldwork. 
L..ocat Entrepreneur.ship 
Settlers .a.re encouraged to start businesses in FELDA schemes. Only settlers are 
allowe<l to operate from pennanent premises within the schemes. This measure is 
expected to provide an 'almost exclusively Malay environment in which infant enterprises 
could enjoy a degree of protection' (Blair, M. Noor and Tan, 1979: 15). Whether settlers 
in Bandar Tun Razak and Ciku involved in business have taken any loans from FELDA's 
revolving fund is unknown, but it can be certain that settlers running retailing, processing 
and agricultural business began with very little capital. This business was mainly 
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restricted ttt grocery shops and ·stores in the centr.al market supplying daily food item~. 
Tndr ability to compete -has remained a.t a low level, as can be observed i:n the weekiy 
market where competition penetrate-s from other places. Clearly, the findings agree with 
th.e pe~s.imistl.c vi.ew ofB.lair, M. Noor and Tan (1979:36) about the prospect of business 
within the FELDA sd '1eg. 1'he dire,ct urban con~ction is vital to settlers' business 
expansion .. Yet, this has not achieved a scale of any significance as supplies were stili 
largeiy froni middlemen co.ming in with their vans from regional centres. Direct urbaa 
connecrfons are important mallow local products (other than crude palm otl) crr services 
to be consumed by urban dwellers. In Bandar Tun Razak, handicraft was crnce conceived 
a& :an alternative to mobilising women to manufac.tll1'e artifacts. The. handicraft centre, 
rH?wever
1 
had to. irnpon raw and semi~finished mat.erials from Peialing Jaya and Koala 
i.umpur. Cons.equently, the cost of production was high, making i1 uncompetitive co- Stitt 
the vperaticm on a medium scale. There ate enterprising seulef's, 'however, who are-
hopeful of ma.king a forrone, despite the pessimism. 
ln Bandar Tun Razak, Zakaria bin Zulkifli is an ambitious young man of 27 years 
atid .one of the few settlers to have completed Form Five. Before becoming a EeUler; he 
was fl !ypist in Pahang Tenggara Branch Office at Bandar Tun Razak. He quit at the end 
of 1986 to join the rank of settlers, with a clear idea of starting a business. As a start, he 
soW hamburgers and repaired shoes while paying his fellow team-mates to do his field 
tasks. Known as 'burgerman', he can be seen almost everyday in the heart of th.e 
township with his self-made 'B.B.Q. plate', preparing orders with admirable patience. 
When asked if he could enrich himself in this way, he was not sure. But he asserted that 
.acquiring business experience is more imp•:>rtant than anything else. With experience and 
some capital, he believed there will be many other opportunities within Pahang Tenggara 
Development Region. 
In Ciku, Mohammad bin Abdullah's successful case is exceptional as most 
bus.inesses here are ·small with miserable profit margins. As a good negotiator, 
Mohammad has won a number of contracts including field manuring, harvesting, 
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trrnsponing fmits .and building storage houses. Moreover, he owns a grocery shop 
whi•.::h i$ .ma.n.aged "by his wife. The whole set of businesses and his income from rhe 4 
hect:ire pkl£ -earn 'him r.:n?I"e than $1, 100 a month, a figure not achieved by other settlers. 
1n summing up, the situation in Bandar Tun Razak and Ciku has not provided the 
~-econd gen:et.ation with good prospects to remain on rhe frontier.. Land inheritance will 
o-nly be .adequate: for ;one ma-le child. They are few off-farm secondary and ·tertiary 
t~pp·ortu.nities w absorb the younger generation. The bulk of them will have to go 
elsewhere for jo'os. Local ·e:rrtrepr.eneurship. however ambitious, is tmlikely to influence 
ihis trend to ,any extent. 
J.nitially, .attention in the chapter was focused on the perception of change from due 
angle cf the settlers. Except for local marketing, and jn the case of Ciku s,eul.ers for 
education opportuni'ties also, settlers from both Bandar Tun Razak and Ciku were happy 
with the change in the shift. This included housing, social f.acilicies and public transport. 
After re['aying toan ·instalments to FELDA for 15 years, the senlers will eventually 
become proprietors of .a 4-hectare oil palm plot and a houselo.t. This represernts major 
capital gains with which they can pass on to their ·children. Their perception of change, 
however. depended on their social background and exposure to the outside living 
environment. Settlers' access to regional centres for higher goods and servic.es 
c-orresponded with thefr daily needs and circumstances. The frequency of travel 
·mnforrued with their income levels, and relied upon the distance. means of transpon and 
types of goods and services available. Their mobility has not been restricted by planned 
regional boundaries. 
Despite general progress, the benefits seemed co be limited to the first generation of 
settlers.. The second generation is expected to face a dilemma. First, the land to be 
inherited will be too small for future sub-division. Secondly, there will be relatively few 
opportunities to absorb them as secondary and tertiary jobs have not been adequat-ely 
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created. Their future needs local ·~ntrepreneurship and incoming investment. Local 
investment, however, has been weak because of the limited scope for expansion within 
the FELDA framework and settlers' expenditure pattern. Few jobs have arisen in this 
aspect. The failure of the rural urbanisation strategy as applied in Pahang Tenggara and 
South Kelaman and 'the problem of .attracting investment to boost the •economic base will 
be analysed in Chapter 7. 
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PART III 
RESOURCE FRONTIER STRATEGIES RECONSIDERED 
/! 
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CHAPTER.7 
'LESSONS FOR MALAYSIA IN THE 1990S AND BEYOND 
Malaysia has been implementing forms of frontier development for at least thirty 
years. It is now possible to assess the resource frontier strategy and prospects for the 
future. Integrated as part of the New Economic Policy since 1970, the aims of the 
resource frontier strategy are co: (a) eradicate poverty; and (b) eliminate the identification 
of race with economic function and geographic location (Government of Malaysia, 
1976:7). The fl.rst objective targets the poverty problem which has a strongly rural, 
regional and ethnic orientation. The second objective involves mechanisms to tackle it. 
Hence, a critical issue is raised: lps the strategy been successful in dealing with the 
poverty and spati.al issues and mee:ting the objectives of the New Economic Policy? Once 
this key question has been addressed, we are in a position to raise another issue: what 
lessons can be learned from Malaysia's experience for national planning in the 1990s and 
beyond? 
In tackling these questions, the argument is divided into two parts. Part one 
assesses the results of the resource frontier strategy in terms of the two-pronged 
objectives of the New Economic Policy. Section 1 focuses on the overall change in 
FELDA settlers' Jiving standards and explains how this has been achieved. Based on 
evidence from Pahang Tenggara and Kesedar, we examine if industrialisation and 
urbanisation has been adequately achieved on the frontiers (Section 2). In part two, 
attention is focused on the lessons and the eff~c~s of resource frontier strategy on national 
urbanisation. Within FELDA schemes, we discuss the sustainability of settlers' living 
standards and land availability, followed by an examination ofthe second generation 
issue (Section 3). Finally, we proceed to examine the effects of resource fr~ntie~. 
development on metropolitan cenrres (Section 4). 
· .. : .. 
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POVERTY ALLEVIATION . ·.· 
In alleviating the incidence of poverty, FELDA's task has been centred on 
mobilising subsistence farmers and other low-income groups from lagging areas for 
higher productive cash-crop activities. To V·lhat extent has this attempt been successful in 
alleviating rural poveny? Attention is focused on the change in settlers' living standards. 
Overall Change in FELDA Settlers' Living Standards 
A very common criterion used in assessing whether a settler community's living 
sta.i1dards have improved is by looking at the change of the incidence of poverty. Before 
any change can be measured, the meaning of absolute poverty; however, needs to be 
clarified. The Fifth Malaysia Plan (Government of Malaysia, 1986a:82) defines absolute 
poverty as the 'lack of income needed to acquire [the] minimum necessities of life'. 
Those deprived of these minimum material necessities are, the.refore; seen as living 
below the poveny line. 
Clearly, cash income is not the only criterion of ev<>Juation. Facilities and amenities 
must not be ignored. In general, FELDA settlers enjoy relatively high income and public 
facilities when compared with most public sponsored resettlement schemes in South 
America, Africa or Indonesia where landless families were settled at little more than 
subsistence levels (World Bank. 1978:15-18). Omar Din's (1981) findings about 
FELDA settlers have some significant implications. After lO to 12 years of settlement, he 
observe~ FELDA settlers would earn 50 to 75 per cent more than their fellow rural 
counterparts of the same age who remained behind in the lagging areas. His conclusion 
might have been based on a particular year and~ therefore. cannot be representative 
because settlers' income levels are highly dependent on commodity prices. When 
commodity prices were good as in 1 %4, an average settler household engaged in oil 
palm production could earn an average net monthly income of.$1,231 compared to $505 
for an average rubber scheme smallholder honsehold(TabRe 7 .'l). Conversely;.thepoor. 
international' demand for palm oil in 1986 brought the :settler's monthly income·down to · 
.·.\ 
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tess thtl!l a .,hird of the 1984 level. Further, the settlers' cash income depends upon their 
Jot size which varies from 2.4 to 5.7 hectares - a disparity of almost 2.4. · . · 
. · .. ·. 
Table 7.1 
.... . :. > .··... . 
FELDA Settlers' Net Monthly Income, 1984-86 
llli 
Lot Oil Palm Rubber 
Size Scheme Scheme 
(ha) ($) ($} 
2.4 460 
2.8 
3.2 
4.4 
4.9 
5.7 
1,202 
1,401 
1,720 
A vera~e i .231 
456 
529 
493 
1,183 
505 
~: FELDA, 1985:19; I98ti:I9. 
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Oil Palm Rubber 
Scheme Scheme 
($) ($} 
885 
764 
1,203 
889 
366 
371 
423 
429 
1,010 
421 
12.li 
Oil Palm Rubber 
Scheme Scheme 
($) ($) 
376 
359 
379 
376 
333 
368 
415 
409 
976 
405 
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Despite uncertainty in incotne levels, FELDA settlers have been privileged in many 
ways. Their income is mainly derived from form produce of the working plots. Off-fam1 
activities bring additional income to many households. They purchase the bulk of their 
food, as crops produced for home-consumption is negligibly small (Blair, Dissanayake 
and M. Noor, 1980:75-76). This is, however, compensated by owner-occupied housing. 
They also enjoy relatively good-quality free or subsidised public health, education, 
_'·:' ·:_ ... · .. ··· ,. 
. . .. ' ·: ' ·. ~-
..... • : • .. •: = .• . 
' : • • II• ~ . : , " 
transport and utility .services. Most notably, when commodity prices faH dramaticall.Yr·· " ,<:\>::·" 
they are provided with an additional loan to cover the difference. between the :acrun{·.'.·./\ .. ·'.:.0-: : .. ·:: .. ; 
income and the poverty line1• Consequently, settlers can still meet minimum necess.iti¢~· :':. :·:./~:.'.;: '~:·<'::, , . 
. . . :~. ·._·::~..:·.~ ... ::~~>· .. ' 
and live above the absolute poverty line. 
D. S. Gibbons's 1982 calculation l1xing Malaysia's poverty line at S330.00 per household has been .' .... ,: . " . , · .: 
widely followed in the country (see Courtenay, 1988:250). In 1986, FE.LOA sclliers in Bandar Tun: . : · 
Razak were granted an extra loan when their monthly cash income foll below S350.00 - a figure ........ · ... :., . 
matching Gibbons's estimate afrer adjustment for I.he rise of consumer price index. for basic items. . · · '. . : ... ".: .. · 
,.' .. : ·, .· 
·, ·.~ .. ' 
~ ............ -.............. .. 
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Because of the special status that FELD A settlers enjoy, they are considered 
modem farmers who have forsaken 'subsistence' living. Consequently: the 'Household 
Jncome ~Jrvey' conducted by the govemment in 1984 did not include any FELDA 
fanners as living under the poveny line. Absolute poveny was seen as highly related 
with existing 'subsistence peasantry' - small padi, rubber and other commercial crop 
farmers - a sub-sector that the NEP planners aimed to eliminate by either raising their 
productivity or guiding them to other higher income activities. Besides, a smaller number 
of lowly-pru.d workers involved in mining, manufacturing, construction and other rural 
services fell within the category of poor households (see Government of Malaysia, 
l986a:Table 3.1). Indeed, FELDA settlers' material achievement has been attributable 
significantly to a high-cost approac~. 
FELDA's High-Cost Approach 
Compared to resettlement programs in other parts of the developing world, the cost 
to develop FELDA schemes has been relatively high. From 1956 to 1986, the total 
Federal and non-Federal loans used for resettling about 100,400 households had cost 
$5,230 million (Table 7.2). For each settler household, the average cost was $52,100 or 
3.8 times higher than the transmigration program in Indones1a
2
. 
From these data, we can identify three inter-related sources which have brought 
about a rise in income of the settlers - Federal government, international financial 
institutions, and settlers themselves. The support of the Federal government has been 
crucial as it accounted for $4.67 billion (89 per cent) of total development expenses up to 
1986. The World Bank occupied a second place - 6.8 per cent. The price of supponing 
FELDA has been high. At the end of 1985, FELDA's loan drawings totalled $4,852 
million but it had only repaid $606 million, of which $283 million was for loan interests 
(FELDA, 1985:17-18). 
2 The development cost of food crops is US$5,500 per household (information provided by J~an 
Hardjono). Food crops account for more than 80 per cent of the transmigration models. One United 
States dollar is equivalent to 2.5 Malaysian ringgit. 
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Thus, FELDA settlers' improved standards of living have been realised by 
pursuing a high-co~c approach. Basically, it is seen as a trade~o.ff to eliminate poverty -
the first pronged objective of the NEP. Having examined how FELDA settlers have 
achieved higher standards of living in their primary agricultural .ac·tivities, we proceed -to 
a~sess the results of promoting non-agricultural occupa.tions on the frontiers -- the second 
objective of the NEP. 
Table 7.2 
Sources of FELDA's Development Fund, 1956-1986 ($Million) 
Source 
Federal Government 
Through Federal Government from: 
World Bank 
Asian Development Bank 
Saudi Fund 
Kuwait Fund 
Overseas Econc:nJc 
Cooperative Fund 
New Planting Grants 
Rubber Replanting Grants 
Total 
Amount 
4,673.438 
354.673 
6.874 
88.961 
53.103 
27.569 
13.480 
12.115 
. 5,230.213 . 
Note: The figure has Leen rounded to the nearest thousand. 
~: FELDA, 1986:18. 
:t ASSESSING THE RESOURCE FRONTIER STRATEGY 
% 
89.4 
6.8 
0.1 
1. 7 
1.0 
0.5 
0.3 
0.2 
100.0 
The expansion of frontier growth centres or townships depends essentially on 
growth of non-agricultural activities. In seeking to explain why rural urbanisation has not 
taken off on the frontiers, attention is focused on comparing the outcome of applying the 
resource frontier strategy in the Pahang Tenggara and Kesedar regions. Two strategies -
growth centre and industrialisation - are discusserl in particular with reference to these 
planned regions. This is followed by a brief assessment ?f whether regional disparity in 
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Peninsular Malaysia has been reduced as a result of applying the resource frontier 
si.raregy in general. 
Growth Centres 
The NEP equates urban existence with higher standards of living not only in the 
fonn of utilities and facilities but aJso the opponunities for social mobility and the change 
of mentality for the rural poor (See Tun Abdul Razak's remark in Sunday Times, 12 
November, 1972). Thus, in evaluating the results of applying the .growth centre strategy, 
we need to refer to the original .targets. 
The targets of the Pahang Tenggara Master Plan, however, differ markedly from 
those projected for the Kesedar region. With the full suppon from the former Pahang-
bom Prime Minister - Tun Abdul Razak - the originators of the Pahang Tenggara Master 
Plan were invited in 1970 to plan the agricultural development of a one million hectare 
j•mgle area as a means of bringing about industrialisation and urbanisation. Presumably, 
this costly two-year task was intended to serve as a test bed for advancing an 
economically disadvantaged group (Malays). As planned, secondary and tertiary 
opportunities would be created through development of the . agricultural sector, 
establishment of the government administration and investment from the private sector 
attracted by incentives. In pursuing these targets, the Master Plan followed a growth 
centre strategy, using agriculture as a 'propulsive force' - a concept fundamentally 
different from the original Perrouxian urban-industrial emphasis. Moreover, the Master 
Plan consultants went further by designating Kuan tan as a 'development pole'. This 
designation had no finn justification in terms of any industrial resources, other than the 
town's central location on the east coast and its potential as an international seaport. 
Within Pahang Tenggara, tr'! designated regional centre, Bukit Ridan (later renamed 
Muadzam Shah) was to be promoted as a major growth centre (Dara, 1972a:59). 
Conversely, 1:he Kelantan Selatan Development Authority was a hasty creation in 1978 
follmving the United Malays National Organisation's electoral victory in Kelantan - once 
the bastion of a political opponent (Pan-Malayan Islamic Party). 
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The devdopment of the Kesedar region has pursued a different and less ambitious 
strategy for two main reasons. Firstly, up to the early 1980s, Kelantan was not a 
'favo~red' st~te to gain s~bstantial financial support from the federal government which 
determines resource allocation. Second, Kesedar has no Master Plan. The Indicative 
E.~ional Plan (Kesedar, 1984) was prepared by the 'Planning and Evaluation Division' 
of the Kesedar Authority itself under the guidance of a West German regional planner -
Hartwig Behnfeld: Completed within a few months, the Indicative Regional Plan covers 
a much smaller scope of study. It used, moreover, mostly secondary sources for its 
projections of population, employment structure and agricultural activities. More 
restrained in its projections of non-agricultural opportunities, the Plan is heavily 
dependent upon the conventional central place system and the development axis concept, 
though there is some reference to the growth centre theory. 
In Pahang Tenggara, however, the growth centre concept has been critical in 
planning. The planners of Pahang Tenggara designated Muadzam Shah as the regional 
centre and thirty-five other townships whose future growth would have to depend on 
non-agricultural activities (Dara, 1972a; 1972b ). They also envisaged that the 
development of this region would help the growth of Kuantan. Once Kuantan grew 
rapidly, it would generate spread effects to the poor states of Kelantan and Trengganu, 
thus helping in balancing the east and west coasts (Higgins and Haynes, 1983; Higgins, 
1988:226). By contrast, Kesedar's Indicative Regional Plan placed its main emphasis on 
the differentiated functions of selected centres within the region. Of the six selected 
centres, only Ciku has originated from scratch while the other five centres (Kuala Krai, 
Gua Musang, Jeli, Manek Urai and Kemubu/Dabong) are existing settlements having 
each their respective sphere of influence and services to offer (Table 7 .3). Kuala Krai 
occupies the position as a middle centre - ranking in the highest urban hierarchy and is 
underpinned by several lower-ranked 'Centres. The latter satisfy the basic needs of rural 
dwellers (Kesedar, 1984:136). All settlements within the Kesedar region are oriented 
towards Kota Baru, capital of the Kelantan state. Thus, each centre is expected to 
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-Table 7.3 
Settlements with More Than 1,000 Population 
in Pahang Tenggara and Kesedar 
Pahang Tenggara Kesedar 
Settlement Population Settlement 
Population 
Bandar Tun Razak 21,655 Kuala Krai 
12,757 
Bera 12,423 
Gua Musang 5,497 
Cini 12,372 Jeli 
2,553 
Kepayang 11,928 ManekUrai 
2,422 
Muadzam Shah 7,754 Kemubu/Dabong 
2,232 
Perantau Damai 6,204 Ciku 
1,346 
Bandar21 4,306 Bertarn 
1,329 
Mentiga Timor 3,704 
Kota Bahagia 2,803 
Perwira Jaya 2,691 
Tembangau 2,681 
Selan car 2,527 
Seladang 2,287 
I barn 2,075 
Kota Perdana 1,853 
Cendarawasih 1,682 
Mela ti 1,060 
Paloh Hinai 1,024 
Dara, 1986:35. Only settlements with a population of more than 1.000 estimated for 1986 
are listed; 
~: 
Kesedar, 1984:162-165. Only settlements selected by the Indicative Plan to perfonn 
fonctions higher than the lower centre are noted (Figure 4. l ). 
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enhance its supply of goods and services when its 'catchment .area' intensifies or 
expands. What then are the results of the projections in the two planned regions? 
. The projections in Pahang Tenggara have fallen far short of their targets. By -the 
end of 1984, more than 80 per cent of the population in the Pahang Tenggara region were 
srill engaged in agricultural jobs. Few agricultural jobs had been generated and were 
largely assume4 b~ the staff of the Pahang Tenggara Planning Authority, FELDA, public 
infrastructure projects and palm oil processing plants. The ambitious multiplier effects 
had not been achieved, nor had urbanisation taken off at the rate planned. Very much 
against the Master Plan's population projected for 1985 (332,700), the actual figure in 
1986 was 103,450 - a third of the original target (Dara. 1986:35). Only one township -
Bandar Tun Razak- reached a population of more than 15,000 (Table 7.3). Yet, .a high 
proportion of the labourers within the region were 50,000 temporary long-term migrants 
from Indonesia (The Star, 16 September 1982)- a factor not antidpated in the early 
1970s in the formulation of the private land schemes within the Pahang Tenggara region. 
They have been able .to move into the estates to take advantage of shifts in the 
international division oflabour and Malaysia's immigration policy. 
The shortfall in population targets was not attributable .to the delay of agricultural 
projects - the principal economic base of the region. Indeed, the extent of agricultural 
land developed up to 1984 had exceeded the Master Plan's target by :t7 per cent because 
both public and private sectors were eager to acquire more land for cash cropping (Dara, 
1985:16). Hence, the explanation which stated that the shortfall was attributable to the 
shonage of labourers for the necessary infrastructural works and to the competition for 
resources from other frontier development projects is unconvincing.Indeed, the gap 
between the. Master Plan's projected non-agricultural jobs and the actual number is 
significant. Table 7.4 indicates the occupational structure of the townships with more 
than 5,000 people in Pahang Tenggara in the mid-I 980s. Except for Muadzam Shah, all 
the townships achieved a much lower proportion of non-agricultural jobs than the figure 
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e.stim:rr.ed by I.he Maste~ Pl:m. Contrary tO-the ~faster Pl:in projections. the rownship 
p.opul.ation .size alone has produced no significant effects in inducing secondary unct 
wn:rry oppon~mities. Muadzam Shah is snucturally ifferenr . .-\s a designated regional 
cemre. it has been the tJ.rget of heavy investmem by the governmenc particularly in 
administration which provided 40 per c.ent of the total jobs. 
Table 7.-1 
Occupational Sti-ucture of Townships with More Than 
5,000 Population in Pahang Tenggara 
Agricultu· % of Non- % o.f 
Township ral Jobs % Master Agricultu- % ·Master 
Plan3 ral Jobs Plan 
Bandar Tun 2,563 80.4 30.9 626 I 9.6 69.1 
Razzk 
Bera 2,048 81.4 52. l 467 18.6 
47-.9 
Cini 2,291 78.3 52.1 634 21.7 47.9 
Kepayang 1,630 79.3 52.1 426 20.7 4'7.9 
Muadzam Shah 1,250 46.6 52.1 1,435 53.4 47.9 
Perantau l, 117 92.9 52.1 85 7.1 47.9 
Darnai 
Total 10,899 74.8 n.a 3,673 25.2 
n.a 
Note; a The agricultural jobs referred in the Master Plan involve resource-based undertakings 
including agriculture, mining, quarry and some primary and secondary processing 
activities . 
.n.a= data not available 
~: Dara, 1972a:l52-Table 14.lb; 1986:36. 
The growth impulses, in fact, have escaped from the Pahang Tenggara region. 
Between 1970 and 1980, Kuantan tripled its population and Segamat
3 
doubled, as a 
result of, at least in part, the 'backwash effects' from the Pahang Tenggara region. 
3 Between 1957 and 1970, Segamat experienced quite severe outmigration and its population dropped 
from 18,500 to 17,800. By 1980, its population had increased to 34,000, improving its ranking to 
twt:ntieth place in Peninsular Malaysia's urban hierarchy. 
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Economic surpluses from Pahang Tenggara's agricultural hinterlands have 'trickled up' 
lO successively higher levels, instead of to the townships (See Dewar, Todes and 
Watson, 1986:141). Thus, ~he 'generated effects' expected by the Master Plan had not 
wpponed the growth of the region bur the reverse was true. In Kesedar. however, the 
-sh0rtfa11 has been smaller because of its less grandiose projections. 
In terms of non-agricultural jobs, Kesedar's Indicative Regional Plan relies on the 
:development of agro-industrie~, including timber, and is not optimistic of attracting large 
·capital investments from outside the region to boost manufacturing and trade. This is 
more realistic than the Pahang Tenggara Master Plan. While the Pahang Tenggara Master 
Eilln. tries to project an autonomous urban hierarchical system with~n a planned region, 
the Kesedar Plan acknowledges the importance of the relationship between the region and 
the settlement structure outside the administrative boundaries (Kesedar, 1984:25). 
Nonetheless, the urbanisation strategy of the Kesedar region has not been realised. The 
Indicative Regional Plan for Kesedar suggested th~ upgrading of seven major townships4 
and an increase in population from 5,000 in 1970 to 54,000 in 1990 - Gua Musang being 
singled out as the main regional centre with a population of between 20,000 and 24,000. 
These targets have not been reached. Although based on projections of vital statistics of 
rural and urban residents, Kesedar also fell short of its planned population target with 
apparently less than 8,000 people in 1987 in Gua Musang, as compared to its 19<:'~ targeE 
of 20,000-24,000 - one third of that planned for the proposed administrative, 
.commercial and industrial centre (Kesedar, 1980:58). It was hoped to attract 3,000 
soldiers .and policemen and their families to make up for Gua Musang"s shortfall; the 
uniformed branches, however, like the proposed footloose industries, have yet to appear. 
Nonetheless, the unsatisfactory results of urbanisation are also related to the lack of 
industrial dispersal in the two regions. 
4 Gua Musang, Jeli, Manek Krai. Kemubu, Dabong, Bcriam and Ciku. 
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Industrialisation 
Wnether the growth centre concept can bring about rural industrial development is a 
direct .co!lsequence of the nature of linkages between the frontier settlements and outside 
~adi11g ·centres. Th'.~ Pahang Tenggara and Kesedar regions are newly developed regions 
and are heavily dependent on agriculture. About 90 per cent of the agricultural land use in 
both regions is under oil palm and rubber (Table 7.5). Thus, their industrial devedopment 
has to rely either on processing local raw materials and resources or incoming 
investments. This, in turn, relies on opponunities and comparative advantages which the 
two regions offer. 
Geographically, Peninsular Malaysia has inherited a relatively efficient urban 
network from colonial times focused on the west coast. As the thrust of agricultural 
development in the post-independence period in Malaysia has been .centred on expanding 
the volume of expon-trade, the inherent dynamics of the inherited urban network has 
been reinforced rather than weakened. The new urban system in Pahang Tenggara and 
Kesedar has been subordinated to the exiscing urban network on the west coast which is 
constantly being upgraded. Their position becomes even more vulnerable as they have 
become heavily dependent upon on an unstable world economy. 
A ca.;;e study of two FELDA settlements - Bandar Tun Razak and Ciku -
demonstrates this situation. As part of cash crop producing regions in Pahang Tenggara 
and Kesedar, the role of Bandar Tun Razak and Ciku is outlined in Figure 7.1. Located 
at the lowest level in the settlement hierarchy, the two 'townships' produce raw materials 
(oil palm fruit) and process it locally to semi-finished erode palm oil. The entire role of 
raw material treatment ends here without going further while the bulk of the agri~business 
is executed outside the region - in national centres enjoying agglomeration advantages or 
foreign centres wh~re crude palm oil is further processed into more refined or finished 
products. Because more than 80 per cent of crude oil is exporred overseas, the largest 
proponion of value-added is extracted outside the country. Hence, Bandar Tun Razak 
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Table 7.5 
Distribu.tion .of Agricultural Land in Pahang Tenggara and Kesedar 
Pahang Tenggara Kesedar 
Land Use 
Hectare % Hectare % 
Oil Palm 241,369 77.9 56,910 39.9 
Rubber 33,799 10.9 77,173 54.0 
Fruits 23,090 7.4 
Cattle Ranch 5,939 1.9 
Diversified 4,241 1.4 8,684 6.1 
Crops 
Research Farm 1,012 0.3 
Tea 526 0.2 
Total 309,976 100.0 142,767 100.0 
Smlfil: Dara, 1985:15; 
Kcsedar, 1986:13. 
and Ciku receive relatively little return from the surplus they produce. They receive 
'higher-order' consumer goods and essential agricultural inputs (chemicals, fertilisers, 
machinery, working tools etc) from their nearby intermediate towns - Segamat and 
Bahau, Gua Musang and Kuala Krai. These are service towns but not market towns for 
agricultural produce of the two regions because nearly all agricultural produce is 
processed by FELDA and other agricultural oompanies. With good road communications 
linking existing major urban centres, fam1 produce from Pahang Tenggara and Kesedar 
regions is efficiently exponed to the international market mainly via metropolitan towns. 
Intermediate towns within or close to the two regions, in turn, receive their goods from 
other metropolitan cities in the higher hierarchy such as Kuantan, Kota Baru, Kuala 
Lumpur and Singapore. 
Thus, the weakness of industrialisation in Pahang Tenggara and Kesedar is 
underlined by their dependence on barely processed raw materials. Some 85 per cent per 
cent of the industries in Pahang Tenggara are palm oil primary processing plants. 
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Figure 7.1 
Linkages of Rural Townships with the World Ma·rket 
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Similarly, 70 per cent of Kesedar's industries are sawmills, pulp and p:iper processing 
factories. Indeed, most of the surplus extracted from agricultural activities has not been 
reinvested in Pahang Tenggara and Kesedar with the exception of public investment in 
the fonn of basic infrastructure, namely roads, schools, religious and other basic 
facilities which are nieeded to ensure the flow of goods and services, and sustain the 
residents' livelihood. But why has the foreign and local capital failed to invest in non-
agncultural pr()jects within Pahang Tenggara and Kesedar? 
Foreign interests are volati1e and highly selective in borh product aRd locatio~ in 
their industrial endeavours. Capital inflow from advanced capitalist nations stems 
principally from their constant 1ndustrial rextructuring and the competitive position of 
recipient nations in spec1fic products. in fact, there was even some decrease in the early 
1900s despite industrial investment incentives (Salih and Young, 1987:171}. Currently, 
great effons have been made to attract foreign capital and there has been some success. 
Not surprisingly, little in terms of infrastroct~re, market and labour skill on the resource 
frontier has attracted the attention of foreign capital. 
Also, the local entrepreneurial class, whether Malay or Chinese, has shown Httle 
"interest in investing in the frontier other than in cash-crops .and timber. Chinese 
entrepreneurs have been the greatest contributors both in capital and experience. Having 
concentrated on tin mining, rubber cultivation, wholesale and retail business in the 
colonial <lays, they diversified their activities into transport, construction and import-
substitution industries during the post-independence period, In the 1980s, their domain 
'has expanded into the manufacturing sector including light consumer goods and 
automobile assembly (Salih and Young, 1987: 172). Overall, however, their predilection 
i'S to invest in property, banking and the share lnarket. The reasons are two-fold. First, 
their expansion into industrial undenakings h~.s been hindered by the Industrial 
Coordination Act of 19755, lack of skills in high technology activitie.'.' and its constant 
5 In 1975, the Act required all manufacturing firms with more than twenty-five full-time workers or 
S250.000 in shareholder funds to register for a licence and become bound by the equity redistribution 
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need for renovation. Not only has high technological know-how been controlled by 
multi-national corporations from the capitalist core nations, but there is an additional 
probiern in finding the markets where they can compete. Consequently, their industrial 
interest has been restricted to the small and medium-scale labour-intensive manufactnrincr 
:::> 
sector concentrated in established west coast cities. Any decentralising efforts to the 
frontier regions would be 'financial suicide'. 
Secondly, within the framework of world trade, Malaysia's comparatively efficient 
cash agricultural and mining sectors have created a relatively large urban middle class. It 
comprises professionals, managerial personnel and high and medium ranking 
administrative staff in both the public and private sectors. Since the late 1970s, the 
government's provision of low~interest loans to encourage home ownership among 
governm~nt servants has stimulated a strong housing demand. Local entrepreneurs, 
therefore, have been provided with opportunities to accumulate wealth by servicing them~ 
not -only in housing bur also in catering, consumer goods and services. Also, Malaysia's 
private investment is constantly affected by the world economic climate. Between 1981 
and 1985, for instance, the private sector's annual growth rate in investment registered 
only 1.8 per .cent which was much lower than the 10.7 p-er .cent projec·ted (Government 
of M~laysia, 1986a.:44 ). 
Hence, frontier re:g.ioas .are economically dominated by national metropolitan and 
-overseas centres which assume the major functions of commercial exchange. With little 
public and private industrial investment on the frontier areas, settlements within the 
Pahang Tenggara and Kesedar regions have remained agricultural in character. These 
agro-settlements are basic units of cash-crop production at the very source, from which 
most surplus is not kept for local reinvestment. Having explained why Pahang Tenggara 
.and Kesedar have failed to reach their urbanisation and industrialisation targets, we can 
(i.e 30 per_ cent reserved share to the Malays and other indigenous people) of the NEP (see Chee, 
1986). 
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now proceed co scudy whecher the resource frontier strategy has conuibuted in reducing 
regionai disparity - a primary aim of the regional policy. 
Resource Frontier Strategy and Regional Disparity 
As pa.rt of Malaysia's regional policy, one of the main aims of the resource frontier 
strategy has been to help reduce economic disparity between more and less developed 
states. Basically, FELD A's effons in transferring pan of the population from depressed 
areas to unexploited frontier regions have contributed to the reduction of regional 
disparities in cwo ways. Firstly, the transfer leaves a higher ratio of resources to the 
iemaining population with resultant. higher levels of per capita consumption (Nilson, 
1973:29). Secondly, the reception areas have been transformed into more productive 
zones both in terms of agricultural outputs and public facilities. The critical issue here, 
however, is the excent of success that has been achieved through the resource frontier 
Overall, .the extent contributed by the resource frontier strategy has been limited in 
terms of per capita gross domestic product since the launching of the NEP in 1971. As 
Table 7.6 shows, the gap between the east (Eastern region) and the west coast states 
(other regions) seems to have been narrowed. But a substantial part of the .rise in per 
capita income of the Eastern region projected for 1990 is attributable to Trengganu's 
input in petroleum and natural gas. Kelantan's per capita GDP ratio to Peninsular 
Malaysia's .average, however, has remained stagnant between 197 l and 1990- less than 
0.5. Pahang, the most important state for FELDA schemes, even experiences a widened 
disparity during the same period. 
Since 1970, Penang has made substantial advances as it has been able to develop a 
series of industrial estates offering tax incentives and tariff protection for export-oriented 
manufactured goods and import-substitution industrial products for local markets. 
Contrary to manufacturing, the impact of agriculture in contributing to Malaysia's 
regional balance in tenns of gross domestic product has declined. Agriculture's GDP 
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input decreased from 30 per cent in 1971 to 23 per cent in 1980, and is expected ro drop 
further to 18 per cent by 1990 (Government of Malaysia, 1981:100-101; 1986a:l90-
191 ). 
Therefore, because of the difficulty in creating secondary and tertiary occupations 
in the rural sector, the agriculture-based resource frontiers cannot help reduce the regional 
disparity to any significant extent, despite the fact that the public enterprises involved are 
more concerned with the provision of services and settlers' welfare (compared to the 
private sector). 
Table 7.6 
Change in GDP Per Capit2 by Region, Peninsular Malaysia, 191'1~90 
.. 
. 'i 
Region 1971 1980 1990 (GDP) (GDP) (GDP) 
Per Capita PMa Per Capita PM Per Capita 
PM 
Northern 998.7 0.84 1,608.9 0.85 
3,539.0 -D.82 
Central 1,763.4 J.48 2,248.1 1.19 
5,950.0 l.37 
Eastern 771.6 0.65 1,185.7 0.63 
3,539.0 0.82 
Southern 1,083.7 0.91 1,726.0 0.92 
3,709.0 0.85 
Note: Northern region comprises Kcdah, Perlis, Pcnang and Perak; Central region covers Selangor, Kuala Lumpur, Negeri Sembilan and Mclaka; Eastern region consislS of 
Kelantan, Trcngganu and Pahang; and Southern region includes only Johor state. 
a Ratio to Peninsular Malaysia given as 1.00. 
~: Computed from Government of Malaysia, 198I:Tables 5-1and5-2; l986a:T.ablc5~/. 
Definitely, however, the regional disparity between the west and the east coascs of 
Peninsular Malaysia would have been even larger without the resource frontier strategy. 
But given unrealistic projections in tenns of population growth and expansion in 
secondary and tertiary activities, the strategy achieved little when evaluated against the 
national objectives and targets. Convincingly, the strategy has been successful in 
bolstering the production of agricultural commodities which have remained as one of the 
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primary foreign exchange earners for the country. Furthennote, Kuantan has benefited 
from the frontier development of Pahang Tenggara, despite the delay in the construction 
of seaport. Because of the relatively loY.' purchase power of the settlers in the frontie.r 
.regions and the east coast as a whole, .the Kuan tan port will be used mainly for .exponrng 
commodities for a long time to come. Meanwhile, the existing business network in 
Peninsular Malaysia is adequate to meet the demand for most of .the consumer goods of 
the east coast states. This leads us further to examine the lessons .of .resource frontier 
strategy for the future. 
3~ LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE 
Our case studies of Pahang Tenggara and Kesedar have shown that the resource 
frontier strategy has not been able to use commercial agriculture (oil palm, rubber) re 
initiate an urban.-industrial take-off in the frontier settlements. Thus, we now draw some 
lessons from the FELDA experience. Three main issues .are srndied: .sustainability, lan.d 
availubility and the future generation. 
Sustaina bHi ty 
.Sustainability involves two basic issues: (a) economic (.Le living standards); and 
(b) ethnic. The first issue has to 'be seen against the rise in the living standards of FELDA 
senlers as a result -of the government's direct high-cost assistance in public facilities, 
administrative staff and improved crop yields. In these circumstances, the most severe 
thr.e.a·t ·Of sustaining FELDA settlers' living standards rests with the uncertainty of the 
.commodity prices and the organisation's marketing skills. Disadvantaged by Malaysia's 
higher operating costs, FELDA is facing incre11sing competition from Indonesia and 
Thailand, two neighbouring countries which are expanding their oil palm and rubber 
acreage and, are also catching up with its much-vaurnted oil palm technology. Yet in 
1986, 70 per cent of FELDA's 682,000 hectares of crop area was under oil palm 
(FELDA, 1986:8) from which a substitutable edible oil is generated. Currently, the 
international palm oil market (60 per cent from Malaysia) is competing intensely with 
215 
. , mprovemem m o-fuer .edible oils- most notably soybean oil. Consequentlv any funher 1· . · 
1l:le living Sl·tandards is problematical. Despite effons .unden.aken to improve product 
.quality and to cu£ down production ·costs, Malaysia's oil palm future is hard to ·predict. 
Ruhbcr, more-over, has ·declined in area during the .last few years. :Because :of its need for 
;JtrOTe labour input, rubber is unlikely to expand in the future. 
The second iss·ue is .moral. As a public agency whose .t:ask is to help el.imina-te 
:pO"'lerty, FELDA's .target ,group is, however, strongly ·ethnic-oriented. More than 95 per 
~ent of its settlers are Malays (Government of Malaysia, 1976:183). Convers.ely, few 
poor frv.m :the Chinese-dominated new villages and Indian~dominated .estates have been 
offered places. Among the 1.8 million people of the new villagers in 1985, an estimated 
half of them were living below the poveny line (Govemmenr of Malaysia, 1986a:91 and 
based on Gibbon's estimate). This contradicts ti . .:. New Economic Policy's objective of 
eradicating poverty irrespective of race and eliminating the identification of ethnic groups 
with geographical location. It is, therefore, .a moral question whether FELDA should 
continue 10 use public funds to suppon its settlers when their cash income falls below the 
poverty line. Like many other resources, land is no-t unlimited. Thiny years of land 
·resettlement has simultaneously brought FELDA to face a new reality: suitable frontier 
~nds ate running out in Peninsular Malaysia. 
Future Land A vaiia·bility 
During the Fifth Malaysia Plan (1986-90). one-third of the 175,000 hectares of 
new land to be developed by FELDA will be in Sabah (Government of Malaysia, 
1986a:320). From 1990 onwards, the prospect Gf expanding large-scale commercial 
agriculture will decrease in Peninsular Malaysia, not only because little suitable land 
-re.mains, but, in particular, the issue of conserving tropical forest is arousing increasing 
concern. Concomitant with frontier clearance in the past thirty years, vast jungle cover 
has been removed, having a severe environmental impact on the ecosystem: topsoil loss 
and general land degradation (upstream erosion to downstream sedimentation). National 
and international criticisms over Malaysia's widespread damage of its environment (see 
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IC!Hl, 1986; Goldsmith, 1985; Brookfield, 1988; Barrow, 1980) have exened strong 
pressure on any further large-scale deforestation in at least West Malaysz' I h a. n t ese 
circumstances, improving existing resettlement schemes and seeking other development 
tll.te·matives have become increasingly important to policy-makers. Increasingly ..... ' 
ex.tending the resource frontiers is not a viable option in Peninsular Malaysia. 
The Second Generation and Planning Dilemmas 
As noted, relatively few non-agricultural opportunities have been created in the 
frontier settlements to absorb the younger generation who averages more than four 
children per family. Initially, politicians and planners had thought of urbanising the 
frontier settlements so that the settlers' children could stay. 
The settlers' response to the macro-level objectives set by politicians to urbanise 
them has been passive and inactive. Their view of a 'region' and urbanisation contradicts 
strongly with that of the politicians (Figure 7 .2). Politicians have a notion of a definite 
region marked by boundaries. This is not observed by settlers and labourers. The 
p-oliticians need Malay urbanisation as an instrument for converting their rural 
s.trongholds to urban settings. Although settlers are provitied with urban faciiitie.; and 
s.ervices, their standards of living are constantly threatened by uncertain commodity 
prices. In times of low commodity prices ar-::i wii.n increased responsibility towards the 
educational needs of their children, most of them can only meet basic needs. Their 
situation has not been conveyed to the planners because of the lack of communication. 
Within their rural setting, the settlers adjust their livelihood and needs to the income 
levels and other social needs and enjoy the facilities through public investment initiated 
by politicians. But apart from their basic function of producing commodities, whether to 
industrialise and urbanise their rural setting is a distant matter. Apparently, they do not 
see a future for their children on the frontiers. While they themselves wish to stay on, 
their children are less likely to do so. With higher educational skills, the frontiers will be 
unable to retain most of them. In short, Malaysia's resource frontier strategy has not been 
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Figure 7.2 
Conceptual Divergence Benveen Settlers 
and Politicians on 'Region' 
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,.entra isauora - for 11n alternative w rural-urban migration and effective to industrial de,.  i· · 
· u 1 most o the mosr settlers it has merely postponed the inevitable for a generat1"on B t ·r f 
children of settlers are unlikely to find a house on the frontier, where can they go? 
.t RESOURCE .FRONTIERS, URBANISATION AND THE NEP 
We have shown that the resource frontier strategy has been unable to retain future 
generntions of settlers. The strategy, however, has induced urbanisation elsewhere. More 
recently, the Malay population has been more migratory and has shown an increasing 
trend towards greater urbanisation than the Chinese and the Indians (Government of 
Malaysia, 1986b:24-25). By the year 2,000, this trend will be intensified as the fertility 
rate of Malay women will be twice that of their Chinese and Indian counterparts 
(Government of Malaysia, 1987:108). Hence, it is imperative to examine the trend of 
Malay urbanisation and its relationship with frontier development. 
Metropolitan Growth and Resource Frontiers 
The relatively efficient frontier commercial crop development and linkage system 
be·rween producing regions a~d metropolitan towns (including ports) have accelerated the 
primacy of Kuala Lumpur and the pace of tertiary activities. Since 1970, Malaysia\ 
teniary sector has expanded and remained at a high level in 1985, accounting for 36 per 
cent of the total active population - a very high level by Third World standards. 
The primacy of Kuala Lumpur (including its satellite - Petaling Jay:-..) has been a 
~ecent phenomenon (Choo, 1978:332). Between 1970 and 1980, its population incre:iseu 
substantially and widened the gap with the second-ranking city (from twice that of 
George Town to four times that of Ipoh). In ten years, it recorded an unprecedented rate 
of annual growth of 7.5 per cent (Table 7.7). As this Table shows, the change in urban 
structure and the destabilisation of the rank-size system in Peninsular Malaysia have been 
associated with large-scale frontier development. Initially, resource frontier development 
required revenues for initial investment and infrastructure. These revenues were acquired 
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Table 7.7 
Size, Rank Position and Annual Growth Rate of Thiny Major Towns in Peninsular Malaysia, 
1947-1980 (in Thousands) 
1947 1931-47 1957 1947-57 1970 1957-70 19SO 1970-80 
City Pop. Rank Annual Pop. Rank An11ual Pop. Rank Annual Pop. l{unk Annual 
Growlh Growth Growth Growth 
-
Kuala Lumpur 176.0 2 2.9 332.8 l 6.58 544.3 1 3.86 1,127.4 I 7.55 
& Pctaling Jaya 
lpoh 80.9 3 2.65 165.8 3 7.44 247.7 3 3.14 293.9 i 1.72 
George Town 189.1 l l.48 234.9 2 2.19 270.0 2. 1.08 24!1.2 3 -0.84 
Johor Baru 38.8 6 3.76 75.1 5 6.83 135.'9 4 4.67 246.4 4 6.13 
Kclang 33.5 8 2.99 75.6 4 8.48 113.3 5 3.16 192.1 5 5.42 
Kuala Trcngganu 27.0 11 4.19 29.4 16 0.86 53.3 13 4.68 180.3 6 12.96 
N Kola Baru 22.8 14 2.74 38.1 13 5.27 55.1 l l 2.88 167.9 7 11.79 
N Taiping 41.4 5 2.01 48.2 9 l.53 54.6 12 0.96 146.0 8 10.34 0 
Scrcmban 35.3 7 3.15 52.0 8 3.95 79.9 7 3.36 132.9 9 5.22 
Kuan tan 8.1 23 n.a 23.l 19 11.04 43.4 16 4.97 131.5 1-0 11.72 
Mclaka 54.5 4 2.28 69.9 6 2.52 86..4 6 1.64 81.S II 0.13 
Butterworth 21.3 15 2.89 42.5 10 7.15 61.2 9 2.84 78.0 12 2.46 
AlorSctar 32.4 9 3.53 52.9 7 5.02 66.2 s 1.74 69.4 13 0.47 
Muar 32.2 10 2.99 39.1 12 l.96 61.2 10 3.51 65.2 14 0.64 
Batu Pahat 26.S 12 4.40 40.0 11 4.20 53.3 14 2.23 64.7 15 J.96 
Kcluang 16.0 17 5.79 31.2 15 6.91 43.3 17 2.55 50.3 16 1.51 
Tclok Iman (Tclok Anson) 23.1 13 2.87 37.0 14 4.82 44.7 15 1.46 49.i 17 0.94 
Sungci Pctani 13.2 19 3.43 22.9 20 5.66 35.8 18 3.50 45.3 18 2.38 
AirHitam 13.5 18 11.70 22.4 21 5.19 25.7 22 1.06 35.6. 19 3.31 
Scgamat 7.3 24 n.a 18.5 23 9.75 17.8 28 -0.30 34.0 20 6.69 
Kajang 7.5 26 n.a 9.6 37 2.50 22.5 24 6.77 29.3 21 2.68 
Dun gun 4.3 30 n.a 12.5 29 11.26 17.5 29 2.62 28.9 22 5.14 
Bukit Mcrtajnm 12.J 20 5.40 24.7 17 7.22 26.7 20 0.60 28.7 23 0.73 
Kulim 9.5 21 n.a 17.6 24 6.36 18.5 26 0.38 26.8 2'1 3.78 
Kampar 11.S 16 0.84 :14.6 18 3.46 26.6 21 0.60 24.6 25 -0.78 
Port Dickson 3.4 51 n.a 4.4 81 2.61 10.2 34 6.68 24.4 26 9.11 
Kulai 3.3 53 n.a 7.8 46 8.98 11.8 30 3.24 216 27 7.18 
Sungci Siput 6.0 29 n.a 15.3 27 9.81 21.3 25 2.58 23.4 28 0.94 
Ben tong 7.1 28 n.a 18.8 22 I0.23 22.7 23 1.46 22.9 29 CJ.09 
Raub 3.6 31 n.a· 15.4 26 15.64 18.4 27 1.38 22.Y. JO 2.21 
~ Sourc(!: Salih and Young, 1981:128; and calculated from 'Government of Malaysia', t986c. -,~~,[:::t 
through the growth of other national econqmic sectors. Being the nation's business and 
.adrninis.trative centre, Kuala Lumpur possesses a strong financial position to enable it to 
·supply th.e bulk of the credit and tax revenue used in the resource frontier regions. 
Be·nefiting from its control of financial flows and the linkages in material supplies, Kuala 
L,umpur is also involved in providing a large proportion of supplies to both FELDA and 
private estates within the frontier regions. Further, substantial tax revenues have been 
spent on development of the capital city. Thus, frontier development benefits the capital 
city substantially in creating demand, especially that of the high-order category <\Ild 
stimulating the growth of Kuala Lumpur. 
By 1980, Kuala Lumpur and other metropolitan centres, with populations in excess 
of 75,000 people, had attracted most of the Malay rural-urban migration. They now 
accommodate 75 per cent of the Malay urban population (Mahbob, 1986:59). Between 
1970 and 1980, the average annual growth of east coast metropolitan centres was most 
significant - Kota Baru recorded 12 per cent, Kuala Trengganu 10 per cent and Kuanw.n
6 
12 per cent. The rate of Malay urbanisation accelerated, increasing from 27 per cent to 37 
'{ler cent of the total urban population of Peninsular Malaysia, whereas the proportion of 
other ethnic groups declined (Table 7 .8). The annual ·growth rate of Malay urban 
population accounted for 6.7 per cent, a high figure compared to 3.7 per cent of Chinese 
u.nd 4.2 per cent of Indians. By 1990, the percentage of Malay urban population (45.6 
per cent) is expected to be higher than the Chinese (43.7 per cent). The fast pace of 
Malay urbanisation will encompass the youths from the FELDA settlements. Those from 
p-adi-growing and smallholding areas will also be numerous, as evidenced by the 
problems of idle land (569,000) hectares, See Nanyang Siang Pao, 25 November 1987). 
Consequently, the challenge of meeting the demand for jobs of an increased urban 
population is dramatic. 
6 These three cities' boundary was expanded during the intercensal period.from 19i0 to 1980. 
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·Table 7.8 
Urban Population Change by Ethnic Group in Peninsular Malaysia 
(by Percentage), 1921-1990 · 
Group 1921 1931 1947 1957 1970 1980 1990a 
~alay 18.4 19.2 21.1 21.6 27.1 37.4 45.6 (54.0) (49.2) (49.5) (49.8) (52.7) (55.1) (58.1) 
Chinese 60.2 59.6 62.3 63.9 59.0 50.6 43.7 
{29.4) (33.9) (38.4) (37.2) (35.8) (33.9) (31.4) 
Indian 17.8 17.8 13.8 10.7 12.8 11.3 10.l 
( 15.1) (15.1) (10.8)· (11.2) (10.7) (10.3) (9.9) 
Others 3.6 3.4 2.8 3.8 1.1 b 0.7 0.6 
(1.5) (1.8) (1.3) ( 1.8) (0.8) (0.7) (0.6) 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
% Urban 
to Total 
Population 14.0 15.1 15.9 26.5 28.8 37.5 41.1 
Total 
Population .. 
(Million) 2.91 3.79 4.91 6.28 9.15 11.47 12.97 
Note: Figure within brackets indicates percentage of total population. 
a Projected figure. 
b The sharp decline was a result of the Malayanisation policy in employment followihg 
the independence in 1957. 
~: Government of Malaysia, 1981:79; 1986a:l34-135; Department of Statistics, Kuala 
Lumpur. 
Meeting the Challenge of the 1990s and Beyond 
The Malay rural-urban migrants have been attracted at two levels. The higher 
echelon has been drawn by the expansion of modern activities and public services. 
Conversely, the lower echeion has been absorbed with the growth of informal and 
industrial activities in major cities in the Kelang Valley, Penang and Johor BarJ. Between 
1970 and 1980, the Kelang Valley grew by over 100 per cent in manpower. Some 
465,000 jobs were created in the process (Government of Malaysia, 1981: 111 }. 
Indeed, in Peninsular Malaysia, a dramarii:: ·change in ethnic structure of manpower 
in manufacturing has taken place. The proportion of Malay labour force involved in this 
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·sector had increased from 20 per cent in 1957 co 54 per cenc in 1980 (McGee, 1986:47). 
Large numbers of Malay female workers have also been absorbed into the expon-
oriented manufacturing sector of the major towns, characterised by low wage and low 
$kill requirements (Mah bob, 1986:92). Most of the Malays in these cities, however, are 
concentrated in services and small-capital businesses and other labouring jobs. Other 
wwns.1 with .a population of less than 75,000, registered a smaller growth in 
employment. 
Thus, our study indicates that the frontier development has contributed little 
towards urbanising the Malays in situ but it has helped accelerate their urbanisation in 
Kuala Lumpur and other metropolitan cities of more than 75,000 people. But the FELDA 
frontier settlements have played a strong role in intercepting a large number of potentially 
urban-bound migrants from the poorly developed rural regions. By delaying the rural-
:urban influx, the eventual second-generation migrants from the FELDA schemes will 
provide .a better quality of labour force with a higher educational standards and ability 
than their parents. Therefore, they will find adaptation to nrban life elsewhere easier. 
In response to the limited expansion of growth centres and townships in the 
frontier regions, the Fifth Malaysia Plan (Government of Malaysia, l 986a: 198) has 
retreated from the offensive front launched in 1970 and reoriented the strategy: 
'The new townships of regional development authorities will be 
developed as settlement centres and allowed to follow their 
natural growth process rather than as artificially induced small-
scale version of existing major cities. Facilities such as urb.an 
infrasrructure and buildings will, therefore, be constructed with 
minimum cost ... and upgraded according to effective demand 
and the standards of living of the population'. 
The Fifth Malaysia Pian has also realised the disadvantages of industrial dispersion over 
vast territories. A retu~ to the neo-classical emphasis of agglomeration economies has 
been made clear and privatisation has also been stressed. What then are other alternatives 
to replace the resource frontier strategy beyond the 1990s? This question will be 
considered in the next chapter. 
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Resume 
In assessing the effectiveness of the resource frontier srrmegy in tackling the 1\TEP's 
iwo main objectives, our findings indicate that poverty has been eliminated within 
FELDA schemes, in spite of uncertainty caused by pronounced fluctuations of 
commodity prices. Nonetheless, this has been achieved by a high-cost approach and nt 
the :expense of the poor among other ethnic groups. Yet, the beneficiaries seem to be 
restricted to first generation settlers. Relatively few jobs have been generated to absorb 
second generation youths. Based on evidence collected in Pahang Tenggara and South 
Kelantan Development Authorities, the use of the resource frontier strategy to promote 
non-agricultural activities has achieved little. The FELDA settlers and other labourers still 
remain basic producers of agricultural commodities. lt has reduced scarcely the regionai 
disparity between more and less developed states but it is recognised that the gap would 
have been even larger without it. Indeed, the restricted growth of these frontier 
settlements reflects the logic of the world market system and the flow of private capital. 
Consequently, the limited improvement experienced by settlers is mirrored in the 
restricted ways in which the resource frontiers have stimulated regional and urban 
development. The frontier development has induced urbanisation elsewhere in the 
metropolitan centres. These centres which enjoy agglomeration advantages and more 
direct linkage with world centres are privileged in their share of national growth. In the 
FELDA settlements, the children of the settlers have now been educated than their 
parents. They are potentially urban-bound migrants and will be better equipped with 
skills for metropolitan life. Chapter 8 will examine other alternatives to the resource 
frontier strategy. 
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CHAPTER 8 
WITHER l\1ALA YSIAN DEVELOPMENT? 
Resource frontier development in Malaysia has generated a surplus. Yet, it has 
failed to induce urbanisation. Instead, much of the surplus has leaked from the resource 
frontiers to the metropolitan areas and bolstered their growth. These stark facts raise the 
·' issue of the nature and direction of Malaysia's development over the next twenty years. 
,/ 
/j 
But first a series of .questions have to be addressed: can the resource frontier 
strategy be replaced by other strategies to seal the leakage of surplus; then what other 
strategies are available; and what is most needed for Malaysia under present 
circumstances? 
In taking up these issues, a wider perspective in relation to current regional 
development theories is considered by referring to a full spectrum of alternatives whose 
range varies from a completely open economy to a closed one. Hence, we outline three 
basic strategies available to Malaysia and examine their theoretical features in turn 
(Section 1). Then we compare and critically analyse the agropolitan and integrated rural 
development strategies. Attention is focused on whether they fit in Malaysia's political 
framework and the actual conditions of Pahang Tenggara and Kesedar (Section 2). 
Finally, we examine the most likely alternative, the industrialisation option, and speculate 
on the problems and feasibility of the export-oriented strategy in absorbing surplus 
labour including that of the frontier regions (Section 3). 
1. THREE STRATEGIES 
Basically, three strategies are available to Malaysia. At one extreme, as shown in 
Figure 8.1, the country can turn away from the resource frontier strategy towards a 
closed economy by following the agropolitan approach. Alternatively, the country could 
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~hift .to the other ex.treme ·of an :open economy by pursuing either an integrated regional 
-development Strategy or manufacturingindnstrialisation app;.-oach. But these options 
differ in spatial terms. While the integrated regional development strategy will have .to be 
applied on ·the resource frontier, the manufacturing strategy makes best use of the 
locational advantage available in the country as a whole and hence is not site specific. 
Although -there are wide variations within each approach, we ignore these subtleties to 
provide the starkest outline of each approach. 
Agropolitan Development 
As a means of eliminating leakage of surplus, the agropolitan approach aims at 
protecting autonomous territories .or regions from being exploited by the world exchange 
system. This approach, indeed, was a product of two main streams prevailing in the 
1960s and the early 1970s: dependency theory and the Chinese commune model. While 
the dependency school launched a fierce theoretical attack on the world market. system, 
the people's commune model advanced concrete measures to achieve self-reliance. 
Before exploring whether agropolitan theory could be adopted to refine Malaysia's 
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resource frontier strategy, there is a -need .to briefly examine dependency theory and the 
agropolitan theory itself. 
The dependency school perceives .that r:he international exchange systtm operates to 
1he- advantage of capitalist core countries. According to Frank ( 1966), international rrade 
{:reates underdevelopment in developing countries within a global metropolis-satellite 
framework. Consequently, the dependent economy is prevented from realising its own 
·potential surplus. Talcing Latin America as an example, Frank quoted evidence that the 
conrinent was able to achieve a higher rate of development when the metropolis was at 
war or in economic crisis. As soon as the ties in trade and investment were resumed, 
Lalin America's efforts ·towards ·economic independence were 'choked off. Other 
dependency theorists - Furtado {1972), Dos Santos (1970), Sunkel (1969), Santos 
{ 1979) and Amin (1974; 1976) - basically suggested that multinationals are spearheads 
of capitalist core countries which constantly seek 'geographic specialisation' within the 
international division of labour. To an extent, they bring modernisation but not genuine 
economic development. Where limited development is possible in the periphery, 
dominance remains at the centre. Spatially, they consider that secondary centres in the 
periphery facilitate the diffusion of foreign capital and modernisation. The benefits, 
however, are restricted to a small community of elites. 
Parallel to this attack on the world exchange system, an alternative seemed to have 
been found by some Western intellectuals from the Chinese commune system which 
emphasised self-reliance and basic needs. Notably, the commune system did not depend 
much on exports1• The growth centre policy- a tool for spatial domination - had no role 
to play because China was talcing the rural autonomy and 'low-energy' tpproach. This 
concept, in some ways, was in accord with the 'Club of Rome' which attacked on 
resource wastage and depletion, pollution and worldwide energy crisis (see Meadows et 
fil, 1972; Schumacher, 1974; McRobie, 1981). In the pursuit of equity and balanced 
implemented at the height of the campaign called 'The Great Leap Forward' in 1958 and abolished in 
1980. 
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regional growth, locational advantage, generally able to provide higher aggregare 0 utµut. 
wa~ a.lso discarded. Instead. :i ''full' employment policy was adop.ted as a major 
development objective. Apparently, self-re.Jia-nce was an e,_plit:i·t expression .of 
independence. self-confidence and basic needs. It ·relied on the capacity of pe~p1~ 
themselves co invent and generate new Tesourc:es and techniques, increase c:apacit\' to 
:ibsorb them, put chem w socially beneficial uses, maste;r their .own economy .aild hav.e 
their O\lm way of life (Galn.mg, i 980). 
This self-reliant strategy had a strong influence ()n the emergence .of a he.avily 
agricultural-based or 'agropolitan' approach (Friedmann a:nd Dm.1glass, 1975; Friedmann 
and Weaver, 1979; Friedmann, 1987). In 1975, Friedrr.artn ar:id Douglass promulgated 
agropolitan theory. Initially, it was a direct response to ecological constrainrs, to the 
human needs and problems of 'dualistic dependence' of the Third World, intensified by 
the world capitalist economic crisis provoked by oil embargoes at the end of 1973. On 
the basis of self-reliance, agriculture was seen .as a leading or 'propulsive' sector of the 
economy. Later in 1979, the theory was further developed to include the concept of 
selective regional closure of Stohr and Todtling (1977). In order to filter out the negative 
'backwash' effects and to retain the posici:ve 'trickle-down' effects, selec.tive spatial 
closure was introduced to promote territorially organised (horiwnta·l) units and defy the 
functionally organised units so that some decision,·tnaki.ng power from the 'top ·are 
devolved (Friedmann and Weaver, 1979:35). 
In terms of spatial organisation for.agropoli.tan development, Friedmann dismissed 
the growth centre concept he once proposed in the 1960s. A~ an ahernative, .he 
introduced certain adapted elements of urbanism to rural settings, so as to establish a 'city 
in the fields' or 'agropolis'. Exrrapolating from the agropolis is the agropolitan district 
which is a larger socio-economic and political network for social interaction. The labour 
force within the district is to be directed towards an intensified development of natural 
resources. Industries should be agriculturally-oriented. The agropolitan district is linked 
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with d1'e iregional network including larger towns by physical channels of 
commurucatlon. The regional town is of higher order in the urban hi era..::-~· j. 
Administratively, the agropolitan district is to be managed on the basis of self-
govemrnen't, with the local population to decide their own affairs. It is an integrated, self-
ruling unit with sufficient autonomy and economic resources to plan and implement its 
own development, while receiving necessarily financial, material and technical resources 
from the central government. 
In practice, Friedmann and Weaver (1979:189-190) warn, however, 'that this 
'territorial power', if achieved, will need most of the world's population to live at 
unacceptably low levels of material consumption and to engage in production outside the 
exchange economy. This is understandable in that the centre of the capitalist world is 
overwhelmingly in control of technological expertise and innovations. 
Not surprisingly, many critics emerged following these proposals. Richardson 
(1978: 137) asserted that Friedmann's approach was not feasible because it recommended 
communal ownership of land, and self-government on a local level, which was unlikely 
to be acceptable to the mostly authoritarian Third World regimes. The strategy has also 
been under fire on other fronts. It has been dismissed as an attempt to 'leave the countries 
·of the world periphery forever mired in rural backwardness', as a 'failure to come to 
.g.rips with political and economic realities', 'utopian', and characterised by 
'superficiality, if not naivety' (Friedmann, 1985: 156). Also, Friedmann (1985: 155) 
.acknowledged that agropolitan development, as a political strategy, 'requires a 
commitment on [the] part of national elites, and this may be difficult to obtain'. Recently, 
Friedmann (1987:383) has become even less confident about the feasibility of the 
n.gropolitan strategy in recognising the persistent influence of capitalism amidst the crisis 
in a large number of socialist countries: 
'Global interdependency is not likely to unrav~l. It is c~pitalism's 
chief legacy to future generations. ~t so~e pou~t, we will have to 
acknowledge the connection that mev1tably lmks the smalle~t 
political community to the largest, the household to the world'. · 
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Parallel to such criticism of Friedmann, China has abandoned the commune model 
in the early 1980s because of its problems of collective efficiency and for bringing the 
Chinese agricultural economy to the 'brink of collapse' (Hung Ch'i (Red Flag), 1979, 6, 
p; 2). Also, Frank (1984: 176-180) - a one-time champion of the dependency school -
became disenchanted with complete spatial closure as a result of the disastrous attempt by 
th:e K,hm.er Rouge in Kampuchea to promote a 'pure agrarian society', 
Thus, the agropolitan approach has evolved in a climate where intellectuals of the 
bite t9B0s and early 1970s were disillusioned with worldwide energy wastage, 'the 
cfi.chotomy between developed and less developed worlds, and their hope for a more 
.equitable society. With an emphasis placed on basic economic production ar rhe village 
level, the approach offers a more equitable distribution of resources to community 
rnembers. But by isolating from the world economy and shifting to food crops, it would 
iikel~, bring lower standards of living to countries which have a strong reliance on 
exports. The approach also requires substantial power decentralisation to the local level, n 
demand hardly acceptable to many developing countries where cohesive force is still 
badly needed to bind their national territory under one sovereignty. With the review of 
Friedmann and Frank on the practicability of the agropolitan approach, we now move on 
to the other end of the development spectrum to examine a markedly different alternative 
of Denis Rondinelli. 
The Integrated Regional Development Strategy 
Of the two open-end strategies suggested earlier, we now review the integrated 
:regional developmenf approach because its nee-classical orientation can be easily adapted 
to Malaysia's prevailing political economy. If proven appropriate, there would be little 
problem in applying it in the country as political objection can be expected to be minimal. 
This strategy has been developed since the mid-1970s by the United States Agency for 
International Development (USAID) as an alternative to help alleviate rural poverty in the 
Third World. It has also been adopted by the World Bank and other international aid 
agencies. Its influence has now been widespread through the whole developing worl~. 
230 
Aiming at spatial integration of an ordered settlement hierarchy th. · 
, is strategy 1s best 
represented by the works of Denis Rondinelli (1980; 1982; 1983; 1984; 1985; Rondinelli 
and Ruddle 1976; 1978). 
Ronclinelli's concept was derived from Johnson's (1970) idea focused on better 
integradon between farm produce and the market. Through the creation of an integrated 
'economic functional area' between the rural market town and the consuming urban 
centre, benefits should, in theory, trickle down to the small farmers. Rondinelli 
developed Johnson's model funher. Rondinelli's primary concern, however, was the 
poor access of farmers to goods and services, which widened gaps between rich and 
poor regions in developing countries. Hence, he asserted: 
'uneven access to productive resources, social services and 
physical facilities ... poorly aniculated and badly integrated 
spatial systems in which a vast, sprawling primate city or a few 
major metropolitan centres have little or no productive 
relationship to the numerous small villages and hamlets scattered 
over the rural landscape' (Rondinelli and Ruddle, 1978:39). 
To better integrate the lagging rural economy with the national centres, he argued that 
there was a need to establish a three-tier hierarchical system in the rural region: rural 
service centre, small market town and the regional centre. This, he hoped, would remove 
the bottlenecks of service delivery from more important urban centres and the expon of 
agricultural surplus from the rural region to the consumers in the cities, thus creating an 
'integrated system of production and exchange' or the 'functional linkages'. 
Later in 1980, from an empirical study in the B!coi. River Basin of the Philippines, 
Rondinelli reached some conclusions on rural regional devdopment. First, he noted that 
the traditional 'growth centre' approach could only exacerbate rural and urban differences 
w1thin regions without linkages to the scattered villages (Rondinelli, i980:41). Second, 
he saw the importance of decentralisation of investment capital from primate cities and 
metropolitan centres to less developed regions where rural industrialisation and 
infrastructure have to be promoted. This included farm-to-market roads, all-weather 
arterials from market towns to other larger towns and cities. Hence, agribusiness, small 
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and medium-scale industries and local consumer goods using indigenous materials could 
be stimulated. But he did not foresee how local entrepreneurship should be developed 
nor how private capital could be attracted from outside, especially from the metropolitan 
centre (Manila). Indeed, he realised from the study there was a large gap in infrastructure 
and other capital investment between a primate city and a distant economically marginal 
region such as the Bicol Valley Basin. This gap had to be filled up by secondary cities, 
without which diffusion of innovation, goods and services would not reach the mral 
poor. Realising this problem, Rondinelli (1983:12) went on to discuss the importance of 
secondary cities by working on the assumption that: 
'a system of functionally efficient intermediate cities linked to 
larger and smaller urban centres and to a network of rural service 
and market towns can make an important contribution to 
achieving widespread economic growth and an equitable 
distribution of its benefits'. 
In 1984, looking at the national urban network, Rondinelli shifted from 
decentralisation and diffusion over vast geographical areas stressed earlier to 'mutually 
beneficial linkages' between rural and urban sectors. The focus seems to have been 
narrowed down to linkages between a large metropolitan city and its nearby rural regions 
(Rondinelli, 1984: 1-5). Only through urban support, he asserted, could the rural region 
can advance more rapidly. But are Rondinelli's ideas valid for Peninsular Malaysia? 
Before ta.king up this investigation, we have to discuss the third strategy - industrial 
development as an alternative. 
Industrial Development 
Industrialisation has long been the common aspiration and objective of developing 
nations especially since the end of the Second World War. Industrial activities not only 
can absorb an expanding labour force, but also have the potential of achieving a higher 
rate of growth and therefore higher standards of living. But the basic issue remains how 
to industrialise within a world exchange system where technology and trade are 
controlled by the core capitalist nations. 
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With limited financial and technical resources of their own develo · · ' pmg nauons 
!lave to set priorities in their industrial undenakings. Almost without exception, impon-
substitution industrialisation has been an inevitable phase because of the accustomed 
habits of consumption amidst the lo~al population. Domestic production can most easily 
be made on existing consumption ite.rns (Cukor, 1971:94). The impon substitution 
strategy allows developing countries to produce manufactured goods for domestic 
consumption previously .imponed from abroad. Hence, not only is foreign exchange 
saved, it also provides favourable market conditions to local firms by imposing tariff 
:protective measures. But there are also disadvantages. First, because of the limited 
market and relatively low purchase power of local population, the expansion of impon-
substitution development will quickly reach its floor level. Funher expansion will have to 
depend on an export market. At this juncture, the problem begins to arise when 
international competition comes into play. There is no automatic transition from 
production for domestic market to that for export. With higher costs of production 
because of relatively low level of productivity, many products of developing countries 
lend to be more costly than those made in advanced countries. Yet, key markets of these 
products are located in more advanced countries. 
The complexity of transition from impon-substitution industrialisation to export-led 
ir)dustrialisation can be explained using a neo-classical and structural approach 
(Kirkpatrick and Nixson, 1983: 14-26). The critique puc forward by neo-classical 
theorists focuses on the inadequacy of implementation, protective measures and 
inefficient use of comparative advantages. The structuralists or dependency theorists, 
however, pinpoint the origins at the market structure and the highly uneven income 
distribution in developing societies. Despite the differences in interpreting the 'failure' of 
impon-substitution as a means of achieving industrialisation, both schools do not ignore 
the benefits of an outward-looking strategy. The neo-classical theorists, in panicular, 
envisage that export promotion would bring significant changes in aggregate growth in 
developing countries. The key strategy, however, relies on how developing nations fit 
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them.selves into the world market structure, making full us~ of their comparative 
.advantage. 
Since the 1970s, much progress has been achieved in some Asian countries by 
pursuing .an expon-oriented industrialisation strategy. Having a similar open economy, 
Malaysia's problems and potential in adopting such a strategy will be studied. First, 
however, we need to examine whether the agropolitan approach and integrated regional 
development strategy are appropriate as alternatives of development in Pahang Tenggara 
and Kesedar. 
2. ALTERNATIVES FOR MALAYSIA? 
The three alternatives discussed above need further examination to detennine if they 
are feasible within Malaysia's socio-political framework. This is important because 
strategies will remain plans of actions if they are not supported by ruling political parties. 
Overall Inappropriateness of the Agropolitan Approach 
The agropolitan approach stipulates a wide range of conditions.. Some compatibility 
is found between this approach and the FELDA organisation, clearly reflected in the 
·organisation of production units. While the agropolitan approach promotes 'social 
power' of the rural residents in determining their daily affairs (Friedmann, 1988:216-
217), FELDA has identical organisations known as the JKKR and the 'block system'. 
Under a centrally guided system, FELDA settlers enjoy cenain democratic rights by 
selecting their own 'block leaders'. Through 'block leaders', the problems are passed on 
to the FEWA management and corrections made. In compliance with their traditional 
mutual help system (gotong royong), settlers within a common block work in a team. 
The return from harvest is basically shared among members consisting of twenty to 
twenty-five individuals. As our findings show, settlers have been capable of responding 
positively to this central guidance. But there are many incompatibilities if the agropolitan 
strategy is applied in Pahang Tenggara and Kesedar. 
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First, the basic needs concept which the agropolitan strategy stresses implies direct 
·consumption of food the rural residents produce. Only surplus is sold to the market. 
Pahang Tenggara and Kesedar, however, have op(~ed for cash crop production (oil palm 
and rubber) and relatively little food is grown locally. Much of Kesedar's land, 
moreover, consists of hilly terrain unsuitable for growing food. Consequently, FELDA 
settlers meet their basic needs through purchasing the necessities from outside the 
regions. 
Second, Pahang Tenggara and Kese:dar are two regions involving the interest of a 
varied group of people: state estates, private estates, smallholders and, most 
significantly, the FELDA settlers. Agropolitan strategy demands collective land 
ownership, a crucial issue in conflict with the basic principle of FBLDA schemes and 
other )ncerest groups. The desire of FELDA settlers for individual land titles has always 
been strong as land has been a key factor attracting them to join the schemes. Indeed, it is 
so strong that the government was forced in October 1988 to abolish the 'share system' 
after introducing it in 1985. 
The third issue is technical. It is impossible for Malaysia to consume all its cash-
crop produce of the resource frontier regions without exporting it. It may be possible to 
change part of the present cash crops to food crops. But this is likely to lower the living 
standards of the frontier residents - a risk which political elites will not consider. 
Furthermore, practical problems would likely arise if FELD A settlers are allowed, at least 
at the present stage, to manage their land, water and energy resources. Without adequate 
help from the government authorities, such management is likely to be sub-standard, 
resulting in a fall in crop yields2• 
Fourthly, effective administrative devolution recommended by the agropolitan 
strategy seems difficult as experience in the past has indicated that technic:al expertise has 
2 This view was expressed by an experienced FELDA regional manager in Gua Musang (based on 
interview in January 1988). 
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been always inadequate ar local and regional levels. Moreover, Malaysia has a strongly 
centralisoo federal system which empowers the central government to have full control of 
all revenues and monies recc!ived through taxation and other means. Regional programs 
have to depend on federal funding which has a strong political orientation. Yet, fund 
allocations have long been based on federal-state relationships and subject to the 
influence of key political figures of the ruiing parties (Nik Mahmood, 1984 ). Such 
constraints emerge often in the process of implementing regional projects within 
individual states. Consequently, it can be foreseen that the extent of administrative 
devolution may have to ~ subject to not only available allocations but the preference of 
location considered as top priority. With these constraints in adopting the agropolitan 
approach in Malaysia, attention is now turned to the open end of the development 
spectrum. 
Inapplicability of Rondinelli's Strategy 
The integrated development strategy also has many problems if applied to Pahang 
Tenggara and Kesedar. Our case study shows that these two planned regions are 
dependent upon oil palm and rubber, whose market is strongly international. Except for a 
small proportion of smallholders (less than 6 per cent), the two commodities are handled 
directly by the state-sponsored and private estates for their processing and subsequent 
sale outside the regions. Thus, the three-tier settlement hierarchical system defined by 
Rondinelli is inappropriate. Above the rural service centre, there is a missing link to the 
regional centre. The market town does not exist because it is not required. Consequently, 
the designated regional centres in Muadzam Shah and Gua Musang do not proc~ss or 
handle settlers' produce .. Further, the rural service centres like Bandar Tun Razak and 
Ciku can satisfy the settlers' in many aspects in the light of their relatively low income 
levels. 
In his research, Rondinelli has assumed the existence of very low standards of 
infrastructure and road communications in developing countries. The case in Peninsular 
Malaysia is quite different. In fact, except in remote villages still dominated by 
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subsistence agriculture, Peninsular Malaysia possesses a far superior infrastructure and 
facilities than in most other developing countries. Such an advantage allows rural 
.commodities to be efficiently exported to the international market via metropolitan towns 
with a population of more than 75,000. This operates at the expense of most small and 
medium-sized towns. Earlier, Osborn (1974) conducted a study on the Malaysian middle 
cities where he observed that .the councry's high-standard transportation systems had 
provided dynamism to some major centres. But at the same time they had also depressed 
-the production sub-systems in some other smaller, less central and agriculture-oriented 
centres. A similar remark was made by Lee ( 1979:57) relating to some Malaysian small 
towns which declined because they could not assume the role of a market town. Hence, 
because of the internal economic structure, the material h :mdling system, and their 
international linkages, an efficient infrasrructure linkage system works not necessarily in 
favour of small and secondary towns as Rondinelli has argued. 
An identical phenomenon also emerges in regions where there is a combination QI 
food and cash crops. In a study undertaken by Cheng Ban Lian in Kedah (see Salih, 
1978:142-144), it was found that the distribution function of small towns was restricted. 
From the upper-level centres, these small towns received consumer goods but they did 
not provide any goods in return. Cheng gave two reasons. First, rubber and rice 
marketing channels bypassed them and second, traditional artifacts had declined because 
cheaper urban manufactured substitutes had been more competitive. Thus, in order to 
benefit from an agriculture-based region whose nature resembles that of Pahang 
Tenggara and Kesedar, a secondary city should have a highly competitive base to supply 
a range of goods and services needed by residents of that region. In this sense, Segamat, 
Bahau and Gua Musang have largely benefited. 
Rondinelli also has a strong belief in the diffusion of innovations. This diffusion is 
considered to pass down from the main city and eventually modernise the rural towns 
and raise their productive capacity. It has been rrue in~ofar as agricultural productivity is 
concerned. The nature of the resource frontiers, however, confines the diffusion mainly 
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to agriculture as the conversion of a~ultural innovations into non-agricultural 
entrepreneurship has proved to be difficult, though the latter is essential for urbanisation. 
It is, therefore, not surprising to observe that industrial development within Pahang 
Tenggara and Kesedar is merely confined to resource-based plants. As our findings 
show in Chapters 6 and 7, rural industrialisation in the frontier regions had not worked to 
any significant extent. The rural settlements remain basically dormitory quarters of 
seniers engaged in producing raw materials. The great majority of the second generation 
youths 'have to be absorbed outside Pahang Tenggara and Kesedar. 
In rum, both the agropolitan approach and integrated regional development strategy 
are not appropriate for refining Malaysia's resource frontier strategy. Another alternative, 
therefore, needs to be found outside the frontier regions so as to absorb the surplus 
population from the frontier regions. The exodus to existing metropolitan and smaller 
centres is expected to be substantial in the next twenty years. Indus.try is a ·rea:;onable 
.choice. 
3. THE INDUSTRIALISATION OPTION 
Resource frontier development has approached its final stage in Peninsul:ir 
Malaysia. There is little suitable frontier land left for further expansion and the pressure 
for land conservation has also grown stronger for ecological reasons. Older established 
reseuled zones, moreover, have ceased to be frontiers in the passing of time. Frontier 
expansion has almost come to a halt. Neither the agropolitan ·nor the integrated regional 
development strategies offer Malaysia much hope for future development on its frontiers. 
As such, industrialisation within existing centres looms as a real alternative for tackling 
·the country's continued problems of poverty and demand for job opponunities in the near 
future. As an option in an open economy, manufacturing industrialisation fits into 
Malaysia's 'state-capitalist model' (White, I 984; McGee, 1986), and it is also an 
acceptable option for the present system of government. 
238 
!' 
~ 
I 
I 
' 
Malaysia's recent industrial development has been impressive, marked by its 
gtowth in value added- an annual growth rate of 12.5 per cent was recorded between 
'1970 and 1980 (Government of Malaysia, 1981 :294 ). The impact has been so substantial 
tha'c the country can now be considered a near-industrialised nation joining Asia's four 
·Rewly industrialised countries (NICs) of South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and 
Singapore (McGee, 1986; Ariff and Hill, 1985). From Independence in 1957 to the mid-
1970s, industrial growth was chiefly derived from import-substitution and the expansion 
of domestic demand in consumption, intermediate and capital goods. Since the mid-
i 970s, however, the backbone of Malaysia's industrial growth has shifted to .consumer 
durables and, increasingly, has been infused with the export-oriented industries which 
irte iargely foreign-controlled. Three key questions need to be ra.ised: what is the potential 
for labour absorption in industry; what are the constraints and prospects of a deepened 
industrialisation; and what are the implications of industrialisation for tegional 
development? Before any answers can b.e given, we have -ta examine the structure o.f 
industry i:n the country. 
Prese'nt Structure of Industry 
·on the basis of ownership, there are three types of industry in Malaysia~ 
indigenous private-owned small industry, state-owned large and heavy industry and, 
foreign-induced export-oriented manufacturing industry .. 
A small industry is a manufacturing finn which has fixed assets of less than 
$500,000 or engages less than 50 full-time workers (Chee, 1986:3). The 'Incentive Act 
of 1958' promoted import-substitution and had helped the domestic small industry 
expand substantially through the 1960s. Given the nature of this indusrry3, its products 
are mainly for domestic consumption. Few (less than 10 per cent) have potential for the 
export market because its relatively inferior quality, production costs and prices are not 
3 Most of the finns arc small and are involved in rice mills, manufacture of spices, curry powder, 
brooms, brushes, cooking oils, ice, furniture, wooden and can containers, wood and cork products, 
lime, plaster, non-metallic mineral products, motor vehicle bodies. noodles, confectionery, chocolate, 
bakeries, rubber products, basic meial, garments and other manufactures. 
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competitive (Chee, 1986:30; FEER, 14 February 1985) In 1982 11 · . · • sma rndustnes with 
Jess ·than 50 employees engaged some 118,000 workers Despite the · · capacity for 
gen.erating employment, owners of small industries are normally not looked upon as 
'entrepreneurs' but little more than 'backyard workshop operators'. 
In sharp contrast to the small enterprises are heavy industries backed by substantial 
£tate capital. Basically, the government's large-scale industries were initiated in the mid-
1970s, and the creation of Heavy Industries Corporation of Malaysia (HICOM) in I 9&0 
marked the launching of a fully ·state-owned heavy indusrry. In an attempt to create a 
broad indigenous heavy industrial .base by the end of the century, HICOM aims. at a long-
term program to transform radically the national economy highly dependent upon a 
vulnerable commodity cycle. By September 1983, total fedem1 invesrrnent in heavy 
industry was $3 billion, largely supported by oil revenues and intemadona.1 loans (FEER, 
15 September 1983; 14 February 1985). 
The thir.d type of industry is basically foreign-owned or controlled. Before the 
introduction of the Free Trade Zones (FfZs) in the early 1970s~ foreign industries used, 
on the whole. low levels of technology for pro"ducing food, beverages and tobacco, and 
basic metal products for domestic consumption (O'Brien, 1989:3). Since 1972 however 
generous incentives and the provision of free trade zones
4
, industrial estates (IEs) and 
li:censed manufacturing warehouses (LMWs) began to attract footloose multinational 
industries to Malaysia's strategic points near to the ports in Penang, Melaka, Selangor 
nnd Johor. 
By early 1984, there were 96 industrial estates and 8 free trade zones in the 
country, producing more than half of total manufacturing exports - with inte1est focused 
·on electronics and electrical industries as a result of an international shift of locations 
from technologically more advance': re;,ions. All the above three types of industry, 
4 Firms in the free trade zones are entitled to duty-free imports of raw materials and capital equipment, 
concessions in land and tax. duties, and relaxed customs formalities. 
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however. have their constraints and prospects affected by either d · 1. omesnc po icy or the 
1ntemational investment climate. 
Cn.r.rent Constraints and Prospects on Malaysia's Industry 
'The small industry is labour-intensive, engaging an unskilled or semi-skilled labour 
force. Such enterprises are mainly run as family businesses and mostly owned by ethnic 
.Chinese. Since 1970, within the strongly interventionist nature of the NEP. the share of 
production ·of small industty has reduced. In contrast, firms with fifty workers or more 
have expanded in proportion both in employment size and gross output (Ariff and Hill, 
1985:167). 
About 80 per cent of the 17 ,000 manufacturing firms in the country are in the small 
industry category (O'Brien, 1989:8). Constrained by their weak position to compete 
overseas, the Industrial Coordination Act of 19755 and lack of modern equipment, many 
Chinese firms choose to remain small or divert their capital to other businesses. Indeed, a 
substantial number of small machinery and engineering enterprises traditionally closely 
associated with large industries have stagnated (FEER, 14 February 1985). State-owned 
heavy industrial plants, being capital intensive, have the disadvantage of providing 
relatively few jobs. Because of a premature focus on heavy industry, inefficient 
allocation of resources affecting other resource-based industries has resulted (Ariff and 
Hill, 1985:235). Also, the state-run heavy industry has shunned low or medium 
technology. Other public enterprises6 have been created primarily to provide top-level 
managerial jobs to Bumiputras7 and to prepare for future take-over of equity shares 
acquired either from foreign-owned corporations or established with public funds. 
Highly protected and short of management skill, they have yet to perfonn well. Like local 
big private entrepreneurs, they have not been actively invol".ed in the manufacturing of 
5 
6 
7 
On 24 October 1986, the Act was relaxed. Only industrial firms with 75 full-time employees and 
above or a paid-up capital in excess of S2.5 million were required to have a license (i.e need to have a 
share holding of at least 30 per cent for the Malays and other indigenous people.) 
Estimated to be more than seven hundred of them. 
Literally means 'sons of the soil' - Malays and other indigenous people. 
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low and medium technology. Their interest has been focused on acquisition of shares in 
the corporate sector and areas where wealth accumulation is faster than manufacturing. 
The foreign-induced export-oriented industries accelerated :i.fter the mid-1970s. 
World trade recovery since 1987 has brought substantial foreign investment t0 
Malaysia's electronics industry, notably from the United States, Japan, Taiwan and 
Singapore. In 1988, largely because of the electronics industry, manufacturing became 
the largest foreign exchange earner (Table 8.1), a.nd Malaysia is now the largesr producer 
of semi-conductors outside Japan and the United States. The same year also saw the 
value of manufacturing exports achit:ve a record-high level, reaching nearly $27 billion or 
almost half of the total export value. Nonetheless, our main concern is: how good is its 
potential in labour absorption? 
Table 8.1 
Share of Exports in Malaysia by Percentage, 
1970-1988 
Commodity 1970 1980 1985 
1988 
Manufacturing 11. l 20.6 32.8 
48.6 
Rubber 33.4 17.1 
7.6 9.5 
Forestrya 16.3 12.9 
10.3 10.5 
Palm oil 5.1 9.1 
10.4 8.2 
Crude petroleum 3.2 25.3 
22.9 11.1 
Otherb 30.9 15.0 
16.:Q 12.1 
Total 100.0 100.0 
100.0 100.0 
Value 5,163 28,445 
38,017 55,334 
($ M:llion) 
Note: a raw log and saw timber 
b tin, cocoa, copper, canned pineapple, gold etc. 
Calculated from Government of Malaysia, 1976:20-21; 1981:206-207; 1989:169 and 194-
~: 
195 .. 
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Despite huge foreign investment and expansion in the electronics industry, there is 
no assurance of sustainability. The current boom has been a result of several factors: 
soaring land prices in Japan and the NICs, multinational globalisation strategy (Nakajo. 
1980; Chen, 1987) and the appreciation of the yen. The situation could be fragile once 
the boom is over as multinational capital is very mobile. Malaysia's presem comparative 
advantages may be lost when other neighbouring countries offer better conditions of 
investment. Moreover, little transfer of :technology has been achieved - Malaysian 
workers are primarily engaged in low-skilled labour intensive production (O'Brien, 
1989: 13; Chee, 1987). They absorb, in fact, only a small part of the whole sem1-
conductor manufacturing. Further, the potential of employment generation in the 
electronics industry and linkage with local economy remain relatively sma11
8
. Thus. 
constrained by conditions of labour quality and other urban infrastructure and services, 
there is no foreseeable scope for future foreign investment in the frontier regions like 
Pa.hang Tenggara and Kesedar. 
Hence, the recipe of industrialisation has to be sought at home. The government 
can assist in inducing local capital to invest in manufacturing using resource-based 
materials and, at later stage, in the high technology. As Kamal Salih
9 
argued, the public 
sector must not just create 'a narrow band of tycoons living off investments' (Straits 
Times Weekly, 21 January 1989). Speaking on the Malaysian Incorp:"'rated Concept in 
1983, Mahathir, (Mohammad Nor et al, 1984:4-6)- Prime Minister of Malaysia- also 
noted that the public enterprises had more responsibility than the creation of jobs: 
'The government cannot forever run [businer.s] inst~t~tions in 
order to sustain or create employment ... Malaysia s future 
depends on improved productivity and the ability to sell more and 
more goods to the world'. 
8 In 1982, despite an export value of $4.7 billion, the total emp!Clymcnt gcne~tcd in the Free Trad~ 
Zones and the Licensed Manufacturing Warehouses accounted for only 97 ,650 JObs or 12.3 per cent o 
the manufacturing sector. It also used Jess than 5 per cent of materials from local sources (Warr. 
1986:189-194). 9 · h th" k tank f r the gov1'""ment 
Executive-director of the Malaysian Institute of Economic Researc • a m -
0 ~·" 
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L!.1 .his foreword to the 'Mid-Term Review of the Fifth Malays· Pl • (G ia an overnmem of 
Mal.aysia, 1989), Mahathir promised to reduce the role of the govemm · ent m commerce 
.und ind us.try, and stressed that the m.ain scurce of economic dynamism should come 
f.ro:m the .Private sector. 
With .a very -open economy, Malaysia's future will be strongly associated with 
· international trade. This implies that a firm commitment to productivity is needed, and 
locations with the bes.t conditions will have to be chosen fo.r indus·trial activities. Clearly, 
such .a strategy will have severe consequences and is likely to lead to spatial polarisation. 
But there are also positive results - more ethnic integration in existing metropolitan 
centres as a result of the ·exodus from mono-ethnic rural regions such as Pahang 
Tenggara and Kesedar. Furthermore, in terms of poverty eradication, a more rapid 
industrialisation process will create more resources which could be used for less 
favoured groups, irrespective of ethnic origins and whether they are from rural or urban 
areas. Thus, the way forward for Malaysia will be an accelerated ind.ustrialisatjon, 
concentrated in areas with locational advantages. 
Implications ·for Regional Development 
Having accepted that industrialisation should be located in places enjoying 
comparative advantages (basically in the present cores) instead of where it is most needed 
(the periphery), a new issue arises: what impact will this industrialisation have on 
regional development and the frontier regions of Peninsular Malaysia; are we suggesting 
5patial polarisation as a prei;:;rred model to the welfare-oriented redistribution so hotly 
pursued as 'spatial justice' in the 1970s? We may be accused of leaving out the frontiers 
completely and not doing anything about their industrialisation and tackling the future of 
the FELDA land schemes10• But the resource frontier strategy now looks as if it is 
something of the past. In the first place, the 'Investment Incentive Act of 1968' (followed 
IO Th b b ck the cash crop plots from I.he settlers and operate on the basis of joint-
e government may uy a . affi th ultimate exodus of most of the 
ventures or complete privatisation. But such move will not ect e 
second generation youth. 
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·by NEP) aimed at stimulating indusaial decentralisation b t h" · u t ts was unnmely _ hardlv 
·ten years after an early phase of impon-substirution. . 
In 1970, there was no adequate evidence that industriali~ation in Peninsular 
\falaysia had already reached a highly centralised level and ·hat 1 · 1 agg omerauon 
diseconomies in existing major centres asked for dispersal to the remote frontiers in 
Pahang Tenggara and Ke.sedar. At that time, the developmental stage in the metropolitan 
:eentres of Malaysia was inadequate indusaialisation and nor. too much. Unfortunately, 
besides abundant development literature in vogue in that period for advanced nations 
(trecause of industrial congestion in the core areas), there is 110 evidence to support such 
necessity in Malaysia. Consequently, it is worthwhile to refer to a self-critical statement 
.of Richardson (1980:72): 
'A r~gional policymaker or planner in a developing country 
relymg on the products of regional economic research in the 
United States is likely to be more misled than helped.' 
The indusaial decentralisation policy as i.t has been implememed under the NEP is not 
appropriate for Malaysia. Industrial dispersal, in the foreseeable future, should be left to 
market forces with government regulatory measures. The key issue is to examine when 
polarisation reversal will likely occur in metropolitan centres of Peninsular Malaysia. 
This, however, remains a focus for future research 
11
• 
In sum, the options for Malaysia are limited. Industrialisation, despite its problems, is a 
feasible alternative for substantial future growth. For some rime yet, especially due to the 
highly competitive nature of the global manufacturing, it will have to be located where 
·economic efficiency, rather than social equity, is the main consideration. The frontiers 
will be excluded and regions such as Pahang Tenggara and Kesedar will continue to 
produce agricultural products which will feed into the international trac1e and industry. 
11 Frohloff-Kulke's (1988) research showed signs of polarisation reversal ,,\ Peninsular Malay_sia 
between 1970 and 1980 based on selected socio-economic factors. Most of the selected factors leading 
to improved standards in Jess developed districts were. indeed. the results of government invesunem 
on infrastructure and facilities there. There is yet the need to investigate why industrial firms would 
not choose to invest outside established centres without incentives. 
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The Three Strategies Reconsidered 
Initially, we examined two alternatives to refine Malaysia's resource frontier 
strategy. At the closed end of the spectrum was the agropolitan approach suggested by 
John Friedmann in 1975. To protect an autonomous region from surplus leakage, this 
approach recommends the policy of self-reliance and basic needs by disconnecting from 
exploitive external linkages - thus avoiding wealth disparity between individuals, 
resource depletion, poUution and energy crisis. Instead of relying on the growth centre 
concept to stimulate local growth, Friedmann proposes to set up a 'city in the field' 
where urban management is determined on the basis of self-government. Strongly bu.ilr 
on the Chinese commune system, however, such 'territorial autonomy' would have to 
depend on food crops primarily for local consumption and would likely lower the 
standards of living of the participants. Further, it demands -.:ommunal ownership of land 
and least interference from the central government. These conditions will not be 
acceptable to Malaysia's present government which has inherited a very open economy 
and a system of private ownership. 
At the open-end of the economy, the integrated regional development strategy 
forwarded especially by Denis Rondinelli attracts the greatest attention. This strategy 
attributes the root cause of widespread rural poverty in the Third World to the lack of 
functional linkages between metropolitan centres and rural areas. According to 
Rondinelli, infrastructure and capital investment will help rural development by 
stimulating market demand and facilitating the access of farm produce to urban 
consumers. Hence, a three-tier hierarchical system is required. Nevertheless, the nature 
of Malaysia's resource frontier settlements is inappropriate to apply this strategy. As 
many case studies have indicated, Malaysia's relatively good infrastructure and the 
market-oriented cash cropping basically do not require small market towns. Intermediate 
or secondary towns may or may not handle the rural produce, depending upon the type 
of services required or the nature of agricultural production. Consequently, while some 
secondary towns either prosper or decline, the metropolitan centres continue to benefit 
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.from the rural regions producing surpluses. Without an appropn"ate alt·· r· fi ~.ma ive to re me 
:the resource frontier strategy, we move on to investigate industrial expu~L''n outside the 
frontier regions as a means to provide jobs to the growing population in Pahang 
Tenggara and Kesedar. 
Manufacturing industry has experienced rapid growth in the last three decades. Of 
'the three types of industry, the export-oriented electronics industry has made t!ie greatest 
progress. Proportionally, the private-owned small industry - constituting 80 per cent of 
;ill industrial firms - has declined, however, for lack of incentives and the drive to 
compete for oversea markets while the state-owned heavy industry has suffered 
substantial losses. Other public enterprises and local private capital have shown little 
interest in the manufacturing industry. Despite the recent boom in electronics investment 
from multinationals, the future is uncertain because their capital is highly mobile and site-
selective, depending upon the comparative advantages of the host countries. Further, 
they use very few local materials and allow little transfer of technology. Consequently, 
Malaysia's future of industrial development needs to rely on its resource-based light 
industry. Once this basis is consolidated, local capital can be directed towards high 
technology. 
In view of current global competition in the manufacturing industry, Malaysia has 
'to dispense with its resource frontier strategy. In the foresee~ble future, the frontier 
regions will have to be bypassed in the new wave of industrialisation - spatial equity has 
already become a casualty of the new pursuit of economic growth and efficiency. 
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CONCLUSION 
Using the Malaysian regions of Pahang Tenggara and Kesedar as case studies, the 
.thesis has examined the consequences of applying an urban-industrial growth pole theory 
derived from the West in the frontier regions of the developing world. Initially, the 
origins of resource frontier strategies are traced. Immediately after the Second World 
War, the fear of Communist expansion in the ~·';":st:;rn oloc led economists to formulate a 
series of theories to guide the growth of the underdeveloped world. The need to trigger 
development across geographical space produced the growth pole or growth centre 
theory. Before it could be transferred to the developing world, some adaptation was 
necessary. Having weak industrial bases but being rich in natural resources, many 
developing countries such as Brazil and Venezuela modified the theory to suit their own 
needs and constraints. Thus, agriculture or resource based resource frontier strategies 
emerged on the development frontier. 
Malaysia has also been the target of these modified growth models. Having 
inherited an uneven spatial economy from its colonial past coinciding with imbalanced 
wealth distribution along ethnic lines, the resource frontier strategy has been used under 
the country's New Economic Policy as a tool to induce urbanisation of the Malays, and 
lessen social, regional and ethnic inequalities. Consequently, resource frontier regions, 
Pahang Tenggara and Kesedar, were targeted under this new rural urbanisation strategy. 
Our case studies of these two regions show that little urbanisation has been achieved. Oil 
palm and n!bber were used as 'propulsive force' to boost the economic base of the 
frontier settlements but they served principally the interest of the world market and local 
metropolitan centres. Little surplus was retained within the producing regions. Though 
:;0c2 _:ettlements had more t_han 10,000 population, they remained basically rural in 
character. At the household level, most settlers improved their material standards of 
living after moving - income levels, food quality, housing, assets and land. There was 
some success in relieving the incidence of poverty. Yet, the progress was unstable 
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' e ivrng standards of the because of strong fluctuations in commodity prices· and th l' · 
· • s were es1gned to settlers remained at a relatively low level Funher the land scheme d · 
· r government imp.rove the welfare of the first generation - the original settlers Except fio 
services and other secondary and tertiary opponunities supplying basic services to local 
settlers, relatively few non-agricultural jobs h:h'e been created in the settlements. 
Consequently, a large proportion of the second generation youth will have to leave when 
they enter the labour market. 
!ndeed, much Malay urbanisation between 1970 and 1985 - one of the primary 
objectives of the New Economic Policy - occurred in the metropolitan cities, especially in 
.the conurbation of Kuala Lumpur-Petaling Jaya. It is in metropolitan centres that jobs 
Iiave to be created for rural youth expected to arrive in great numbf in the next twenty 
years. Industrial expansion will have to be focused as a main sou .. e of job provision. 
Currently, public action is needed to encourage capital investment to establish finns as a 
means to provide jobs and training facilities within existing urban centres. An untimely · 
intervention to induce industrial dispersal to the frontier areas will only result in a waste 
of resources. A polarisation reversal - which will bring more balanced spatial 
development - has to be based initially on a more efficient industrial development. 
~- Main Findings of the Thesis 
This study of the resource frontier strategy in Mah~y.•:la has d.liowed us to draw 
useful lessons by considering the issue within a broad theoretical context of human 
resource development. Since the eighteenth century, ~ey development theories have 
emerged and faded. But they have remained basically the monopoly of the \Vestem core 
nations. Developing nations have endured not only in material poverty but also h a 
poverty of theory. They have been in a perpetual state of theoretical dependence, reliant 
upon ideas imported from core nations for adaptation to suit (often) the neerls of 
dominating interest groups. With the intemational aid institutions acting as diffusing 
agents, development concepts, such as resource frontier strategies, cut across different 
continents. Having identical training backgrounds, both international consultants and 
:;_> 
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o ogy and approach. their host country counterparts have shared a common method l 
Consequently, for example, an untimely industrial dispersal was planned and 
implemented in the resource frontier regions of Malaysia in the early 1970s. 
Yet, the application of resource frontier strategy cannot be studied in isolation. It is 
an integral part of the global politics. The strategy is closely associated with the world 
market system which ultimately determines success and failure. Constrained by political 
op:tians, planners help impose the top-down objectives (rural urbanisation on Malaysian 
frontiers) upon the recipients - the. FELDA settlers. As implementors appointed by 
politicians, their primary .task is to put government policies into practice. 1 heir 
perfonnance cannot be assessed, however, because development programs are decided 
by the central government and are out of their control. 
Frontier settlers have been recruhed from the peasantry to become cash crop 
farmers whose basic needs are met through a world exchange system. Their response to 
imposed objectives have been spontaneous, in accordance with daily needs and as 
expressed in their mobility, work duties and obligations towards family and children. 
Divergence in objectives between politicians and settlers has oeen substantial. Indeed, it 
mirrors effectively the success or failure of government policies. 
Resource frontier development has had trickle-up effects on metropolitan and 
intermtillate centres. The intensity of surplus leakage which these centres have been able 
to intercept is, however, uneven and selective, depending on the type of services they 
offer to the frontier regions. Subject to the control of the metropolitan centres, the newly 
emerging frontier settlement pattern cannot modify, at least for a period of time, the · 
existing national urban system to any significant scale. 
Resource frontiers have been a place of opponunity and challenge. Yet the frontier 
per se is a concept of transition. It ceases to exist once established. New frontier.; need to 
be opened up if the concept is to survive. The limits have been reached in Peninsular 
Malaysia after thirty years of pushing back the tropical forests and replacing them with 
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plantation crops. Despite large revenues derived from cash cropping, the ecological 
consequences have been serious. Pressure is mounting from both national and 
international conservationist groups who are determined to put a halt to the frontier 
plunder in at least Peninsular Malaysia. Consequently, the time has come ro end the 
res.ource frontier strategy and tum our attention to improving the lives and prospects of 
Those who inhabit in existing urban and rural regions. 
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APPENDIX 0.1 
5a.rvey ·Questionnaire -- Comparing Settler's Past and Present Status 
in Pahang Tenggara and Kesedar 
A. SET1LER'S PREVIOUS STATUS (BEFORE SHIFTING) 
1. Place .of Origin: __ ........... __ ~__._~ {State) __ .._._.,.._.... ...... 
2, Land Holding Size: _____ hectare(s},. 
OR 
lf none, land size owned by parents:_~~~ hectares~ 
Main crop·: __ .___~ 
Other crops: ____ ~--~--; 
Livestock kept (in number): Chicken ( ), Duck ( ), Goat ( ), Cow ( ), Pig { ). 
3. Occupation and Income of Household Members: 
a. Household head's main occupation:_~ ___ ....... ~ 
Estimated monthly income: $ __ , 
b. Secondary occupation (if any): _____ ...... , 
Estimated monthly income: $.~---
:e. Wife's occupation: ______ __... 
Estimated monthly income: $ __ , 
d. Any child's occupation: ___ ........ _. 
Estimated monthly income: $. ____ . 
Total household monthly income: $_...~-
4. Previous House Conditions: 
·a. House type 
(i) wooden wall with atap roof ( ), 
(ii) wooden wall and roof with galvanised zinc/asbestos ( ), 
(iii) brick wall and roof with galvanised zinc/asbestos ( ), 
(iv) brick wall with tiled roof ( ), 
b. House age: _years 
c. Did you own it? Yes/No 
d. If you rented it, the monthly rental was $ __ _ 
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5. Facilities and Amenities 
a. Distance from home (km) 
Primary High 
.school school 
Mosque/ 
praying 
house 
b. (i} Water supply by~--~­
:{ii) House .lighting by -----
6. Household Possessions (in .number) 
Health 
centre 
Shops Public 
transpon 
Radio ( ), Television ( ), Video ( ), Bicycle ( ), Motorcycle { ), Car { ), 
Sewing machine ( ), Refrigerator ( ), Washing machine ( ), 
Cooking1 by gas/ kerosene/firewood 
B. SETTLER'S PRESENT STATUS (AFrER SHIFfING) 
1. Date of AJ.Tival:. ___ _ 
8. Household Head's Educational Level: 
a. No fonnal education ( ). 
b. Primary school, standard ~-· 
t. High school, form __ 
9. Household Size 1/ 2/ 3/ 4/ 5/ 6/ 7 / 8/ 9/ 10/ l 1/ 12 
Children 
Member 
Ae 
Husband Wife 
Children's situation 
1 
10. Reasons for Joining the Scheme: 
2 3 4 
a .. _______________ _ 
c .. ______________ _ 
1 Delete whichever is inappropriate 
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.Q._ . 
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11. }lave Any of Your Relatives Joined Other Resettlement S·chemes'! Yes/ No 
if yes, how many?.( ) and where? _ _.....~__........__..........,--..-...--------~-~-
rz. Pregent Living Conditions 
.a. Land size:_ hectares. 
Vlhatcrop: ~ 
b. Do you still own land elsewhere? Yes./No 
.if yes, size: . hectares and; crop: ............. ----"---~ 
t. Livestock kept (in number): Chicken ( ), D.uck { ). Goat.( )., Co-w { ). 
u. lncome 
t Household head's main occupation ..........,,___.,..._._....._.... ......... ~ 
Monthly income$-~~-
ii. Secondary occupation _____ ............. ___,_ 
Monthly income $~~~-
iii. Wife's occupation __ _._......,..._.....---
Monthly income $ __ ..... 
iv. Children's occupation. __ _,___ _ _ 
Monthly income $_....--
v. Total income $ ----
:e. How long is your repayment period .to the FELDA 
loan? years, 
How many years left? _years. 
Your monthly repayment amount: $ __ _ 
13. Travel Distance, Workin Time and Trans ore to Work 
Member Husband Wife Child 1 
Distance (km) 
Working hours 
Transport by 
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Child 2 Child 3 
14. Household Possessions (in number) 
Radio ( ), Television ( ), Video ( ), Bicycle ( ), Motorcycle ( ) c ( ) , ar , 
Sewing machine ( ), Refrigerator ( ), Washing machine ( ), 
Cooking2 by gas/ kerosene/firewood ( ) 
15. Household Expenditure Pattern (Malaysian Ringgit per Month) 
1tem 
Rice 
Other food 
Cigarettes 
(or tobacco) 
House maintenance 
&repaira 
Clothing & footwearb 
Education for 
childrenb 
Total 
Amount($) Item 
Pn vate transport 
(maintenanceb & fuel) 
Public transportb 
Lighting 
(fuel/electricity) 
Water supply 
Entertainment 
Ceremonies 
R 
. b 
· emittance 
Amount($) 
Note: a Expenses incurred since moving in. 
b On a yearly basis and the monthly expenses are obtained after dividing by twelve. 
16. Frequency, Means and Purpose of Visiting Nearby Towns 
Town 
Naine 
A Series of 
Selected Towns 
Frequency 
(Times /week 
/month/year) 
2 Delete whichever is inappropriate 
Means of 
Transport 
Purpose of 
Visit 
17. Corn par.:. to the Place of Origin, State Whether th..: Presen c Area is --
Much Better (1), Slightly Better (2), About the Same (3), 
Slightly Worse (4), Much Worse (5) in terms of: 
a. Income I/ 2/ 3/ 4/ 5 
Comment. ________ ~-----------
b. Housing 1/ 2/ 3/ 4/ 5 
Comment. ___________________ _ 
c. Educational facilities 1/ 2/ 3/ 4/ 5 
Comment·-----------~----~~~~ 
d. Religious and communcal facilities 1/ 2/ 3/ 4/ 5 
Comment·--------~-----·----~-
e. Public transport I/ 2/ 3/ 4/ 5 
Comment ___________________ _ 
f. Living environment l/ 2/ 3/ 4/ 5 
Comrnent ______ ~-------------
g. Food supply and auality 1/2/3/ 4/ 5 
Comment ___________________ _ 
h. Marketing of home-grown food produce (if any) 1/ 2/ 3/ 4/ 5 
Comment'------~--------------
18. Settler's Other Remarks 
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Appendix .3.IA: Agencies to Modernise the Malay Economy 
(Mainly Urban Areas) 
Promoting 
~ency 
PERNAS 
(National 
Corporation) 
UDA 
(Urban 
Development 
Authority) 
MIDA 
(Malaysian 
Industrial 
Development 
Authority) 
SEDC 
(State 
Economic 
Development 
Corporation) 
BIF 
(Bumiputra 
Investment 
Foundation) 
Ye.;:;r 
Created .. 
1970 
1971 
1970 
1971 
1978 
Main Functions 
~ Accelerates Malays'a involvement in 
modem sector activities and trains 
high-level professional staff to 
manage firms in manufacturing, foreign 
trade, mining and construction; and 
- Invests in joint-venture projects 
with large foreign firms. 
.. Identifies strategic sites i.n Kuala 
Lumpur, state capitals and other major 
towns to transform them into multi-
ethnic commercial areas; and 
- Purchases or leases private commercial 
premises co facilitate Malay's 
investment in business. 
- Promotes industrial activities 
(feasibility studies, research and 
industrial technology), and assesses 
whether they fulfil the requirement 
of the dispersal policy. 
- Talces part in activities such as 
construction of houses, manufacturing 
and commercial enterprises, and 
industrial estates as well as land 
development projects; and 
- Develop land schemes of commercial 
·crops 
- Acquires reserved shares ?f enterprises 
with high growth potential. These 
shares will be held in trust and 
subsequently sold to the Malays. 
Note: a includes other indigenous people. 
_____ 2_5_7 ________ _;ir,, 
Appendix ·3,lB~ Agencies to Modernise the Maiav Economv . . 
(fot Rural Areas) 
?rox.oting 
Agency 
Bank 
Pert~.:ian ('B'Wk of 
Agriculture) 
LKIM 
(Fisheries 
Development 
Authority 
of Malaysia) 
MARDEC 
(Malaysian 
Rubber 
Development 
Corporation 
RISDA 
(Rubber 
Industry 
Smallholders 
Development 
Authority) 
LPN 
(National 
Padi and 
Rice 
Authority 
FOA 
{Farmers'· 
Organisa-
.tion 
Authority) 
Y eai-·--------~ ... 1':'"ai"""·-n-;:F.-u-n·c-...,.ti-on_s ___ .· · · ·-·,·------------
Created 
1970 
1971 
1971 
1973 
1973 
1973 
Ccordmates the fel'.-~1:t1 goveininent;s 
credit programs for ag:-~culture, with 
initital focus centred on MurL : ·.•d 
Kemubu rice scheme areas; and 
- Provides services to tobaccu planting 
and marketing, livestock raising, 
agricultural machinery, agro-based 
industries, forestry; purchase and 
development of agricultural land. 
- Promotes commercial fisheries and 
aquaculture projects, prcvides 
subsidies to small fishermen for 
equipment and materials; and 
Assists 'Fishermen Associations' or 
cooperatives with working capirnl to 
undertake trading enterprises. 
- Sets up factories to process rubber 
produce of smallholders in 
collaboration with RISDA which has 
2,000 collecting centres for purchasing 
rubber from smallholders. 
Offers replanting grants to 
smallholders; and 
- Undertakes training and extension 
programs for rubber smallholders. 
Coordinates the planting, processing 
and marketing of padi (unhasked rice 
grain) and rice; and 
Provides milling, drying and 
warehousing facilities and ensures 
sufficient supply of rice in stable 
price from producers to consumers. 
'Provides credit and other facilities 
to members for agricultural inputs., 
processing, marketing and 
extensive services; and 
Coordinates activities of rural 
institutions particularly betwe~n . . 
cooperatives and the Farmers Associations. . ..... 
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ADDENDUM1 
Growth pole theory was developed during the early 1950s from Francois Perroux's 
c~nceptuali~·uion of the nature and pattern of economic growth. According to this theory, 
big industrial firms induced linkages by acting as a 'propulsive force'. Consequently, 
multiplier effects were generated and the ~:ggregate economy bolstered. Perroux's idea 
was later extended to imply that growth could proliferate across geographical space. 
exemplified by the direct relationship of an urban centre with its hinterland. This 
relationship fonns the core of resource frontier strategies. 
Eager to boost national growth, South American country leaders were encouraged 
by the potential of growth pole theory. During th~ early 1960s, the theory was modified 
and applied adaptively in the remote frontiers in Venezuela and later, in a different form, 
.in Brazil. As the idea propagated, Malaysia incorporated it in her frontier development 
program developed by the Federal Land Development Authority (FELDA) during the 
early 1970s. Frontier development, however, involves shifting of people from one place 
to another. Hence, the settlers become the chief target in evaluating the success or failure 
of regional land schemes. As the change in income between a settler's place of origin and 
the resettled area is an important yardstick in assessing the FELDA experience in 
Malaysia, it is the focus of the thesis. 
Hence, two sets of questions arise in discussing the application of a modified 
theory whose focus shifted from urban-industrial growth poles to include rural growth 
centres of the Third World, and the income change of settlers. First: why was it 
necessary to detail the South American experience since the focus of the thesis is on 
Malaysia; and why were Malaysia's neighbours neglected in this analysis? Secondly, in 
examining the Malaysian fronrier experience: how can the survey methods be justified 
1 Most material of this addendum has also been incorporated in the revised version of the thesis. 
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when two schemes were selected for a compararive srudy and, why was ner income 
(instead of gross income) used for assessing progress? 
In tackling these two sets of issues, we have to examine how growth pole theory 
was applied in different ways in South America and explain why it is imperative to do so 
prior to the study of the Malaysian case. Contrasted case studies are taken from 
Venezuela and Brazil to set the precedent and to imply that social theories are modifiable 
when applied in human societies (Section 1). Subsequently, we explain why it was more 
logical to select two FELDA schemes at two different levels of development and why net 
income was used (Section 2). 
1. THE GROWTH POLE REVISITED 
A distinction must first be made between 'growth pole' and 'growth centre' 
because in actual practice they have different connotations. Basically, the 'growth pole' 
refers to existing or newly created urban centres whereas economic growth hinges upon 
industry as the main propulsive force. Conversely, the use of the term 'growth centre' 
has been more flexible. Since the 1960s, it has been used to denote both a major city of 
national importance (with servicer '• ~ the most prominent source of employment) and 
rural centres. In the latter case, ano · .. _.;t typically in the Third World, a rural growth 
centre relies on agriculture or small industry as its principal local employment source. 
Despite this general distinction, there are a small number of authors who have used these 
two tenns interchangeably. 
The initial application of grvwth pole theory in the developing world was a result of 
direct interventions of the 'MIT-Harvard Joint Centre for Urban Studies' in the early 
1960s. Venezuela's Guayana region became the first development package undertaken by 
John Friedmann and his North American colleagues. Their conviction then was that city 
was a 'civilising agent' which would diffuse modernisation elements to any 'under-
utilised' and 'backward' sub-national regions. Besides Venezuela, Friedmann was also 
err.ployed as a senior consultant in Brazil and Chile. Although he was not directly 
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involved in the Amazonian frontier program, his presence and the fashionable 
development ideas had clearly influenced Brazilian decision-makers to use tl":e: 
pole theory in their attempt to narrow tile gap between the more developed Centre-South 
coastal core region and the depressed N onheast. Later, in the late 1960s and the early 
1970s, this development concept was reduced to a rural agricultural strategy for the vast 
Amazon Basin. In a program called 'l?olamazonia', SUDAM (Superintendency for the 
Development of the Amazon) had conceived the idea of 'rural growth poles'2 in setting up 
agr('-r;artle and agro-mineral centres. The Brazilian model has downgraded the original 
criteria needed for an urban pole to a simple rural growth centre based on agriculture. 
Thi~ adaptation, howeve..-, had relieved the Brazilian government of financial inputs 
considerably. In comparing the different resource frontier strategies of Venezuela and 
Brazil, it paved the way for studying Malaysia's own strategy where we show how a 
development theory was conceptualised and, during impiementation, was adapted to local 
social, economic, political and ·:)i'ysical conditions. 
There was a direct link between the Friedmann package in South America and 
Malaysia -- both areas being strongly exposed to international development concepts al 
the governmental ~evel. In Malaysia, it was her main national planning agency -- the 
Econom\c Planning Unit -- which, thwugh its expatriate advisers and local senior staff, 
placed the growth centre concept on the development agenda in 1970 when the New 
Economic Policy was launched. Consequently, Malaysia's FELDA schemes have been 
incorporated into the 'rural i.irbanisation program' to inject an urban environment in rural 
settlements. Although cash cropping ag1iculture was used as the 'propulsive force', 
industry and off-farm jobs have been highlighted as important components of the 
resource frontier strategy. Consequently, the term 'major growth centre' was u~.:!d to 
designate the rngional centre of Muadzam Shah within a planned frontier region when the 
2 llinsen, N.; Higgins, B. and Savoie, D. 1988. Regional Policy in a Changing World. Plenum, New 
York (In Press). p. 361. 
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1 Pahang.Tenggara Master Plan3 was prepared in 1972. Likewise. in planning for the 
South Kelantan region, the 'Indicative Regional Plan' selected a rural settlement -- Jeli --
to act as a 'development pole' to lead the growth of its adjacent southern areas4• 
Growth centre terminology had a more direct impact on Malaysia than neighbouring 
Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines. Indeed, the use of the term 'development pole', 
'growth pole' or 'growth centre' in the official documents of those countries was either 
vague or had li.ttle meaning in describing the implementation of their frontier development 
projects. Due to budgetary constraints, their investment for infrastructure and facilities 
per household was much smaller than Malaysia. Consequently, the conceptual and 
practical link between South America and Malaysia was more coherent and vigorous than 
Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines. Hence, there is no need to elaborate their 
experience in this thesis. Thus, based on the contacts of Friedmann's development 
package, it is appropriate to use Venezuelan and Brazilian material as an essential 
introduction to the core of the thesis focu&ed on Peninsular Malaysia. 
There is, however, a weakness in the discussion ofsettlers' life in the Amazonian 
and Guayana frontier development programs. Short on local language sources and data, it 
also lacks a comparative perspective indicating how settlers' life patterns evolved before 
antl after they moved in the process of being incorpor2.ted in their respective countr/s 
frontier regional planning program. This perspective is fulfilled later when we undertake 
to study FELDA settlers in Malaysia. 
~ Dara (Pahang Tenggara Development Authority), 1972. 'Pahang Tengg~ regional ~asterplanning 
study __ The Master Plan for the development of Pahang Tenggara. Found.at1on .of :Can~da 
Engineering Corporation Limited, var Ginkel Associates Limited, A. G. Gardiner Engmeermg 
Services Limited and Charnell International Consult.ants Limited, Toronto. p. 59. 
4 Kese<lar (Kelantan Selatan Deve.lopment Authority), 1984. 'Indicative:"l!gional Plan'. Unpublished 
Repon. Kesedar Office, Gua Musang. p. 29. 
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2. JUSTIFYING THE SURVEY METHODS 
Bandar Tun Razak and Ciku are two FELDA settlements located respectively in the 
Pahang Tenggara and South Kelantan regions. They were deliberately selected from rwo 
lagging east coast states of Peninsular Malaysia to examine the long-tem1 economic and 
social sustainability of FELDA program and the consequences of Malaysia's resource 
frontier strategy initiated since 1970 -- the prime objective of the thesis. Under the Ne'" 
Economic Policy, the strategy aims at narrowing the disparity between the west and the 
east coasts by concentrating on infrastructure and productive investment in townships and 
rural centres within newly-cleared zones. 
Two Schemes 
A comparative study of two schemes is important because it shows how two areas 
planted with the same crop (oil palm) under identical type of management, but at different 
stages of development, can lead to diverse results. Thus, by explaining that settlers' 
income corresponds with yield levels of oil palm trees (according to age) and available 
secondary jobs opportunities in each area, a more comprehensive picture of changes in 
their income can be supplied. This eliminates biases arising from studying a single 
scheme. On this basis, Bandar Tun Razak, an older scheme in Pahang Tenggara, and 
Ciku, a younger scheme in the South Kelantan region, were chosen. 
Two Samples 
Bandar Tun Razak and Ciku differed substantially in popuiation si?.r. -- the former 
had an estimated 3,200 households whereas Ciku (consisting of Ciku 1 and 2) had only 
720 households. As FELDA settlers were virtually all oil palm workers after resettlement, 
a 3 per cent sample size was deemed adequate for surveying a highly homogeneous 
population. Nonetheless. to make computation easier for a comparative study, an 
identical number of households was taken for both schemes. Consequently, one hundred 
households were surveyed in each settlement, with Cik!.l having a higher density of 
sample than Bandar Tun Razak. In selecting the households, a varied SO\;io-economic 
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comparative study. 
Net or Gross Income 
Net income was used because the asses~menr of change in settlers' Ji\·ing standards 
\.vas not based on income alone but also on the change in their expenditure patterns. asset 
holdings and occupational strucmres. Us.ing this method, the life pattern:\ of settlers could 
be more accurately reflected by the acrunl amount of disposable cash. Further, the use of 
gross income would have been incompatible for a compar~Ui\'e study as 55 per cent of 
Ciku sertlers5 were still nor incorporated inro the block system whereas all Bandar Tun 
Razak settlers were block members. Under FELDA arrangements, the large income gap 
between block and non-biock members is transitory and will disappear when oil palm 
trees reach maturity in a relatively shon period of time. Thus, it is best not to use the 
gross income for our comparison purposes. The difference between gross and net 
incomes, however, is reflected in the capital gains of seulers; it is acknowledged in both 
Chapters 5 and 6. These capital gains are a 4-hectare oil palm plot and a houselot which 
the settlers will eventually own after repaying loan inscalments to FELDA for 15 years. 
5 These non-block members received an income much lower than block members (less i.han half.in we.·· ..... 
case of Ciku). Their remuneration was based on the number of workdays and the outpul of palrrt ·. 
fruits. They were not required to start loan repayment as yel. · 
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